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SMITH: We have a full committee hearing this morning to discuss the fiscal year 2021 national defense authorizing budget request for the Department of Navy--of the Navy and we are joined by three witnesses this morning the Honorable Thomas Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations and General David Berger, the Commandant for the U.S. Marine Corps. Gentlemen, thank you all for being here appreciate your willingness to testify and also your service to our country all of the work that you do to help make sure that we have the strongest--strongest military we possibly can and meet our national security objectives.
We kicked off our posture hearing season yesterday with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I think got a pretty--pretty good overview of the overall budget, and now we are going to work our way through piece by piece, and I think the most interesting thing is what the Department of Defense has undertaken that I know you all are participating in as well that is come to be called the--the blank slate review basically an effort to look at everything that we are doing in the military and reassess, figure out where we can potentially save money, where we should spend more and how we need to realign our priorities to make sure that they match up with the national security strategy that was put in place over a year ago now I believe.
The overarching theme of that is the notion of--of great power competition and the reemergence of that which reemerged a while ago but dealing with Russia and China and how that enabled how--how we should realign our forces and realign our defense priorities to--to meet that challenge, and I think that is the most difficult question and one that we definitely want to hear from all of you today in terms of how it is specifically impacts the Navy and Marine Corps. What do you need to do differently, where are you short assets, where can assets be transferred from, and how do we balance all of those complex needs, and the great challenge here, of course, is we--we do not have infinite resources. The budget is what the budget so if we come to you and say we want you to do more here logically, you are going to have to do less somewhere else.
I--I do realize that efficient these are part of that. We discussed a little bit yesterday they move toward an audit trying to make sure that we create greater efficiency in the acquisition and procurement process, I know Ranking Member Thornberry has done an enormous amount of work on that. All of that done we still have to make choices within the budget, and you gentlemen are in a position to best understand those choices and why you have maybe ones you have, so hearing from you how you prioritize where you want the money spent is going to be enormously important.
We are specifically concerned, and I know Congressman Courtney will express these concerns better than I can about some of the reductions in the shipbuilding accounts and money that apparently was transferred around in the president's budget at the last minute that among other things required the reduction of one attack submarine how we are going to meet those needs and overall in that area I am interested in we--we have been talking about a 355-ship Navy I think for the entire time that I have been in Congress I think they had a different number when I started, but I forget what that number was.
It is almost meaningless at this point since it is like 20, 30 years that were going to try to get to that number. What I am more interested in is what do we have now, what are we likely to have the next five years, how does it meet our needs and how we plan for the future. It is great to have goals, I suppose, and we can aspire toward that number, but at the point--at this point, it seems like just that an aspiration doesn't translate necessarily into a strategy so more interested in how the short-term strategy works on that front.
So we look forward to your testimony, and we have many questions, and it will help inform us as we get ready to produce the National Defense Authorizing Act this year, and with that, I turn it over to the ranking member Mr. Thornberry for the opening comments he has.
THORNBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming our witnesses today and also thanking each of them for their service and their many contributions to the country's defense.
As--as Chairman referenced, there was considerable conversation yesterday with the Secretary and the Chairman about Navy shipbuilding. It was interesting to me one of the benefits they Chairman and I have as we get to be here from the front until the beginning to the end of these hearings and--and while there was a lot of concern about this year's budget as the conversation evolved there seemed to be more questions about okay, where's the Navy headed in a longer-term sense, not just numbers of ships but characteristics of ships and capabilities and so forth. And so I do think members are interested to get that sort of where we are headed and--and that will enable us to do a better job not only this year but in the future.
And similarly, reference was made to potential changes coming to the Marine Corps and so I--I think while we will focus of course on this year's budget as the Chairman referenced changes in warfare moving from as much emphasis on counterterrorism toward great power competition means that all of the services will have to make some changes probably--maybe your two as much as any. So we look forward to hearing from you and again, thanks for being here.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Modly?
MODLEY: Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts on behalf of our sailors, Marines, and civilians in the Department of the Navy. It is a true honor for me to be here today with Admiral Gilday and General Berger, both of whom have demonstrated great commitment to each other and to each other's respective naval service as they have worked collaboratively to lead our integrated American naval force.
Consistent with that spirit we have taken a different approach to the written testimony this year as you have received, we have submitted one unified document instead of three separate statements and staying ahead in today's rapidly changing global strategic environment demands that our Naval forces commit to unified planning, clear-eyed assessments and sometimes in very, very hard choices. In this process, we must harmonize competing priorities, sustain our critical industrial base and not allow our maritime competitive advantage to erode relative to global competitors and more accurately stated aggressive adversaries who wish to hasten our decline as a global force for liberty and decency around the world.
In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of the hard choices we had to make this year, but it is essentially about our sailors and Marines, their safety and their security and their well-being and their families. Ultimately I ask that you recognize that in this submission, we could not make trades that put our sailors and Marines on platforms and with equipment that are not ready for a fight if that fight is what is required of them. While this budget does slow our trajectory to a force of 355 ships or more, it does not arrest it. You have my personal assurance that we are so deeply committed to building that larger, more capable, more distributed naval force within what I consider a strategically relevant time frame of no more than 10 years. I look forward to working with this committee and the entire Congress in the coming months as we develop realistic plans to do so.
Our budget also demonstrate a clear commitment to the education of our people as we implement the recommendations of the Education for Seapower study that I led while serving as the Undersecretary of the Navy for the last two years. We are establishing a naval community college for our enlisted personnel as part of a bold and unified naval education strategy that recognizes that the intellectual and ethical development of our people is going to be the most critical element of our success as a naval force. We're also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn commitment or military families through significantly more engaged oversight and accountability of our public-private venture housing program.
Finally I would like this committee to understand that as leaders of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and united in our determination to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment throughout our force. Every sailor, every Marine, and every Navy civilian deserves individual dignity, respect, and protection from this great naval institution that we have the honor to lead. We have a lot of work to do in this regard, but you have my personal commitment that we take it very, very seriously, and we are going after it every day.
We are grateful to the committee for passing this year's NDAA which enables many of the priorities identified within this document. In passing this legislation, you have sent a strong signal of support to our people and a stern warning to our adversaries around the world. We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability of the last several years; this has saved a lot of money for the American taxpayers and given our force the flexibility and agility to address emerging threats while investing in our integrated force.
We urge this committee to do what it can to continue the stability in the future so that we can implement the reforms and investments required to meet the great power challenges we face, protect the maritime commons and defend the United States of America. Thank you for your time, and we look forward to your questions. Thank you.
SMITH: Thank you. Admiral Gilday, do you--were you going to make a statement? We were--
SMITH: Okay, good. Okay.
GILDAY: Chairman Smith--
SMITH: --If you could be sure and pull the microphone down in front of you there.
GILDAY: Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguish members of the committee, good morning. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today with Secretary Modly and General Berger and for your enduring support of the Navy/Marine Corps team. I'd also like to point out that my wife, Linda, joins me this morning.
I'll be brief, sir. I like to address some of the points that both of you made in your opening statements, and this really gets down to priorities. So, in our budget submission for this year, the Navy has four priorities. The first is to fully fund the Columbia class submarine. So, that nuclear seaborne deterrent that this nation depends upon is aging out. By the time we replace the Ohio hole, it'll have 42 years in the water. And so, we need to deliver Columbia on time for its first patrol in 2031.
Numbers two and three are readiness and lethality. We are catching up and closing gaps that we have created over the past 15 to 20 years. And so, in order to come to this committee and ask for more money for a larger fleet, we need to make sure that we can maintain and sustain the fleet that we have. And so, those are two priorities for us and our budget reflects that.
In terms of lethality, we are closing gaps against near peer competitors by investing in capabilities that have range and that have speed. 21 percent of our budget is invested in closing those gaps against our near peer competitor. All the time--while we're doing those top three parties, we are still investing in capacity. The size of the fleet is growing. It's just not growing at the pace that some would prefer.
And meet those priorities, we've had to make some hard choices inside the Navy, and that includes decommissioning some legacy platforms that don't bring lethality to the fight. So, with those comments, sir, I thank you again for your time this morning.
SMITH: Thank you. General Berger?
BERGER: (OFF-MIC) appreciate the opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and the priorities for our future. And I'll start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday's thanks for timely funding, as well as your enduring commitment to Marines, sailors, and their families through efforts like the hurricane recovery effort and funding that you provided last year, and the revision to the public-private venture housing program. Your bipartisan support is critical to ensure that we continued to prioritize people as our greatest resource.
Thanks to predictable funding, over the past few years your Marine Corps has made significant progress in restoring both availability and readiness. We are now at an inflection point. We have to pivot now toward modernization while sustaining the readiness that this committee has resourced. This pivot, in my opinion, cannot wait until next year or the following. We must move now or risk overmatch in the future by an adversary, and that is a risk we will not take.
As the National Defense Strategy directs and as Secretary Modly recently emphasized in his first a vector to all hands, we must pursue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines have always sensed when it's time to move out smartly. We don't hesitate. This is that time. Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance requires acknowledging fundamental changes in the operating environment, and that means how we must train, organize, and equip the force. I believe most leaders recognize that significant changes are required, yet the scope and pace of necessary change is seemingly at odds with some historical resource allocations and major acquisition programs which predate the National Defense Strategy.
This budget submission marks the beginning for the Marine Corps of a focused effort to better align resources with strategic objectives. Our future budget submissions will build on these investment decisions with informed recommendations for force design modifications and adjustment to our programs of record. Together, in partnership with Admiral Gilday and under the direction of Secretary Modly, we are committed to delivering the integrated naval and Marine forces that our nation requires.
As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our findings along the way and keep each of you and your staffs informed as we progress. We will be frugal with the resources we are given. We will ask for no more than we need. With Congress's commitment and support, we will ensure your Marines continue to have every advantage when we send them into harm's way. I look forward to your questions.
SMITH:Thank you, General. Could you, as a starting point, quantify for us the readiness gains, where we're at, where we've come to, how much further we need to go? Taking your point on the--on the procurement needs now that are--that are paramount, explain to is where you're at--at in readiness, where you were, where you're at, where you think you need to be.
BERGER: Chairman, if I--I'll probably just use a couple examples, first of all TacAir, fixed wing aviation. Three years ago, if memory serves me right, we were in the mid to upper 50s across the F-18 and Harrier communities, and we were just introducing the F-35. And 50 percent is not the readiness that you all expect. Last year, the goal that the secretary outlined and we both strode towards was 80 percent, and we in fact achieved that. We would never have made that without the resources that Congress provided.
Ground side, similar--similar picture. Because Iraq and Afghanistan, we had rode our forces--our equipment pretty hard and we had postponed maintenance. The last two or three years, we have recovered that.
SMITH: Terrific. Thank you. Admiral, could you help me out with the 355 ship thing? What--what--I think it is really important, as the ranking member pointed out, you know, one of the capabilities we need? What are the specific types of ship? How do you sort of balance that focus in terms of what types of ships your building, what capabilities you need, with the oft stated goal of having 355 ships? And when is it--I forget that the date when we're supposed to achieve that number. How does--out of those two things mash in terms of your plans? I don't think your mic--there we go.
GILDAY: To your point, it is about capabilities. And so, when we take a look at what we need--what we need the Navy as part of the joint force, we're taking a look at what unique capabilities the Navy can bring to the fight that other services can't. And so, it is a--it is a analytical approach within the Pentagon to try and make the best in vase--investments now to close capability gaps against the--against both the Chinese and the Russians.
So, couple of examples of the Navy in terms of the air wings that are embarked on aircraft carriers, so no other--no other place in the military do we have an airfield that I can move 700 miles a day and at the same time provide the integrated capability of early warning, electronic attack, and anti-submarine warfare, air to ground, air to air, and logistics. All the while, I have a self-sustaining platform that, again, is mobile.
At the same time, we bring unique capabilities with respect to ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare on our destroyers and with our submarines as well. And so, those fold in--into that joint mix in terms of what the Navy--what the Navy can contribute to the joint fight, and that translates platforms.
And so simply, that's--that's kind of the quadratic appraise--equation that yields a number of ships, but it also takes into account attrition models in a fight. It also takes into account one of the missions we need to conduct around the globe in accordance with the National Defense Strategy, so that would include deterring a near--another near peer competitor conventionally, strategically, being able to respond to additional threats, assuring allies and partners. Those--those also fold into the equation, as well as a--as a strategic reserve bench in case we do get into a--
SMITH: --So, sorry, to--but what's the point of the 355 goal? Mr. Modly, if you want to take it--
MODLY: --Mr. Chairman, do you mind if I address this question? So, it--it's--it's not a--it's not a random number. It's a number that was--that's basically benchmarked off of a study that was done in 2016, the force structure assessment.
SMITH: But when--when is it that we're saying that we're going to need the 355 ships?
MODLY: I'm sorry, sir. I didn't--
SMITH: --When--when are we planning on--
MODLY: --Well, it's--it's my objective to try to get us there within 10 years. That is the--that is the strategy I'm trying to drive through, and it's not just a random number. It's driven by strategy. It's driven by the capabilities we think we need. I will also say it's--it's improper for us to be benchmarking against a static number. What we're trying to develop in the Department of the Navy is more of an iterative process to look at that number so that we can understand how we might adjust certain ship categories based on how we perceive the security environment evolving. The security environment is not static. We have to develop a force that's agile, that we can quickly adjust certain ship categories as they--as we see that we need them.
We just completed a integrated force structure assessment that was led by the commandant and the CNO for the first time together, trying to determine, as we look at that future security environment in a 10 year horizon, and we have to take it with some real--reality here, because it takes a long time to get ships designed and built and into an industrial base that can support it. But in the 10 year horizon, as we look at those numbers again, they actually end up increasing. And--but the mix is different.
So, what I'm trying to emphasize is that it--it--it's--the 355 was pegged at 28 force structure assessment that was done four years ago. We're trying to develop a process in the Navy where we constantly look at this, constantly iterate this, give good signals to industry so they can adjust with us.
SMITH: Understood. One last question on that. So, looking at that 10 year goal, how does the money that was--
SMITH: taken out of shipbuilding that cost us that submarine number one in this budget which was not in the original President's budget that was taken out as I understand it to fund the NNSA at a higher level. How does that plus the cuts that you are now facing from the money being reprogrammed for the wall, the programs that are cut, how do those things impact your ability to meet those goals?
MODLY: Well, to be frank it's not helpful because it takes a ship out of a plan that we are driving towards. It particularly is--is harmful in the sense that it takes a ship about of a category of ship for which we are going to have a hard time getting to in the way. We feel like we need to have at least 66 attack submarines. Even on the 10 year trajectory based on industrial base capacity we think we can get to about 49 or 50 so it takes out one. If we can get to 48 instead of 49 bad impacts that number but that--so of course in the ship that comes out of the process of in any given year is going to impact our ability to get there as quickly as I would like to.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Thornberry?
THORNBERRY: As--as I look at the numbers the shipbuilding account is down what, about $4 billion from the last year and the readiness O&M account for the Navy is up about $3.6 billion from last year, basically the same the cuts and the increases so could either of you Mr. Secretary or Admiral give us--give me a little deeper explanation for why the emphasis needs to be in your view on the O&M part this year?
MODLY: I will take it initially and then I will turn it over to the CNO(SP) but I think what I tried to-- what I'd tried to basically state in my opening statement was we did make that trade. It was an intentional trade because our decision was that at this particular time because of the readiness hold that we had fallen into over many, many years we needed to address that first and foremost because that the immediately impacts the safety and security of these sailors and Marines that we put out on these platforms. I--we could not in good conscience trade that money for more ships that could not operate properly with the right equipment and with the right readiness and so that is the trade we made.
We have to looks now as we look from 20 to forward how do we afford this larger Navy and maintain the readiness and those are the challenges and that is being pressurized by a lot of things such as the Columbia recapitalization which is a necessary part of--a necessary part of our national security but we are looking internally to see what we can do to look at our own budget first to see what we can do to find additional funds to drive that and I will--
THORNBERRY: And Admiral as--as you describe this can you give us--you've got what, ships that are not deployable? Kind of what is this readiness priority in a practical concrete way?
GILDAY: Yes, sir. So big picture I believe we need a Navy that is ready, that is capable and lethal more than we need a bigger Navy that is less readying, less capable, less lethal. And so the money that we are putting into the readiness accounts specifically if we talk about manpower so when I commanded a destroyer we had over 300 sailors on the destroyer. We went down to 245. We had collisions in the Pacific, we learned a lot, lessons learned in blood. We are now buying that manpower back where we had 265 this year we will come out to 285 in those destroyers in 2023 as an example.
We have gaps at sea, those gaps need to be filled so our ships are fully man for all of the reasons that you--that you well know. So we are buying back those people. There are years when the Navy has shed it people faster than we should ships and the size of the Navy has declined since I have been in uniform in 1985. But the people piece is where you can get money fast and it is a really attractive place to go after money and we are saying we are not going to do that; we are going to buy back that manpower that we know that we need on our ships.
In terms of training for that manpower what we also learned from those coalitions we--we need to do a much better job of training our sailors at sea. We have put significant investments in live virtual training as an example, simulators that are world-class than we have those at all of our fleet concentration areas.
In terms of--in terms of modernization so we are modernizing our ships. We have taken a holiday for a while in--in keeping up with a--70% of the fleet that we have today we are going to have in 2030 and so we have to take care of that fleet. So in terms of modernization we are putting new systems on their to make--to make our ships more lethal and we are filling the magazines with weapons and the investments we are making in weapons are those that have range and speed. So for years we have invested in defense of systems because we haven't had a hot breath down the back of our neck now that hot breath is China. So we are closing those gaps. That essentially sir, I hope answered your question on why that is where the focus is at the expense of growing a Navy at a--at a precipitous pace and so--
THORNBERRY: Let me just ask one of their question. Lots of flak yesterday about not having a 30 year shipbuilding plan come with the budget. Any idea when we might see such a thing?
MODLY: Representative Thornberry the--the issue with a 30 year shipbuilding plan is that we developed this integrated force structure assessment and we presented it to the Secretary of defense, he wanted some time and some space to look at that, analyze it and understand how that would impact a 30 year shipbuilding plan so unfortunately it was a confluence of events this year that we did not--we submitted our budget the force structure assessment was delivered and we didn't have time to really iterate that, talk to him about it, test it before we submitted a 30 year shipbuilding plan but we will work with him hopefully by--in a couple of months we will be able to submit that.
THORNBERRY: Okay. Thank you.
SMITH: So two quick things before we go to the rest of the questioning. First of all we have a fiveminute clock for everyone and the witnesses need to be helpful to me. Once you get down close to that five minutes if you could try to wrap up so that I don't have to interrupt you that would be great. Second, Mr. Garamendi--Garamendi has an introduction he wants to do quickly.
GARAMENDI: If I might, thank you Mr. Chairman. Very quickly the 75th anniversary of Erie Shema is upon us. Wondering into my office today is a 98-year-old veteran of Erie Shema Purple Heart, Clinton(SP) (INAUDIBLE) is down here in the front row. His unit was the first on the beach, and engineering unit. He was wounded in that battle and I would like to welcome him and general, not he said he's got a few things he can tell you about how to do it right.
(LAUGHTER)
(APPLAUSE)
SMITH: Thank you very much sir. Thank--mag--thank you, John.
GARAMENDI: He was just recently given his new license from the California Department of vehicles Highway Patrol caught him a couple of days after that traveling at over 100 miles an hour and when the highway patrolman said do you how fast he was going he said yes, 2 miles an hour over my age.
SMITH: Thank you. On that note Ms. Davis?
DAVIS: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you for your service to our country and certainly for being with us today. I wanted to go back to the issue that we--we began talking about yesterday and as--as you may know I had asked General Milley about the cut to the Virginia class submarine, we have reference that already today, to increase nuclear weapons programs and he said that while he supported fully funding the nuclear arsenal the last minute change was not supported by his best military advice and I know that has been mentioned it again. Could--could you share your thoughts about that so we have a better understanding about how that occurred? I was addressing that to the admiral but Mr. Secretary do you--
MODLY: Ma'am, I was not directly involved in those discussion. It happened at budget endgame very quickly and we were informed after the decision was made.
DAVIS: Okay. And Mr. Secretary I think you addressed it.
MODLY: Exactly the way it happened. Thank you.
DAVIS: Okay thank you. Thank you very much. That is helpful and may be further discussions about how again Congress can play a stronger role in that as well.
In--in this budget shipbuilding has also seen cuts in logistics and support vessels like oilers and I wonder if you could talk about the way forward with those programs as well. Where are we? Where should we be going?
GILDAY: Yes, ma'am, thanks. As you probably know we have a new class of oil or that we are building and will reach its initial operating capability in just a couple of years. So we are replacing an aging fleet of oilers we are also beginning to make investments in strategic sealift and so that is another area of the budget just like the Columbia class summary, just like our infrastructure is sure where we haven't made significant investments in a while.
So the Congress has given us the authorities to buy used vessels and so we are buying two used vessels in 2021 and the authority is to buy up to seven of those. At the same time we are doing R&D in a new class of a--of affordable sealift platform. At the same time we did service life extension on six of our older ships last year. We are going to double that this year and we are going to triple that next year in 21 with this request. I hope that answers your question, ma'am, in terms--
DAVIS: Sure and you feel that that is going to get us where we need to be?
GILDAY: No, ma'am. So--
DAVIS: Okay, so we need to be.
GILDAY: So we--we take a look at pressure points within our top line and that is among them. We are giving it attention but it is just a long time
GILDAY: to catch up with that aging fleet, given its size.
DAVIS: Thank you. The Navy, as you know has been offering unmanned systems and has developed multiple programs of record systems that were never yielded. In FY '21, the Navy proposed the serial production of the large unmanned surface vessel before prototyping and testing are complete. Considering the history, is it prudent to continue serial production of large unmanned surface vessels before the prototyping and testing are complete? Mr. Secretary, you want to answer?
MODLY: Yes, absolutely. I--well, we--we have to--we have to really accelerate our investment in unmanned platforms, and that's what we're trying to do. And we're trying to do it on a--at a reasonable pace so that we can understand how these technologies might work and, more importantly, how they might operate together.
So, without having the platforms, it's very difficult for us to do that type of testing, that type of integrated testing that we would be to do. So, we are--we are proceeding, we think, in a--in a somewhat cautious pace to do this. But it's absolutely going to be part of whatever future for structure we have, and so we need to start experimenting with concepts, understanding how the technology will work.
DAVIS: Thank you. You know that the Navy struggles to forecast ship depot maintenance, that's a big, tough issue for everybody, and has recently requested congressional approval to cover approximately $1 billion of shortfalls in this account. This creates unpredictability, of course, for industry and diminishes Congress's confidence that the Navy is effectively managing this huge and critical enterprise. What are you doing to better predict the schedule and cost of ships and submarines maintenance availabilities?
GILDAY: Ma'am--I'm mindful of the time, Mr. Chairman--but--so as you point out, we've had challenges with depot level maintenance on our ships. Most recently, we've only been able to get about 30 percent to 35 percent of our ships out of the shipyards on time.
That's been a priority of the Navy to turn that around. We want to reduce 80 percent of our delay days this year. Right now, 63 percent of our ships are coming out of maintenance on time through '20, and we want to eliminate all those delays by the end of '21.
So it's--very aggressively, we've done a lot of analytical work. We found out, as an example, that most of the--many of the delays, about 25 percent, could be attributed to four--poor forecasting and planning up front. That's our fault in the Navy. And so, we took a round turn on that.
Additionally, we're taking a look at bundling contracts for private–
SMITH: --And we will have to leave it at that. Mr. Wilson?
DAVIS: Thank you.
SMITH: Mr. Wilson is recognized for five minutes.
WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for being here. And I particularly appreciate you being here. I'm a grateful Navy dad, and I have a son who's been an orthopedic surgeon and serving today, has previously served in Iraq with the SEALS and the Rangers, so we just appreciate our family being part of the Navy family.
Additionally, Secretary Modly, the National Defense Strategy lays out the--rebuilding military readiness as we face a more lethal joint force as a distinct line of effort. The Navy's FY '21 request for F-35 joint strike fighters include five less than last year and six less than FY '19. Topping the Navy's unfunded priorities list, however, is $525.5 million for five F- 35C carrier variants. How is the naval readiness and ultimately military readiness impacted by these aircraft not being funded, and what is the Navy's plan to compensate for the shortfall?
MODLY: Well, as you know, sir, we--we did put that in it. It's the number two item on our unfunded priorities list. We would obviously love to have those aircraft. But, again, at the--at--and when we got into the final budget deliberations, we felt that we could trade that without severely impacting our readiness over the long-term and--and try to pick it up in future years.
WILSON: Thank you. And--and General Berger, I previously represented Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort. And one of the great achievements was--for that community that just really loves the Marine Corps Air Station, they love the sound of freedom, all right, when it flies over. They do not complain. And so, that's why they help recruit and support to be located there.
By replacing the fourth generation planes at Beaufort with fifth generation aircraft, what is the current process and what challenges do you foresee?
BERGER: Sir, 2.5 years ago, we sent the first squadron to Iwakuni. Last year, they went on ship--or year and a half ago they went on ship. We are--we're moving fast. In our view, comparing the--the Harrier against the F-35 is--is pretty striking. And all you need to do is listen to the media in the Indo Pacific on the other side to find out what the impact of a squadron of F- 35s on board a--on board an amphibious ship float--floating around out there is no--no difference--or no--there's no comparison.
In Beaufort and on the East and West Coast, moving as fast as we can to get out of F-18s and Harriers and into F-35's, that is our goal.
WILSON: Well, we appreciate it. And they are--if ever there is a community that will welcome it, it's Beaufort, South Carolina and the state of South Carolina.
And Admiral Gilday, I'm grateful that the Navy is fielding W76-2 low yield warheads. Earlier this month, the Nuclear Posture Review identifies a requirement to modify a small number of submarine launched ballistic missile warheads to combat potential adversaries with low yield nuclear weapons for peace through strength. However, the W76-2 is one of two variants of the W76, which just completed its service life extension program.
These systems will require modernization in the coming years as their cores are increasingly older. What steps is the Navy taking to ensure the seamless modernization of these systemsand to ensure that the naval readiness is not impacted by giving--by the growing nuclear threat?
GILDAY: Yes, sir. Thanks for the question about low--low yield nuclear weapons. We--we are making investments right now in--in--in modernizing--modernizing our--our nuclear weapons inventory. And so, that's an included in that--in that plan. That'll take a number of years in order to close, but it is included.
WILSON: Well, we--I particularly appreciate it because I know the--the Savannah River Nuclear Laboratory is--is very vital and very, again, enthusiastic to work with you.
Sadly, in 2017, I visited the Fitzgerald in Japan, which so many American sailors were tragically and, to me, just shockingly killed. What lessons have we learned? What steps have we taken to avoid any further accidents such as the Fitzgerald and McCain?
GILDAY: Yes, sir. I know you're aware of the comprehensive review we've done and the phases we've gone through in order to institutionalize what we learn from both of those collisions. I will actually be traveling to Pascagoula, Mississippi tomorrow, and I'll be aboard the Fitzgerald and we're going to talk about many of those issues.
WILSON: And I hope every effort is made for an early warning advance system to--to--for the best for our sailors.
GILDAY: Sir, we–
WILSON: --Thank you, and I'm–
GILDAY: --Yes–
WILSON: --Grateful to be--yield the balance of my time.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Langevin?
LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger for being here today, for your testimony and all that you do on behalf of our nation.
I want to begin by lauding your efforts with the recent Education for Seapower Study to enhance professional military education and increase opportunities for our enlisted sailors and Marines to earn accredited technical degrees. I think it's absolutely essential that we continue to educate all of our service members wherever possible and providing them these opportunities. It was a big priority for a former chairman of this committee, Doug Skelton, who believe greatly in professional military education. And it's something that has stuck with me during my time here in the--on the committee.
On another topic, I appreciate both the chairman and my--my colleague, Ms. Davis, for raising the concern about the--the cut to the Virginia class submarine in this year's presidential budget. I don't think this is a time that we should be cutting it. It does concern me, Admiral, that that decision was aft--made after the fact and a--and not, it seems, with your--with your input. That does not inspire confidence here that we are making decisions based on our--our military needs versus what some may be doing with playing around with budget numbers.
But that being said, Secretary Modly, in your recent vector 12, you--you emphasize the importance of a continued increase undersea dominance for the long run. The most, obviously, survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the Columbia class submarine, is--is essential to that mission. My question, Secretary Modly or Admiral Gilday, is the Columbia class submarine vital for our success in great power competition? And would you agree that the Columbia class submarine is a strategic asset that will benefit more than just the Navy?
MODLY: Sir, I absolutely agree that it is probably the most vital part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. The current force is aging and has to be modernized. So, that is why it's number one on our priority in terms of as we--as we looked at this budget and how we intended to roll it out. It is going to be even more relevant in a more complicated world with powers who have greater ability to project power both under the sea and other areas and so it is absolutely vital to our future and that is why it is such a priority for us in our budget.
LANGEVIN: So this asset will carry 70 percent of the--the nuclear arsenal and yet the Navy seems to be the only one covering the bill. Secretary Modly or Admiral Gilday do you believe that the maybe is shouldering a disproportionate share for this--for this asset?
MODLY: Well, we--we work under the top line that we are given to work on her, sir, and so that is how we are managing it. We prioritize it. I think there are a lot of discussions being held both in the halls here and other places about how we might come up with more creative ways to fund that program because frankly it is putting a huge pressure on our shipbuilding budget. It is 25 percent now, it is going to escalate to 31 percent and if we also have this goal of growing to 355 or I like to say 355+ we are not going to be able to do all of those things. So we are looking, we are digging hard inside our own budget to see where we can free up dollars for this. There may be some creative ways to look at unexpired or unused or unobligated funds to try and fun that but we are looking at every possible way to do that but we can't abandon it so.
LANGEVIN: I would agree and I think you would find support here on the committee. We need to get creative because this is a national strategic asset and I don't think we should be taking it just out of the shipbuilding budget. But to this point what steps are you and OSD taking to ensure the Columbia class submarines procurement timeline remains less volatile than our current experience with Virginia class? Admiral Gilday I am glad to hear you talk about how we are committed to fully funding Columbia but what--what are the steps we are taking to make sure that procurement timeline stays on track?
GILDAY:
Probably the best example I can give you Congressman is the fact that we began building the submarine later this year, 83 percent of that summary will be designed. If I compare that against Ohio 2 percent of that submarine was designed when we started building it. Virginia class less than half of that submarine was completed designed by the time we started building it. So it is vitally important for the reasons stated previously to stay on the timeline to begin its first patrol in 2031 that we absolutely remain focused on it. And--and the teamwork with the shipyards is absolutely critical here in order to stay - make stay on that timeline as well.
SMITH: Thank you gentlemen. Mr. Rogers?
ROGERS: Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you all for your service and for your availability today. Admiral Gilday to address a gap in homeland defense due to program cancellations missile Defense agency is looking at a regional defense system to serve as an underlayer to the GMD system. Specifically they are looking at the ages the shore using the SM3 block 2a missiles(SP). How will that impact your BMD mission?
GILDAY: Sir, it would--it would allow us to use BMD capable ships for other missiles--for other missions besides defending the homeland and so it would give--I think it would give more flexibility to senior decision-makers in terms of how they would use those assets if that gap were covered with a land-based Aegis system with essentially the same capability as the ships.
ROGERS: Well, I--I am glad you mentioned the land-based system. Has there been discussion about moving the Aegis ashore from the Navy to the Army given that there is talk about expanding that capability?
GILDAY: Sir, not that I am aware of.
ROGERS: Great. Over the last decade we have seen significant growth in the Chinese battle fleet and they have surpassed the United States now as the largest Navy. We are seeing significant investments by both Russia and North Korea in their submarine technologies and capacity. How do you compete with that?
GILDAY: Sir, so I go back to the priorities right in terms of making sure that the fleet we have today 70 percent of which we are going to have in 2030 is ready--ready and capable to fight. 21 percent of our budget is focused on lethality and modernization so that we have weapons that can actually out stick our adversaries with great speed and that includes doubling our investment in hypersonic sense so we are working very closely with the Army and the Air Force as we develop not only the airframe that we should be again doing testing here together very soon but also the warheads.
ROGERS: Thank you. General Berger you talked in your opening statement about this being an inflection point and that we can't waste time, we have to start acting now but when I look at your PB 21 numbers I don't see much difference between PB 20. What am I missing? If we have really got to do something now why is it not reflected in larger numbers in the PB 21?
BERGER: This year is--is the pivot. This budget was largely built in July and August based on our annual fiscal cycles so I could fit some things, I could change some things but not the significant ones that we need to make. In 22 and 23 it will be significantly more but even in this one, even in this one there is investments and things like ground-based anti-ship missiles that you wouldn't have seen a couple of years ago at all but this is the direction the integrated force must go.
ROGERS: Great. In your written testimony you also talk to about an acquisition review of legacy programs, you also talked about F 35 the joint light tactical vehicle and the amphibious combat vehicle and others and you said you may have to turn loose of some legacy programs. When do you think that review is going to be complete and ready for you to take action?
BERGER: I think much like the integrated force structure assessment in terms of ships it is not going to be ever over because we have an adversary that is moving so we have completed the first round of it. We know the size of the Marine Corps that we are going to be we think in 10 years from now and much of the capabilities and capacities are driven by the size of your force. We will need to make adjustments to the programs of record based on a couple of things. First, the size of the Marine Corps. We don't--we are not going to waste the resources you give us. Second, the threat. We have to match--we have to maintain and over match all along. So as long as we are in great power competition we are going to gauge off of a pacing threat which means we are going to increase decrease.
ROGERS: From our previous conversations I very much like the aggressive approach that you are taking. I am just wondering when we are going to start seeing you take the knife out and start taking some action. Will that be in the 22 budget or what?
BERGER: This year in this budget we reduced the manpower the equivalent of a couple thousand Marines. That probably won't be the largest one or the last. Why? I think every service chief would love to have a bigger force but you need us to be lethal, you need us to be mobile, you need us to be integrated with the Navy so we are going to reduce the size of the Marine Corps some this year, more next year. You will see the impacts to programs I think later this summer and into the spring of next year but again it will be a--it is not a snapshot in time where we hurries or else--or else an evil thing threat will stare at a signpost and he will be moved.
ROGERS: I like your leadership on this. Thank you. I yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Larsen?
LARSEN: Thank you. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday the FY 2020 NDAA included a provision that required the (INAUDIBLE) to conduct a real time sound monitoring at no fewer than two Navy installations and their associated outlying landing fields and so have a very parochial interest there trying to deal some issues around (INAUDIBLE) would be island(SP) and OLF(SP) but I think this is a good compromise step moving away from the traditional model that we have used and moved to real-time noise monitoring. The plan though for additional monitoring is due to Congress by March 20 according to the language in the--i the law. So is the Navy planning to submit that plan to Congress on time?
MODLY: Sir, my understanding that they are wrapping up that study and it is on track to be delivered on time.
LARSEN: So the plan--the plan for the study is due on March 20 and then implementation then would–
MODLY: That's right.
LARSEN: --would occur. So you are saying by March 20 we will see--we will have the plan?
MODLY: I have not heard anything otherwise in terms of our ability. I will check into that for sure and get back to you, sir.
LARSEN: Yeah, earlier is better certainly so--so then with that plan I then assume that the Navy is prepared to begin implementing the real time monitoring soon after?
MODLY: Sir, I--I will get back to you on that one, sir. I was just reading about that this morning that they were preparing this plan--preparing to deliver this plan but I have not seen it yet so once I know more of the details I will get back to you on that, sir.
LARSEN: Good. Thank you very much. We will be in touch. Appreciate that. And then second for Secretary or Admiral you can choose really the EPA's signed interim guidance in December providing recommendations to address groundwater contaminated with PFAS and PFOS(SP) and we have had this debate here and of course can we have the issue on would be island and will note the Navy's commitment to would be island has been great in helping the city of Coupeville(SP) deal with their wells situation but we still have groundwater issues there. Is the--is the Navy following the EPA guidance, continuing to follow the EPA guidance?
GILDAY: Sir, so we finished our investigations and in areas like Coupeville where we found contamination we have taken steps for example to provide suitable drinking water from other sources. We have money in the budget this year, about $60 million to address cleanup and so we are moving through cleanup in 20 and 21. So in both 20 and 21 we have money towards cleanup. In the last report that I
GILDAY: saw that we were on track to conduct that cleanup on time.
LARSEN: Excellent. We'll follow up with you on that, too. There may be some--I think every community is unique, and we have some unique issues there at NAS Whidbey Island and Coupeville, as well, so we'll follow up with you on that. Appreciate that. The third question I have has to do with the readiness--readiness question, especially as it applies to the F-18s, specifically the G's, the Growlers at NAS Whidbey Island, and again it's a Growler question, but what is the--given the percentages you've outlined with the E's and F's, do you know the readiness level of the G's?
GILDAY: Yes, sir, it's over 60 percent right now. What we've--we've learned a lot from what we've done with the Super Hornets, right, the E's and the F's. And so we were at 50--we could not break 55 percent mission capable aircraft for a decade, and so we took a deep look at our processes, and we're applying those same to our ships' maintenance. So we've now been sustaining above 80 percent for four or five months. So we're applying those same processes to every type, model, series, aircraft in the inventory. So I expect that the Growler numbers will come up. They're headed in the right direction.
LARSEN: excellent. So if--apologize, this is kind of a leading question because if we can get to 80 percent plus on the G's, does that change the number of Growlers that the Navy will need?
GILDAY: No, sir, it won't change--it won't change the requirement. We just have a more ready fleet.
LARSEN: Okay. I think that's it. I yield back. Thank you.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Lamborn.
LAMBORN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your service, for your contribution and, Admiral, for your wife, as well and what she contributes. I'd like to ask you about conventional prop strike, presumably with a hypersonic glide vehicle. What is the need for such a submarine launched capability, Admiral or Acting Secretary?
MODLY: Well, one of the great challenges we have right now is that our adversaries have developed long-range hypersonic missiles that hold our forces at bay, make us have to operate farther and farther away from the first and second island chains. And so we have to develop some type of capability to be able to meet that. And so that's why we're developing this conventional prompt strike weapon, and we're working with the Army and the Air Force on this collaboratively. We are looking at all kinds of different options for how we might base that, some of which I can't discuss in an open forum but would be happy to come in a closed forum and talk to you about that.
LAMBORN: And we are talking about a conventional capability, not strategic or nuclear, but conventional. Would that affect strategic stability? Would it make the environment more unstable with our near peers?
MODLY: Well, sir, I think the goal of everything that we're doing is to try and increase strategic stability, to maintain strong enough deterrent force to keep our adversaries guessing and uncertain about their capabilities. So everything that we do is with that objective in mind.There's nothing that we do to try to create a more unstable security environment.
LAMBORN: And does having such a submarine based capability put our submarines under an unacceptable risk of detection and so forth?
MODLY: I'll yield over to Admiral Gilday on that in terms of the actual operational elements of the attack submarine force.
GILDAY: Sir, I think any time you fire a weapon you face that kind of risk in terms of--particularly if you're firing from a concealed position like a submarine. But it's not just what you're firing. It's how you're going to actually maneuver to conduct the fight, right? So it's how we're going to fight, our concepts of operations. And so that will be taken into account, and in each situation where we would employ those weapons would be a little bit different. So it would be based in the fighting environment as well.
LAMBORN: So are you confident that even if there is a risk it would be an acceptable risk?
GILDAY: Sir, we would maneuver to make that risk accessible. I want to create--we want to create a dilemma for the Chinese fleet commanders so that they don't know what vectors they have to protect themselves from.
LAMBORN: Okay, thank you. And how would not having this capability affect your ability to operate in a contested environment with a near peer competitor?
GILDAY: So I think the ability to have a long-range weapon at speed like hypersonics, it allows you to get in closer sooner. So it allows you to create a dilemma for the enemy. We actually out stick them with mass volumes of fire to put yourselves in--to put yourself in a position of advantage early.
LAMBORN: Okay, thank you. I appreciate those answers. Changing gears, I'd like to ask you about the four public shipyards, and I know that the current budget includes funding to continue the virtual mapping of the public shipyards and some military construction funding for dry docks. When do you expect that the Navy will complete this mapping and begin increasing annual investments in the shipyard infrastructure optimization plan, SIOP, in line with about $1 billion annually that it's going to need?
MODLY: Just at a high level, sir, this is about a 20-year program that we have that we absolutely must do with these public shipyards to modernize them, not just modernize the facilities but modernize the way in which work flows through them more efficiently and more effectively. So we are starting already on this process of investing in this long-term--long-term plan. And I don't know if the CNO has any more to say about that.
GILDAY: Yeah, so the mapping should take a couple years in terms of doing the virtual mapping of all the shipyards and really taking a look at processes and how they can become more efficient. But at the same time, we're investing in infrastructure like dry docks. We just--we just began work less than a month ago down in Norfolk in a dry-dock that's 101 years old. We just did a ribbon-cutting up at Portsmouth, New Hampshire on a deep basin up there. And so at the same time, sir, we're taking a look at where we want to make deliberate investments. We know some things now that we have to fix. We have to replace cranes. We have to rebuild dry docks, as examples.
LAMBORN: Okay, thank you so much. I yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Courtney.
COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I've had a chance to meet with you all over the last few months or so, and again, just really impressive serious people and appreciate your testimony here today. Just real quick on the 30-year shipbuilding plan issue and the integrated force structure assessment, you know, the reason why that's in statute on the 30-year is just that shipbuilding takes a long time. You know, I mean a sub is about 65 months for a Virginia class. Columbia will be longer. Carriers, I think it's year 12 for the Ford carrier. So we need to have that longer sort of perspective because these investment decisions, again just have a--they're just years-long impact in terms of how Congress operates.
The integrated force structure assessment, again, we look forward to seeing it. But I mean, without trying to quibble here, these are two separate endeavors. I mean, the 30-year shipbuilding plan is a budget requirement in law, and the integrated force structure assessment, just like the last one in 2016, I mean that was a separate process, a good process. And so--and the reason isn't necessarily to find out what's the top line, what's the-- how many do we need. It's also about the fleet architecture. What's the composition of the fleet because when we talk about lethality, it matters, you know, in terms of being able to see where we're going over just a one-year budget period.
So for example, in this year's submission you've got two salvage ships. We need them. They're important. But let's face it, you know, the old plans for our near peer competitors, China and Russia, you know attack submarines are really the tip of the spear in terms of, you know, what we need out there. And cutting, you know, that Virginia class sub, I mean again I just think is at odds with the National Defense Strategy when you sort of drill down in terms of what real lethality is.
So last year Admiral Richardson, Mr.--Admiral Gilday's predecessor, when he was testifying about boosting attacks on production to above the program of record of two a year stated that with respect to our greatest gap between the war fighting requirement and current inventory there is no greater need than the attack submarine fleet. It's a wide gap, and it's getting wider. So every single submarine counts against closing that gap. Again, that point we're talking about going above the program of record. Now we're in a situation where we're below the program of record of two a year. Again, I want to just salute the fact that in your unfunded priorities you put at the top of the list restoring that submarine. Again, Admiral Gilday, we were up in Groton on Monday, and a couple months ago up in Quonset. You got a real firsthand look in terms of the workforce, the design completion, which you mentioned for both the VPM and Columbia. What's the Navy's position about execution in terms of adhering to the two a year program in terms of just is that a factor in the decision, or was it resources?
GILDAY: Sir, it was definitely afford ability in terms of that submarine being cut. If I can make a point about the force structure assessment, and so that work is done, and I think the reason you would benefit from having that inform the thirty-year shipbuilding plan is because, if we didn't use it to inform this plan, you go back to the 2016 assessment. And as you said yesterday, that thirty-year shipbuilding plan is the headlights that--that we provide so that you know where we--where we need to go.
So, I--I think if we can--if we can have those discussions with the secretary of defense and-- and once he's comfortable with that, I think that at--that is all packaged and--and ready to come up to the Hill.
MODLY: And Mr. Courtney, if you don't mind me commenting on this as well, I–
COURTNEY: --Because I have one more question to ask him.
MODLY: Okay.
COURTNEY: Yeah.
MODLY: Just quickly, about thirty-year shipbuilding plan, we--we agree with--with you. We understand the Congressional requirement. It's a--a requirement for the secretary of defense to--to deliver. He wants a little bit more time to understand it. And we're going to-- we're going to help him with that and it's not going to be a long delay. It will--as you think about this '21 budget, you'll have plenty of information and enough time to be able to do that. I'm--I–
COURTNEY: --Okay, the chairman's–
MODLY: --You have my commitment on that–
COURTNEY: --Plan is to get this to the floor, as you know–
MODLY: --Yes–
COURTNEY: --On a very aggressive schedule this year–
MODLY: --Yes, sir–
COURTNEY: --Which is support. Regarding Columbia, we talked again up in--in Groton about the fact that the NSPDF (PH), which at least created authorities for incremental funding and multiyear, is a way of reducing costs. And I just--if--if there is--maybe you could just comment in terms of whether the Navy is coming to us with more requests in that regard.
GILDAY: Yes, sir. So, to your previous question, you asked about, you know, numbers per year. Yes, in terms--in terms of two--to close the gap of where we need to be, that's how we need to build. And if you asked me, you know, if I could give you another ship today, what would it be, it would be a--it would be a Virginia class submarine.
And--and your question was about the–
COURTNEY: --Incremental authorities–
GILDAY: --Yeah. And so–
COURTNEY: --And maybe you want to take that for the record–
GILDAY: --And--and so–
COURTNEY: --Because I don't want to–
GILDAY: --It's--it's not the fund. It's the funding. That's the--the issue is the funding that needs to go in that bin. I personally don't care what bin it's in as long as we can use it to build more submarines. But that's the issue, is fencing that money off. The authorities are terrific and help us tremendously.
COURTNEY: Thank you.
SMITH: Mr. Wittman?
WITTMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank the witnesses for joining us. Secretary Modly, I want to begin with you. You've heard my colleagues talk at length about the under investment the Navy is making in shipbuilding.
When you put that in contrast to our adversaries and the increased investments that they aremaking, the pace that they are building their navies, it is pretty concerning. 355 ships is the law, and we look today at the Navy's budget, only about 10 percent of the Navy's budget is devoted towards building ships. And if you look at the current path that you're on, we're only going to have a net increase of eight ships in the next five years.
You talked about getting to 355 by 2030. That is an impossible task based on the current pace. You heard my colleague, Mr. Courtney, talk about the incredible importance of our attack submarines. We're going to be down to 42 submarines to--attack submarines by 2028. All of those things lead me to this question.
What is the Navy going to do in the looking at reallocating resources to the shipbuilding account over the period in the near future through the five-year defense plan, better known as--as--as the fit-up? Give me your perspective on how we--how we do that, because you talked about 2030 being the focus on getting to 255. Tell me what you're going to do immediately to get us on that path.
MODLY: Well, sir, thanks for--very much for that question. As you know, I've been a pretty vocal supporter of the 355 ship Navy since I've been in--back in the Department of the Navy. And I would just take issue with your point about it being impossible. I don't think it's impossible.
I think there are two fact--two things that have to happen for it to be possible. One is a reasonable plan that demonstrates how we can get there on an accelerated path, and political will.
WITTMAN: Yeah.
MODLY: That's it. If those two things come together, then I think we can do it. My job is to develop that plan in a reasonable way, and also demonstrate that the answer isn't, oh, we need more top line to do this, because I know that in our $207 billion a year budget there's a lot of money in there that we could probably use a lot more efficiently.
So, I've--I chartered about two weeks ago something called a stem to stern review, and we're looking internally to see what we can stop doing that doesn't make sense for this future force. And that's what we're doing. So, we're going to go through this process. I gave them a--I--I was very aggressive on the time-line. I said 45 days. We need some answers on this.
What we need to get on this path from preliminary analysis that we've done is about $5 billion to $8 billion more a year. Relative to the overall DOD budget, it's--it's a very, very small amount. But I'm not in the business of making trades on the overall DOD budget. I'm just in the business of trying to present a plan, advocate for the Navy for the reasons that are important for the nation, and sell that plan as something that's reasonable and that can be done. And then the political will has to align around it, and then we can go do it.
WITTMAN: Got you. Well, listen, thank you so much for being focused on getting us to 355. Thanks for saying it's not impossible. I put that out there just to--just to get your thoughts on what the path may be going forward. I'm glad to hear from you that it is possible and that we are going to get on the path to do that.
Admiral Gilday, I want to go to some of the comments that you've made. You--you talked about not just the ship component of the Navy, but the manning component of the Navy. And we see some the things that have happened because of the manning issues, the risk that the Navy has taken on, in many instances unacceptable risk.
And you talked about the shortfall of sailors being at about 6,000. It now looks like some of the new protect--projections are closer to maybe 9,000 sailors. Can you give me your
perspective on what the Navy can do to reverse this alarming trend? And what are we going to do to make sure, as ships go to sea, we have both proper manning and training to make sure that our sailors have exactly what they need to do the difficult job we ask of them?
GILDAY: So, sir, thanks. So, the answer is retaining them, right, retaining that talent. And so, that begins with their families and all of those programs that we have, including childcare, including housing. And the focus in our budget reflects it, that we're putting on that. Right now, our--our retention numbers over the past year are at 75 percent. So, we've exceeded at every pay grade our expectations in terms of the numbers we retain. A lot of that has to do with the good work that the Navy has done over the past few years to digitize many of the applications that we used the for sailors.
So, to give you an example, we have a detailing marketplace now where, on an app, they can compete for jobs. And they can do this a year out so that their family has the understanding of where they're going to move next. It allows--it allows the family to actually, through these apps, take care of childcare and housing reservations months out before they even report to the duty station.
They seem like small things, but we're taking, you know, systems that are maybe 75 different websites and we're collapsing it down to a single entry point through a micro processing app like on your phone. That just makes a world of difference for people. So, it's really--sir, a long answer to your question, it's really putting a focus on people and families.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Garamendi?
GARAMENDI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I--I think we need to really deal with the fundamental thing that's going on here. It's a sea change. The 355 ship Navy is yesterday's plan. If I'm at all perceptive of what's going on here, it's that the Navy is rethinking the way it will operate and the equipment, ships and other things, that they need to operate, and that that's underway. The Marine Corps, you're--you're very clear that you're in the process of doing that.
I--I sense myself that this is happening, and therefore a frustration about let's share about what you're thinking. This may not be the forum in which that takes place, but underlying all of the questions that have come thus far and my own is, wait a minute, everything that we've been building and planning for and--is suddenly wait a minute, that sea change is occurring and you're rethinking this. Good.
To the extent that you can, share with us soon the general outline of that rethinking. Commandant Berger, you said that you're not able, given today's budget, to make that shift today. I understand that. Nevertheless, we need to change our thinking it. And we need to put in place in this NDAA and the appropriations the elements that allow you to continue that process.
Right now, we--we're very much in the dark. We really don't have that, and therefore we're kind of--not kind of, we're clearly--I'm frustrated and I think my colleagues are also. The information we are hearing doesn't line up--or the information we're given doesn't line up to what you're saying or at least indicating.
So, having said that in 2.5 minutes, let me get to one of my favorite subjects, which I think all of your aware of. And it's sealift capacity, my new flag that I keep waving in front of you folks. Whatever the future holds, the current sealift capacity, which is inadequate for at least the next decade, we need to think about how to bring into reality a sealift capacity for whatever you plan out there, big power competition. The Pacific is a long, big ocean, and we simply are not capable of sustaining the fight.
I mean, it's very clear. I want to work with you on developing a national fleet. The bow wave of the Columbia and rockets and nuclear and other things is going to make a very, very difficult to provide the logistical sealift support from the Navy budget. You were just talking about that. Is there another way to do it? I think there is.
I think if we are to rebuild our merchant Marine capacity in a way that builds that capacity in a militarily useful, maybe useful manner for both a transport of--of weapons, material, men, equipment as well as fuel I think we can do it without significant impact on the Navy budget and the Navy budget in so far as noncombat ships would be for the specialty ships that are not now available that would absolutely be necessary. So they Navy does that and then the merchant Marine is over here.
We have available to us programs that have not been used for a couple of decades so I want to just put that on the table. Pursue that with you and obviously we don't have 38 seconds to answer all of the questions here but be aware we are going to have this with (INAUDIBLE) Admiral Busby(SP) and the like and so I will let it go at that. I will yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Ms. Hartzler?
HARTZLER: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman thank you for your support and thank you as well for your support as well Ms. Gilly(SP). You have mentioned several times about the improvements with the F-18 and their readiness levels and we need to celebrate that. This has been a focus of this committee for several years to get that up and so we celebrate the 80 percent readiness milestone. I--I really think that we continue to build on that with this year's budget that you put forth an additional 24 new mission-capable aircraft and as you know the new aircraft have the most immediate and profound impact on the tactical aviation inventory and fleet readiness which is why I am concerned that the budget request proposes to eliminate 36 super Hornets for future year defense budget. So would you please speak to how this will impact the tactical aviation inventory since that is three squadron's worth of aircraft that the Navy is no longer investing in? It is my understanding the Navy has an existing strike fighter shortfall of approximately 48 aircraft so could you please speak to the impact and the potential operational risk that this will bring to our readiness?
GILDAY: Ma'am, thanks for the question. The--these cuts this year were the HEINRICH: Were due to afford ability and so we made what we thought were balanced risk discussions based on what we could afford given the current top line. The mission capable Jets, the--the path that we are on right now to get the most we can out of the fleet that we have including modernizing our--our existing super Hornets to block three puts us on a good path. As you know the--the numbers of our F-18 super Hornets are above 650. The fleet that we really need when we have our fourth and fifth gen mix is around 785 and so we are trying to maintain that path through the FYDP and beyond.
HARTZLER: Will you be able to maintain the 80 percent target for mission capable aircraft by cutting these aircraft out?
GILDAY: We think we will. So that--so the fact that we have reduced the buy doesn't necessarily affect our ability to reach 80 percent mission capability - make mission capable aircraft excuse me.
HARTZLER: I am still concerned about this decision and the cause that it could bring to the aircraft because you have current production lines that help bring the parts and the service to the modernization effort and if you cut out that new line then that could jeopardize the ability to get your parts and--and for the modernization. So could you please elaborate on whether the Navy has assessed what if the additional cost will be encouraged the super hornet production line be shattered and can you provide this cost analysis to the committee?
GILDAY: Ma'am, if we could I would like to get back to you with some more detailed information on that so that we can lay it all out for you in a way that--that makes sense and gets to the detail that you are asking for.
HARTZLER: And you said that the cuts were due to the lower top line. Are you saying that if we were to add additional funds you would report reinstating those new aircraft, pushing that out?
GILDAY: I think it would go into the prioritization mix as we took a look at what we--what we really need you know based on the time frame that we are given.
HARTZLER: Okay, very good. Switching gears talking about munitions certainly we have a lot of challenges with that. Our stockpiles of high demand preferred and precision guided munitions have been significantly reduced as we all know over the last 15 years. So in order to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, to support globally and integrated defense planning for contingencies we need to procure sufficient inventories of munitions by a healthy industrial base. So what is your assessment of risk in the Navy's precision guided and preferred munitions request and what specific actions are you taking to manage stability, capability and capacity risk in the U.S. munitions industrial base to include reducing critical supply chain dependencies sourced from outside the United States?
GILDAY: Ma'am, in terms of--in terms of our budget this year I talked about a focus on both readiness and lethality and 21 percent of our budget dedicated to that so a large portion of that is dedicated not only on modernizing our ships and aircraft but filling our magazines with weapons so that is not only our ships but also our air wings and to get to your last point in the supply chain I would have to get back to you on that with more details.
HARTZLER: Great. Thank you very much. Yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Gallego?
GALLEGO: Thank you Mr. Chair. Admiral Gilday I understand the PA8(SP) Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft are the best submarine hunting aircraft in the world. Would you agree with that assessment?
GILDAY: Yes.
GALLEGO: Thank you. Can you just--can you please describe to us and me in an unclassified way how we use our Poseidon aircraft specifically with respect to Russia and China?
GILDAY: So it is the most effective platform that we have for not only wide area search but also localization so that we can actually find, fix and if we are in a position to finish a Russian submarine and so the capabilities of those P8s I think the best testimony is the fact that all of our allies and partners are lining up to buy the P8, tremendous capability.
GALLEGO: So knowing that were use surprised to see the department - make see it in one of the cuts, a P8 cut from last year's budget to help for this border wall?
GILDAY: Yes, sir. Before my time I can't speak to that to the decisions that were made in--in the last budget.
GALLEGO: Acting Secretary Modly the recent reprogramming notice says that the above--the items above last year's budget request were what was stolen from but the Navy says that we need 138 P8As(SP) and we only have funding for 120. How is this--how is the reprogramming anything other than arbitrary and capricious if the Navy is disagreeing with the department's rationale for completing this (INAUDIBLE) of this budget--of its budget?
MODLY: Will come of those--sir, those decisions are made by the Secretary of defense. We--we support them as he makes them but he has lots of trade-offs that he has to make for other competing priorities. We would obviously love to have more P8s clearly, it is an incredible weapons platform. We want a lot of our allies to have them too. So we are looking for ways to work with our allies to get them involved in the program so that Boeing can continue to produce them out in Washington.
GALLEGO: For any of you consulted before being--before being informed that your budget was being cut by Secretary Esper and others in the administration? Did they talk to you? Did they ask your preferences if this was you know necessary or not necessary?
MODLY: Well, sir, we--we go through a continual process on budget negotiations and deliberation so we are consulted all along the way. Ultimately we don't have a veto.
GALLEGO: Well, no, no and I understand that, definitely understand you guys don't have a veto but more along the lines of did Secretary Esper or other aspects of the administration at least talk to you all before they went into this cut because it's--this is not just unfunded money like it was last year, this is actual equipment, very necessary equipment.
MODLY: We--we knew that they--that they were looking at a variety of different options and then at the end those options were presented to us.
GALLEGO: And Admiral Gilday again understand that you didn't have a veto over any of this?
GILDAY: Sir, I was not consulted before that final decision was made and the 3.8 million–
GALLEGO: Okay.
GILDAY: --under the provision to 84.
GALLEGO: Okay. So the same thing General Berger?
BERGER: That is correct, sir.
GALLEGO: Okay. Moving on our national posture in Asia is mostly naval and highly concentrated in very small and specific parts of Japan of Japan and Korea. This committee recently heard testimony from former East Asia (INAUDIBLE) Abraham Denmark(SP) that the relatively small number of large bases that we have in Asia should be diversified to a new approach that prioritizes new airfields, new positioning and new posture. One is your take on the survivability of our naval assets in Asia and (INAUDIBLE) across the Pacific should the balloon go up? Start with you Admiral Gilday.
GILDAY: So I think based on the fact that we are relocated we have concerns which is why we are making investments in better weapons systems and it's not just--it's not just on the kinetic side, it is the investments that the department is making in space, and cyberspace to put us on a much better positioning against those types of threats.
GALLEGO: And just because I have a little--want to get one more question in. How does this budget take the necessary steps to increase the survivability of our INDOPACOM assets against Chinese threats or aggression? Mr. Modly?
MODLY: Well, as I mentioned before everything that we do was to increase the readiness and lethality of our forces that are particularly the ones that are deployed and so that--that is really what our primary concern is right now so as we look to the future we are looking at some of these other bigger issues in terms of how do we distributor force, how do we do more distributed maritime operations, what types of ships will we need to do that to support that, etc. and those are the types of changes and things that you will see that will be different in this force structure assessment than in the one that was done four years ago.
GALLEGO: Great. I yield back my time. Thank you.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Kelly. Sorry, Mr. Kelly, sorry to--hello. Mr. Kelly?
KELLY: Thank you.
SMITH: (INAUDIBLE)
KELLY: Sorry. Thanks, Mr. Mitchell. I first want to talk about--I want to be real clear. I support our border, and particularly our southern border and building the wall. However, during the recent reprogram, $650 million was diverted from an LHA American class of amphibious ship which is built by Huntington Ingalls, a massive shipbuilder in Mississippi. The impact that will be felt will be loss of jobs, and it will hurt the industrial shipbuilding base. I think consistency, long-term maintained plans are key to maintaining our industrial base, and they, much like an aircraft carrier, can't turn on a dime. And so when we destroy that industrial base, we don't just get it back when we decide we want to build a different ship. So what is the plan to get this ship back on track, either Mr. Secretary or Admiral Gilday?
MODLY: Sir, I can speak to the high level on that. We did end up--funding was moved from this year for that. However, it did not change the delivery time for that ship. We actually pulled that ship forward and plan on starting that in FY '23. In previous plans it was either '24 or '25. So it's actually, over the course of the last couple years we've actually accelerated the delivery of that ship. And we understand and are very sympathetic to the impact it might have on unemployment down there in Mississippi. That is a critical shipyard for us. So they do fantastic work, and we want to make sure that we maintain a healthy shipbuilding capacity down there. But this was just a decision that was made here at the end game (PH).
KELLY: Understand. But when what we do is lose long-term effects for short-term gains, and you can't buy that back. We see that when we make cuts in personnel to the Marine Corps, or the Navy, or the Army when we make those cuts. And then the next year we go well that number was a little too low, so we'll just build it back. You can't replace that E-6 with a trainee. That's 12 years of experience to get there that we can't replace. It's the same way with the industrial base. If they're geared up and tooled up to build a ship and we change the plans, they can't just next year when we change them back, get back to the same spot because they've lost that. Those guys are working somewhere else. Those guys and girls are doing different jobs somewhere else, and we can't rebuild it. We just have to be real careful about doing that.
And I'm a firm believer in all of our services owe us--every year we ask you what are your personnel numbers, what are your requirements? And when you give those to us and then we change them the next year, it makes it very difficult for us to plan and our industrial base to plan. And we've got to adhere to that because I'm kind of a patent guy. An 80% plan violently executed is better than a 100% plan two days after it mattered. And so I just ask that we keep that in mind when we're dealing with the industrial base.
General--General Berger, in your planning guidance you talk about the need for smaller, more maneuverable Marine Corps that gets back to its expeditionary roots. I suggest we may need different platforms or amphibious ships to do this. Can you tell me what you envision in this, General Berger?
BERGER: Sir, for the last two decades we did what the nation needed us to do in the Middle East. But that's not what you need us to do in the future. You need us as part of an integrated naval force because my--our view, that's an asymmetric advantage that we have by a wide margin. We need to sustain that margin. So in simple terms, we need instead of a land force that could sometimes, if we really tried and it would be really painful to get aboard ship, we need to be a naval force that you can send where you need to, the commander can send where they need to, can go ashore when they choose to, back aboard ship, very dispersed, very distributed, in other words pose an adversary a real challenge, that makes his day really hard. That's what we've got to do.
KELLY: Thank you, and I agree, and I think that 98-year-old marine would agree also. He's not here anymore, Commandant, but I think he would definitely agree. And Secretary Modly, I want to talk a little bit--I just visited DDG when I was in Rota and visited our great sailors out there, and we had a discussion yesterday. But I just want you to talk about your optimized fleet response plan and how personnel figures into that.
MODLY: Well, one of the things that we're trying to do particularly in this budget is adjust some of the problems we had in previous years with respect to the manning that we had on our ships. And I think that CNO mentioned this earlier in terms of what he experienced back when he was on a DDG and what that had declined to over the years. And we started seeing the results of that in these horrible accidents that we had in the Pacific a couple years ago. So we're trying to adjust that to make that better.
With respect to specifically about OFRP, we are doing a deep dive look on that. We have-- meant the secretary of defense actually hired an outside company FFRDC to help us look at that and look at better options for that. I would--
SMITH: I apologize.
MODLY: Sir.
SMITH: The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Speier:
SPEIER: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all of you for being here today. Secretary Modly, in your opening statement you indicated that you are committed to stamping out sexual harassment in the Navy. And yet last February you promoted a man named Ronnie Booth to head the Navy's audit agency even though there had been multiple whistleblowers and complainants that had come forward documenting his workplace sexual-harassment retaliation dating back to 2007. Alarmingly, many people reported him wanting to offer to mentor female subordinates, suggested they meet outside of work, arranged travel with them. This man is the person you chose to lead a major naval agency.
I wrote your office asking about these concerns, and then Secretary Spencer responded by saying there was no documented substantiated evidence of Mr. Booth's behavior. Yet following my letter Mr. Booth was reassigned to work as a special assistant and retired shortly thereafter. Would you please indicate to us how that squares?
MODLY: Yes, ma'am. I appreciate the question, and I remember your letter very clearly. Let me say that that situation was part of a broader cultural and climate problem that I had at the Naval Audit Service. I had to take action to remove somebody and move somebody into position of authority in that organization. I did it very methodically and very carefully. If I may, I was not aware--when we made that decision we went back and followed all the rules in terms of what can restrict you from putting somebody in a position of that (PH) place. There was no documented evidence, no IG investigations, nothing.
SPEIER: There were complaints that had been filed. How can you say there was no documented evidence?
MODLY: There was no documented evidence in his individual record that prohibited me from doing that. When I found out about this, thanks to your letter and to some emails that came to me, we immediately started an internal investigation. The DoD started an internal--broader investigation, and we were told to shut down our investigation on that.
SPEIER: Who told you to shut it down?
MODLY: The DoD IG because once they started an investigation we can't have a parallel investigation.
SPEIER: I see, because they were now investigating.
MODLY: That's correct. And so--
SPEIER: I guess the real question is, why did it take a letter from me that then triggered an inspector general evaluation?
MODLY: Because there was no--there was no evidence before I found (INAUDIBLE)
SPEIER: Well, I find it hard to believe if there are complaints that are filed that that's not considered evidence. Let me ask you another question.
MODLY: Ma'am, may I say something--may I say something else about this?
SPEIER: In your budget proposal--well, maybe for the record.
MODLY: If the suggestion is that I would ever--that I would ever--
SPEIER: For the record.
MODLY: That I would ever--
SMITH: Mr. Modly, she controls the time. I'm sympathetic (INAUDIBLE) she has the right to ask the questions she wants to ask, so let her ask.
SPEIER: In the budget proposal the Navy has cut the SAPRO budget. How can you cut that budget when we have an epidemic on our hands?
MODLY: Ma'am, I don't know the specifics on terms of how much we cut that budget, but I have been extremely committed to fighting sexual assault and harassment in the service.
SPEIER: Then why do you cut the budget? The numbers are up.
MODLY: (INAUDIBLE) The numbers are up. We take it very seriously. The Navy, the Department of the Navy actually initiated actions with other universities around the country to get after this problem, to share information and to share data. And I would just say if the suggestion is that I would ever put a person in a position of authority knowing full well with documented evidence that that person was a sexual harasser, that would never happen. I would never do that. And the suggestion I think is--
SPEIER: Well, all right, this is my time. I'd like to ask another question. The LCS turned out to be a debacle. Part of the problem was the cost estimates were way under-valued. They were first supposed to be $220 million apiece. They ended up costing 2.5 times that much. The GAO said you should do independent cost estimates. As of August 2019 there has never been an independent estimate of the frigate. CBO thinks that the actual cost will probably exceed your estimates by about $300 million per ship. Seems like we need the benefit of an independent estimate. Are you intending to do that?
MODLY: We intend to do--the LCS program predates me by many, many years. We intend to do independent cost estimates on every new platform that we're doing.
SPEIER: So the frigate will be subject to an independent cost estimate?
MODLY: Yes, yes.
SPEIER: All right. I'll yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Cook.
COOK: Thank you, Mr.--thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to go off in a different direction. We had the NATO Parliamentary meeting this last week or--and there were kind of some things that were said there that were kind of scary to me because some of the concerns in this committee were our ability, the number of ships to, if the balloon went up in Europe, our refueling capability which is a very contentious hearing here. Boeing did not have a good day and I won't go into that but the--the point that was made at this me being here I am where I am a big me to supporter and everything like that the--it broke out that the EU was invited to speak and they are talking quite frankly about taking over some of the aspects the way I understood it of the strategic forces under their cognizance. Now we have had problems with the EU going from some of the different exercises and the (INAUDIBLE) study a few years ago we you know the Javelin missile and some of the other systems were based on some of these things.
Now if this is true it might be partly a reaction to Brexit and but there were a lot of countries that were alarmed at the fact that now the EU is going to make it very, very difficult if many of these countries which are NATO members but also EU members are not totally committed to NATO. Do you have any reactions Mr. Secretary at all or have you heard any-- any of the repercussions of that conference?
MODLY: I have not been briefed on any of the repercussions of that conference and on these discussions so I don't have a comment right now. I can find out more information on it and get back to you, sir.
COOK: And the reason I raise this issue here because we are talking about some of these funding issues. In the past you know it was the situation in Korea and it changes from day to day where the thread is and by the way I want to thank you for coming here. We--we learn a lot, I think we make changes. I remember when General Scaparotti(SP) talked about the Air Force wanted to get rid of the U2s(SP) this was in Korea and he said no, the U2s had more reliability and the next thing you know they are back in the budget. So some of the things that you say here have tremendous repercussions at least in my decision-making and I think everyone here. All I am saying is that some of these of their questions in terms of preparing, pre-positioning equipment and everything else if this NATO situation is going to be revisited in terms of perhaps conflicts with the EU I think it might affect some of the things that our budget decisions in this committee any of the Admiral or general do you have any comments on that? I think you are familiar with those.
GILDAY: Sir, I would just say I would take your point. There are two different political bodies that make different decisions that--that are not always synchronize and there is a potential risk I--I think your point is to NATO. I just am not familiar with the context of last week's discussions in Brussels.
COOK: Yes, it was on class and--and you can probably see everything. General Berger I never thought I would be happy about the day that you know we are not getting a new weapon systems or anything else but right now in the President's budget we have these sewer plant for 29 palms, this combat Marine that is his greatest accomplishment was to get these sewer plant for 29 palms but it really, really is a big deal because of the environmental concerns in California and something like that can--I think it is one of the greatest training bases in the world and it an admin thing so I am going to try and bring that all of the way to fruition. So thank you very much for being here. I yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Brown?
BROWN: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your testimony here today. You know I am really proud of the efforts in the department of defense, our uniformed services in integrating a force and leaving this nation by its example, started in the 1940s executive orders have remove racial barriers to service, the work that has happened over the years for inclusion of women and now every aspect of the military. It is hard to believe that it took an act of Congress just last year to finally get the Marine Corps to include women in basic training platoons but you know sometimes it's come easy and sometimes it's been a little bit more of a challenge but I think we can all take pride in the progress that we have made.
Mr. Secretary I really, really want to thank you for the historic decision that you made in naming an aircraft carrier after an enlisted soldier, recognizing the important contributions that enlisted men and women make to the force and to naming that aircraft carrier after cook first class Doris Miller(SP). So thank you very much for that.
Having said what I have just said we have got a problem and we have got a problem in both the civilian staffing and in uniform staffing in both the Navy and the Marines and particularly in what I call the Ely sector such as your fighter squadrons. Looking at your civilian staffing you stated in your statement on page 17 regarding recruiting, curating and retaining the best talent that you are leveraging the leading private sector business practices but in your human capital strategy for 2019 to 2030 there is only one mention of diversity. Mr. Secretary, what are you doing to ensure that you are diversifying the civilian workforce that the Department of the Navy?
MODLY: Mr. Brown thanks--first of all thank you for the compliment on the Doris Miller, I really appreciate that and agree with you in terms of the historical significance of it and I will tell you that as great a day as it was for the family of Doris Miller it was an even greater day for the Navy so just a wonderful moment for us as a country.
This--we--we have challenges with this, sir. We have talked about this in your office before about the challenges we have particularly on--on the uniform side as people progress through the service we--we don't have a lot of diversity in the senior ranks. We have pretty good diversity in the--in the civilian ranks. It is interesting that you noted that I did not note that when I read through the human capital strategy. I will have to look through that again but the whole concept of our human capital strategy is to try to attract people from a variety of different areas new types of people, new thinking, more diverse thinking give them ways to come in and serve in the government, perhaps go back out. So I will look in certain specific--
BROWN: Yeah, so let me just suggests that if--in as in your statement you suggest that you are taking leading private sector business practices I think in this regard the private sector is well out front of your strategies so I would ask you to go back and look.
Let's--let's turn to the uniform service, both the Marine Corps and the Navy you have a serious problem in your fighter units you know your fighter pilots. You have in the Navy 710 Navy fighter pilot 17 are less than 3% or African-American and not a single woman. You have 735 Marine Corps fighter pilots, less than 1% or five are African-American and one woman. You have got claims of equal opportunity violations, Inspector General reports, you have flag officers who are making inappropriate public comments undermining the integrity of the EO process and the Inspector General process and I have sent a letter to the Secretary to that regard. You have--you have pilots, and African of American pilot who has left the
service, another whose record is still tarnished and will inhibit his promotion, a whistleblower who is still on the edge waiting and outcome of a report and the concern is that the initial EEO complaints substantiated that there were racial discrimination against these pilots and then for some unexplained reason it was reversed and now you have three people sitting on pins and needles wondering the fate of their future because you have these outstanding complaints so you take the numbers alone, the lack of diversity and conclusion by race and gender, you have got these terrible cases in front of you and you have a pilot shortage to boot. You have a lot of work to do so I will take it for the record what your response will be because I did submit a letter to you back in January and I am waiting for the response. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Gallagher?
GALLAGHER: Thank you. Secretary Modly so in the last 24 hours we have learned that you have delivered the integrated naval force structure assessment to the Secretary of defense. He wants some time to evaluate that, potentially compare it against some alternative assessments that are out there whether they are in Cape(SP) or he alluded to outside assessments and that is why we don't have a 30 year shipbuilding plan because it will be informed by the integrated naval force structure assessment but over the last four years we have done a lot of outside studies. A lot of us have committed to not only rhetorically but put it into law that we need a 355 ship fleet. We believe that to be a floor not a ceiling so could you help us put into perspective what the total ownership cost of a 355 ship Navy would be in constant dollars over the current fleet of about 293 ships?
MODLY: So as we have looked at this in terms of as we use the integrated naval force structure assessment as our benchmark as sort of our Northstar in terms of where we think we should go as a Department of the Navy and understand that the Secretary of defense has not signed off on that order has not bought into it yet in order to get there on an accelerated path which would approximate getting to that ideal for structure in 10 years it is probably if you assume a flatline budget for us it is probably going to take between 120 and $130 billion more total over that 10 years. Those are the initial cuts we are looking at, the additional numbers that we are looking at.
So that's basically what it--what it comes down to.
GALLAGHER: So, per year it would be fair to say that would be well north of $8 billion?
MODLY: Yeah and we're looking--that's the reason why I put this benchmark out for our teams to look at how do we get $8 billion out of the top line that we have right now so at least we can start moving down that path.
GALLAGHER: Thank you, Admiral Gilday, I could help but notice that the budget for the new frigate now reflects one ship per year over the first three years of production can you assure me that the navy remains fully committed to executing this program to achieve the 20--achieve the 20 ships briefed to this committee previously?
GILDAY: Yes, sir. We're committed to that number. I think that--I think that one frigate in the first year is prudent. We need to get this right. There have been comments made about LCS and other programs and so we're focused on making sure that that first ship puts us in a very good direction for the remainder of the class.
GALLAGHER: Secretary Modly, should the Colombia be a Navy bill?
MODLY: Well, Rep Gallagher, it is a Navy bill and so we're assuming that it is a Navy bill. Obviously, it has strategic implications for the whole country for the whole force but right now, it is a Navy bill.
GALLAGHER: Calling on Berger, in your planning guidance you write about importance of ground base, long range precision fires with no less than 350 nautical mile range and you call for potentially, we need more than that. Can you talk a bit about how central these long range precision fires are to your planning guidance and executing the overall strategy and what any restrictions on the ranges of missiles your Marines could employ would impact your ability to execute your vision?
BERGER: The distributed maritime operations concept that we fit within means we do two things in support of the fleet commander--sea control and sea denial. The fires that you're speaking of that capability allows us to do that either embarked or ashore.
So, what's the value? The value to the fleet commander is he is not just hauling around Marines as passengers anymore. They are part of his--part of his fighting capability. We need the ability to reach out and hold at risk an adversary's naval fleet from wherever we are, embarked or ashore.
Range limitations, you definitely want longer rather than shorter if you are going to out stick an opponent. So any restrictions on range--on--on ranges of weapons systems from our perspective, from a warfighting perspective we're--we're going to pushback on that.
And then, it becomes just a function of technology and weight you know, size we have to be mobile, we have to be expeditionary.
GALLAGHER: Let me just follow up on your planning guidance. Well, this is just a comment. Your planning guidance has sparked a lot of very useful discussion in forms like war on Iraq, in company grade officers, field grade officers. I just I know you're bought into this but I just would continue--please, continue to encourage that. Make sure that those marines who are challenging long held assumptions aren't being punished when it comes time for them to be up for promotion cause I think this is a really healthy discussion going on in the Navy and the Marine Corps right now among all levels of officers enlisted and I am really pleased to see that.
Finally, just to end where we started really at times contentious debate about waiting for the shipbuilding plan you know, there is a lot of frustration here. In 2017, we had three outside studies about the force structure and where we needed to go with the fleet the next year the NDS came out. Two months later in March 2018, the Navy came to this committee and testified that a new FSA was on its way. Then in September the Navy said wait, it is not coming until 2019, and (INAUDIBLE) said we would have it by now. Last year, so please just as soon as you can tell us your vision for the future of the Navy and the Marine Corps in geopolitical terms I think you will find a very receptive audience here.
Cause it's hard for us to give you money until we know that vision.
SMITH: Duly noted. Mr. Moulton.
MOULTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to start by echoing my colleague and fellow marine, Mike Gallagher's comments about how important it is to encourage this discussion. And I would say not only should we make sure that these aren't being punished for being willing to question the assumptions they are exactly the people that we should be promoting and promoting quickly.
What you are doing is setting an important tone for the entire department of defense, Commandant. And, we need the other services to do it too. We need to do it more. I'm the cochairman with Representative Jim Banks, a Navy veteran, of the future defense taskforce. We are trying to do that here on the Armed Services Committee to really question our assumptions.
Because we are losing the game to Russia and China right now--that's the harsh reality. They are outpacing us and that's why they're closing the gap. So we got to keep doing this and it's incredibly important. Of course, one of the challenges is literally staring at you on this committee because about half the questions this morning if my tally is correct were essentially parochial qu--questions about district priorities not strategic questions about what we need for our Navy and Marine Corps.
In other words, are my airplanes going to be OK at my local base or my missile capability is that going to be developed? How do you propose that we get around that challenge to your changes and that we support your courageous willingness to slay sacred cows in order to make room for new and innovative weapon systems?
BERGER: I think we owe you a couple of things, sir. First of all, our assumptions about where the threat is where the adversary will be in the future. Which could change cause it's--there's a series of assumptions that go into that. Second, is a clear picture at the unclass--more valuable the classified level of how we expect we will fight the joint force. A subset of that is how we will fight the naval force. Armed with that--you should be able to ask us OK now armed with that the threat pictures this I understand how--how you think you are going to fight. Tell me how these capabilities that you are asking for that are on your shopping list how do they fit onto that mix?
MOULTON: So, let me ask you, Commandant, about one specific capability--the CH53. As you are aware the Marine Corps has a proud tradition of generating overwhelming combat power with less manpower and less cost--but right now, the per aircraft cost is set to exceed $120 million, which is $20 million more than a fifth generation fighters--fighter and many more orders--and many orders of magnitude rather, more expensive than proven alternatives such as the CH47F. That is a very expensive toilet for a joke that only the Marines will get. What's going on here and what do we need to do to fix it?
BERGER: The lift requirement to move Marines and equipment and the naval force around valid-- remains valid. As distributed as we are going to be we are going to need the ability to move that force and the sustainment around. So the--the requirement is valid and it is 200 aircraft. The cost, to your point--the cost is the big factor. APUC right now, 107 million, total fly way cost, we're still a margin away from where it is an affordable aircraft to buy off the shelf much less sustain over the long-term. So we have a valid warfighting requirement. We have an affordability challenge.
Now, it's up to us negotiating with Sakorsky(PH) and Lockheed Martin to try to drive the cost down to where it's affordable by the Department, affordable by the Marine Corps.
MOULTON: OK. Well, we will certainly support that. Mr. Secretary, I want to come back to a question that Representative Lamborn asked about whether hypersonic increase or decrease strategic stability. And you replied that we always want to increase strategic stability, which I heartily agree with but it is sort of like acknowledging the ocean has water in it which you don't need to be the secretary of the Navy to know.
Explain to me how having a weapon and--and understand I am supportive of innovative future focused capabilities--but how is having a weapon especially one that is submarine launched that you know is launched but you don't know where it is going and you don't' know if it has a conventional or nuclear weapon on it. So in other words--you have to make a decision on how to respond to it in a timeline similar to with an ICBM except it is more compressed because you don't' know where it is going. How does that increase strategic stability? You need to explain that in 20 seconds, so, go.
MODLY: I'm sorry you didn't like my previous answer, but I think what it does is it does create some-- crates more unpredictability that's true. It does. And that's really what we are trying to do. We are trying to create more unpredictable nature of our forces so that our--
MOULTON: My time is up but if we could take this for the record I think that would be valuable because I agree--it increases unpredictability. My concern is that it also increases strategic instability and we need to understand that more fully before we commit the kinds of funds we are talking about. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
SMITH: Mr. Gaetz.
GAETZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I'll take note of my colleagues admonition about parochial questions. So, I'll ask my parochial question in as strategic away as I possibly can. We are incredibly proud of the cyberwarriors that we train up at Cory Station that go to serve the Navy and so I was just wanting to give you the opportunity to reflect on the nature of the cybermission and how it fits into the strategic paradigm that we're working on building?
GILDAY: Yeah, so thanks for the question and thanks for--thanks for the comments about those cyberwarriors down at Cory. We think they're the best--we think they're the best in the world. Or among the best in the world.
So, we are not going to fight in one domain and so we are leveraging those cyberwarriors in terms of our concept of how we are going to fight in the future. We are about to do our largest exercise in a generation this summer. And, as part of that exercise we are going to include a cyberelectronic warfare and space cell inside of our fleet commanders headquarters and we are going to assign tactical, offensive cyber teams to the fight. We haven't done that before. And so, just two examples of how we are going to try to better integrate those capabilities into what we are trying to do in the future.
GAETZ: I also wanted to commend the Navy. We got a lot of naval aviation going on in my community and the TH57 is a platform that needs to be retired every other day we are having one of those helicopters coming back on a truck because they are having to land them out on a peanut field or soybean field somewhere as a result of an alert. Folks should not have to train on analog and then go to digital, but the Navy has been very innovative in embracing off the shelf options and I think that particularly at Whiting Field we are going to see a replacement for the TH-57 that will be at lower cost and with greater utility for our naval aviators. My colleague Mr. Gallagher had some follow-up question so I will yield to him the remainder of my time.
GALLAGHER: Thank you, Mr. Gaetz, very generous. Just a quick follow-up for Secretary Modly. So you said that it is going to cost about $120 billion and $130 billion more over the next 10 years to get to 355 ships, was that correct and does that--is that just acquisition cost or is that the total?
MODLY: No, that is everything.
GALLAGHER: That is everything, that is total–
MODLY: Yes, sir.
GALLAGHER: cost? So that is–
MODLY: Above our--if you assume a current flatlined budget this will be the incremental cost of getting to there. As--as you know sir we--we are kind of tapping out at about 305 ships that is where we will be. If that flatlined can sustain that 305 ships. We want to accelerate to 355 within 10 years based on the analysis that we have done, that is the incremental additional cost to not only acquire but also to sustain those platforms.
GALLAGHER: Okay. So in order--I mean in order to build a fleet that is about 20 percent bigger than the one we have now it's going to be about just back of the envelope 7.5 percent more each year but you are saying that–
GALLAGHER: --that's your analysis of the total–
MODLY: Yes, sir. That's–
GALLAGHER: Man, train, build, equip, maintain, modernize?
MODLY: And that--that has a lot to do with the mix because we are not filling it up with--we are not filling that gap with 50 aircraft carriers, right? We are looking at some smaller and more distributed7 ships that are less expensive and that will help fill the gap over that time.
GALLAGHER: Great. Thank you and I--we all look forward to the integrated naval force structure assessment when it arrives.
GAETZ: I yield back Mr. Chairman.
SMITH: Thank you. Ms. Horn?
HORN: Thank you very much. Gentlemen thank you so much for being with us today. I want to General Berger I want to address my questions to you talking--when we are speaking about the needs and choices that we are going to have to make in terms of cost especially looking for word in--in our needs for the next generation aircraft and fighters you have spoken repeatedly about the need for a balanced mix of manned and unmanned systems that--that includes manned--excuse me, unmanned aerial combat vehicles and low cost attributable--I am having--aircraft that are disposable that--that can be used as targets? Let's just--I can't get that word out today, aircraft technologies. And when you talked about the stated requirements for the manned after 35's well, that is well known and is a matter of record. We haven't heard articulated requirements for the unmanned systems to be paired with the more technologically advanced aircraft because we are clearly not going to use the F 35's for--for target practice. So do you--my question is do you intend to pursue a large number of lethal unmanned aerial systems or per your comments in the commands planning guidance and other statements or do you have another plan? Can you speak to that first?
BERGER: I don't know today. We don't know today the number or the ratio. What we know is we have got to move faster than we have in the past three or four years.
Some use a metaphor or example of like a quarterback where the manned platform, a ship or a plane is sort of the quarterback with a whole bunch of manned Air Force uses the term unmanned wing--wingmen. We--we need to move fast. Why? We can cover a lot more round if it is a mix of manned and unmanned. It is also more survivable. We--we have got to complicate the adversaries collection and targeting problem. We--we are making it to simple when they are all manned. It is not in a trying to reduce casualties mode as much as it is trying to gain an advantage and maintain that. But our processes don't re-ward going out on the edge and replacing something with something you have today but we have got to press the accelerator down. We have got to move now. Initially some hybrid of manned and unmanned, lightly manned but in the end it is going to be a hybrid of all of that and if you are sitting on the other side in an adversaries radar screen you can't tell the difference.
HORN: Thank you and to follow up on that I think in terms of strategic capabilities and costs in the balance do you--do you expect to include those needs and the next version of the aviation plan? When can we expect the requirements for that because as you said we have got to move fast but what does that look like in terms of needs assessment?
BERGER: You will see it in--in both 22 and 23 budget. We are in the latter phases now of necking down the what we are going to procure to put on board a ship, provide the ISR and maybe multiple payloads off of a ship.
The other construct is an unmanned series of vessels that launches an unmanned swarm of aerial vehicles. Why--why would we not try to do that? We should never put--if we are going to cross a beach, go somewhere we should send a machine where we can to do the reconnaissance to take a look before we ever send the first human in.
HORN: Cost-effective and strategically increasing capabilities. That's--I yield back the balance of my time. That is all of my questions. Thank you.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Bacon?
BACON: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our gentleman here for your leadership, taking care of our--the world's greatest sailors and Marines. Admiral Gilday my first question for you know three years ago we had a serious readiness problem and those numbers we were using it was like 50 percent of the aircraft and the Navy could fly on any given day. Now we have had three years where--where we restored roughly 60 percent of the budget from what we had from 2010 cuts. Could you just give us some feedback how are we doing with the aircraft readiness? Are we--do we have a very noticeable improvement with the last three years budgets?
GILDAY: Very noticeable improvements so we are at over 80 percent right now sustained with super Hornets in terms of mission capable aircraft and I was just down in Norfolk recently at the operations center where they actually bring together all of the maintenance officers from the wings and they bring them together to get after constraints or getting ready aircraft back on the flight line and so it includes bringing together the folks from DLA, the folks from the Navy supply system the engineers from Nava air and so we have really brought the team together. Ironed out some process issues that we have had an significantly increased readiness.
BACON: Is there a way that we could quantify that--that was the F-18s when you say 80 percent I would like to be able to go back to our constituents and say three years ago 50 percent across the board, today we are 75 percent or whatever it may be you know broader than let's say just the F-18 because I think that was important. Readiness is vital.
GILDAY: So, sir, if I hear you are you talking about each type model (INAUDIBLE)?
BACON: What was the composite number, the 50 percent or cumulative number of all of the Navy aircraft?
GILDAY: So I was really talking about the focus initially has been super Hornets.
BACON: Okay.
GILDAY: And so we have been at 50 percent, 55 percent for a decade now, now we are at 80 percent so above 80 percent sustained. We are bringing those same processes into the other type model series aircraft to bring them back, to bring them over 80 percent sustained as well.
BACON: Okay, thank you. Want to go to electronic warfare it is something I have been involved with for--for about three decades and we have fallen significantly behind as a department in each of our services so I appreciate the Navy's focus on it even while I was in the service I think you had your sites on it all along but the joint staff has appointed a two star now to leave their EW (PH) program. The Air Force has a one star. They created a panel for funding so it is a separate funding process. What is the Navy and the Marines or the department doing to raise the bar here for electronic warfare because it's to me it is a physical domain that we have to control. We can control the ground, the sea, the air but if we can't talk, can't use the radars we are in trouble so I appreciate your feedback.
BERGER: Sir, two years ago I think it was General Miller talked with us about the need to move into the information environment electronic warfare, (INAUDIBLE) cyber and military deception faster. He traded, intentionally deliberately traded a three star billet from a command and created a three star general Lloyd Reynolds who oversees that for us. You know you wish you could go back two years and thanked him for that because right now she is incredibly far out in front of the rest of us telling us where we need to go and not just in one area, EW but how do you integrate those domains and make it a war fighting capability? So on our staff, on our headquarters Marine Corps smaller staff a Lieutenant General Lori.
BACON: Thank you. Admiral or Secretary? However you want to do it.
MODLY: I will ask the see you know to talk about this as well sir but I think one of the things that we are emphasizing at the department level is to ensure that the Navy and the Marine Corps are more integrated in this--in this process going forward as well as how we integrate with the overall joint force and there is a lot of emphasis being placed on that at the OSD level as well.
GILDAY: So we stood up the information warfare development command down in Norfolk and so it brings together cyber, electronic maneuver warfare in space and to a single warfare development center that actually creates operating procedures for the fleet. We are testing that in a big--we are testing out a lot of that in a big exercise this summer and throughout the deployments that we make. We have put together an IW(SP) commander on board carrier strike groups and our amphibious readiness groups so that again brings together space, cyber and EW. We are doing it at the fleet command level based on what we learn there and the Commandant is integrating with his expeditionary advanced basing concept non-kinetic into the fight from the shore.
BACON: Do you have a single belly button if you will in the Navy that solve things EW?
GILDAY: So we have a three star in charge of programs on my staff. We have the one star down in Norfolk that at the tactical level is bringing those concepts together.
BACON: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back and thank you gentlemen.
SMITH: Thank you and I would like to yield for just a moment to the Ranking Member Mr.Thornberry.
THORNBERRY: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman you often rightfully acknowledge the key contributions to not only our committee but to the country's national security by the members of the staff of--of this committee. In my experience working on 26 years we--there is no staff member who has exhibited greater professionalism, dedication to the mission tolerance and patience with members and our inadequacies than Pete Villano(SP). He is about to leave the committee eminently and so I think it is the appropriate to just take a moment to specifically thank and acknowledge his many contributions to this committee and our work over the years but also to hold him up as a shining example of the tremendous staff that enable us to do what we do. I yield back.
SMITH: And I want to echo those remarks. In particular I think it is noteworthy that Pete--he has worked for both of us and that--that is a key part of this committee which by the way is unlike any other committee in Congress. We--we are bipartisan and the staff is more responsible for keeping that in place than anyone and Pete exemplifies that. (INAUDIBLE) had 26--how long has he--24 years which Mark I forget. 26 total years of service. So want to recognize that service and thank you very much.
Resuming the questioning we will go to Ms. Houlahan.
HOULAHAN: Thank you Mr. Chairman and I will also take my turn to ask my parochial and provincial question my community is home to the Sikorsky facility that manufactures the VH-92 known as Marine one and you all know that last year Sikorsky announced its intention to close that facility and to consolidate operations in other locations and I at that time was a very vocal opponent joining with other members of our Pennsylvania delegation asking Sikorsky to reverse that decision and to have an end during commitment to the city of Coatesville which is where that factory is and thankfully the President also shared this view and Lockheed announced very soon after in July in 2019 that it would keep the plant open and at least as long as it had work on the VH 92 program it would remain so. So I have two questions, I think probably the Admiral would be most likely the appropriate person to ask the first one. Last year I placed into section 133 of the NDA a requirement for the Navy to report to Congress on its assessment of what the facilities closure would mean for the program and we receive this response in January and this much of it is the assignment and this is the answer. And I was a program manager in the Air Force and I was also a chemistry teacher in 11th grade and on both counts I think this would merit an F in terms of effort and I was wondering if you could maybe provide a little bit more insight onto what the implications would be because in all likelihood the factory at some point will be closed and moved and was hoping you might be able to provide me some more insight than this report does.
GILDAY: Ma'am, I don't think that I sign that report. I--I don't think that I have seen it and so if I could take that for the record or set up a meeting to come back and a, get old and it might self so I can adequately answer your questions.
HOULAHAN: I would really appreciate that because I really would love to have a more robust answer to a really important question and my second question is for General Berger. I understand that the Marine Corps or aviation plan had originally called for two additional CH 92 a which are the trainer aircraft. Having dedicated training aircraft obviously helps to relieve the burden on the regular fleet and I noticed that funding for this was struck in this--this budgetary process and I was wondering if there was a plan for that to eventually be added, why that was decided to be struck? If you could provide some insight into that as well.
BERGER: The requirement remains to ma'am, you are accurate. One, we have right now down at Quantico, one simulator. The requirement is a second one so that part remains valid. We will need to find the funding for it because as we field the 92 we are going to need to simulators not one.
HOULAHAN: And I guess I would just--I appreciate that, elevate my concern that at this particular facility which is charged currently with this manufacturing is in fact at some point going to be shuttered because of lack of demand we really need to make sure we understand that demand shortly so that we don't end up with a difficult problem. That is the bulk of my questions and I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you gentlemen.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Banks?
BANKS: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am concerned about reports about the Chinese and Russian militaries investing heavily in their submarine fleets with subs that can deploy longer and at more lethal weapon systems. They are increasing their activity in the north Atlantic region and that the rate China is building and currently commissioning ships it's Navy couldn't have 100 submarines within the next 15 years.
The Navy has validated more fighting requirements of 138 P8 Poseidon's, the only longrange aircraft that could detect and track deepwater submarines as previously attested to by the Secretary and the Admiral this morning. My question is has the Navy performed in the risk assessment of not reaching the war fighting requirement for P8s?
GILDAY: Sir, I would have to get back to you on specifically with respect to P8s but I think more--but I think P8s would be part of a broader set of capabilities that we would use that against--and against that submarine build up. But I will have to get back to you with more specifics.
BANKS: Appreciate that. Furthermore what--what does the shortfall of P8 mean for the stockpile of associated capabilities that are necessary for anti-submarine warfare, missions such as (INAUDIBLE)?
GILDAY: Sir, I lost the connection there between (INAUDIBLE) and the–
BANKS: What is the shortfall of P8s mean for (INAUDIBLE)?
GILDAY: So--so I am concerned about numbers of (INAUDIBLE) and have added that to my unfunded list. In terms--in terms of P8 and the risk their I think there is a direct risk to war fighting capability and capacity based on numbers and so I think I can get back to you as part of that previous question and tie it together.
BANKS: I appreciate that very much. You already heard from Representative Moulton a little bit about the future of defense task force that he and I cochair. We are working closely with DOD and members of the national security innovation base to identify opportunities to invest in our future force structure. Mr. Secretary in your testimony you state quote there is clear agreement that certain new classes of ships that currently do not exist today must be designed and built rapidly in the next 10 years". What role do you see unmanned undersea vehicles systems playing in a conflict with Russia and China?
MODLY: Sir, I think they are going to play a role and I think what we need to do, the work that we need to do now and this is largely where there is some disagreements between the analysis that we have done, the analysis that Cape(SP) has done, the analysis that think tanks like CSB a(SP) has done is how do you scale? What is the scale of that--of that unmanned piece of the mission and the numbers vary from my perspective right now we are in this point int ime that I don't think that that difference in numbers is that significant because we have to get after it now anyway and it's going to take time to get to that size of force. But I think we all agree that unmanned platforms are going to have a role to play are they are under-- undersea unmanned platforms, large ones, medium-size ones, small ones, they are going to be part of the future force mix that we are going to design.
BANKS: Can you comment a little bit further on the readiness of U.S. citizens studying STEM professions and how that impacts your ability to prepare the Navy for the future?
MODLY: I think it is a huge strategic problem for us that we don't have enough students, we are not generating enough students out of secondary education to - make to meet those needs. I haven't studied it but I have seen some statistics on it and when you look at what particularly our biggest long-term competitor is doing we have significant challenges there and it limit our--it limits the--the types of input that we have into our force.
BANKS: Okay. I appreciate that. Mr. Secretary in reference to a subject that Congressman Lamborn brought up earlier what is the Navy's plan to proliferate conventional prompt strike and hypersonic weapons across the force in order to prevent them from being solely held within our submarine force?
MODLY: Sir, we would have to come back and give you a classified briefing on that in terms of how we plan on deploying these. There are lots of different options that we are looking at, but I--I really can't discuss that in an open forum, but would be more than happy to come and do that in a classified forum.
BANKS: We look forward to that. With that, I yield back.
SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Golden.
GOLDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chair. A couple of questions, Admiral Gilday. I've sat here throughout this whole hearing just to get to this. Earlier today you mentioned that Portsmouth is in New Hampshire. I just had to point out that the entrance to Portsmouth Naval shipyard is in Kittery, Maine and most of that shipyard. You know I wouldn't let you get away with that. Most of that shipyard is in Maine and were proud of it. Proud to share it with New Hampshire.
But more seriously, you've sat in front of the sea powers subcommittee in the last year we had conversations about your excitement about the DDG Flight III and--and how important getting that platform out into the Navy is. I also notice that in the FY 21 budget request, there's 46 million for industry studies regarding that next large surface combatant, but that is a ways out there.
You've testified today about how a lot of the platforms we have right now are going to be with us for a while. And as a result, you're going to be investing and upgrading the systems that you have. And with that in mind, I wanted to remind you that the current multiyear procurement for DDG 51 runs out in FY 2022 and therefore wanted to ask both the secretary and yourself what your plans are regarding an FY 23 multiyear procurement contract for DDG 51 Flight III.
GILDAY: Right now, sir, I can't speak to a detailed plan for a multiyear procurement of DDG 51 Flight III and 23. I think that would really be dependent upon the integrated force structure assessment that we've done in the prioritizing within that in terms of what we need to move forward on quickly given the top line that we have. And I don't mean to be evasive, it's just I don't have a firm answer to that yet.
MODLY: If I may just add to that, the multiyear procurements give us tremendous flexibility to purchase these--these ships, these long lead-time ships and reduce the cost of overtime, and so we are very much in favor of using that authority whenever we possibly can.
GOLDEN: Yeah, well I appreciate that and, you know, would love to work with you on that as we plan for the future because I think you made the point, Mr. Secretary, it drives down the costs of the ships. I'd be surprised, obviously I don't know what the force assessment is going to look like, but I've heard an awful lot of good testimony about the importance of the DDG destroyer as the Cadillac of the Navy, the backbone of the force. I'd be shocked to see a dramatic shift. Maybe I'll be proven wrong, but I think that be an interesting conversation.
General Berger, I wanted to just ask you in your planning guidance, you made this quote. "Marines cannot be passive passengers in route to the amphibious objective area as longrange precision standoff weapons improve and diffuse along the world. Littoral Marines must contribute to the fight alongside our neighbor shipmates from the moment we embark." I also have heard you talk about having a distributed force. You talked about landbased anti-ship weapons and being able to reach out and touch the enemy. I also can't imagine you envision a Marine Corps infantry that is not able to go ashore and tangle with the best of them.
So not a gotcha question, but during your nomination, you testified that you would continue that Marine Corps support for the close combat lethality task force. I also wanted to point out that Secretary Esper basically committed the same saying that the cross functional nature of the CCLTF increases coordination of effort department wide. For those people listening that don't know, this is an effort to strengthen the lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness of U.S. squad level infantry to ensure close combat over match against pacing threats.
Yet, the--there's a proposal to just move this into the Army and not keep it a shared joint services effort. I can't imagine that much has changed, but I did want to ask because it seems like a pretty rapid shift away from--from where we were just six months ago.
BERGER: Sir, we've benefited from that work they've done so far because we were part of it and inside this budget, plus a very small unfunded priority list for the Marine Corps, 44 percent of that unfunded stuff is individual Marine stuff from the individual combat equipment for reservists to suppressors and night optics. But we have been the beneficiary of that. We have to continue that.
We cannot let that flounder again. Not because we're going to put 10,000 Marines across at beach, were not going to relive 1944 or 1945, but because the way you describe it, we have to first deter, but if that doesn't work, be prepared to distribute a force ashore or afloat, either one, and then it's going to always boil down to a small unit leader and we have to outfit that small unit leader and his team with the very best we can.
SMITH: Thank you.
GOLDEN: Thank you. I appreciate it.
SMITH: Mr. Waltz.
WALTZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Modly, before I get into my broader strategic and parochial questions, I just wanted to--to note that several members of the Florida delegation wrote you were warding regarding the awarding of Purple Hearts to those wounded during the December terrorist attack on Pensacola NAS and--and asking you to review whether any of those personnel merit valor awards.
As a combat veteran, I certainly--I certainly saw valor in--in the actions of many to--to protect their fellow sailors and civilians. So I understand the valor awards are still under review, but I wanted to thank you for awarding several Purple Hearts to the victims of that horrific attack.
I just wanted to echo quickly my colleagues, Representative Gallego, representative banks, the concerns of the burgeoning allocative and quantitative Chinese and--and Russian fleets and lots of discussion of the Virginia, lots of discussion of the Columbia, obviously that's a key part of our deterrent. Moscow and Beijing, I think feel the same way.
So--so taking a look at that P8s and just following up on Representative Banks, we have a-- we have a reserve squadron, the P3's are so old that I guess we are retiring those even without replacements, but what's the bottom line where you need to go on--on the total numbers of P8s and--and how--how and when are we going to get there? And I know that is a piece of the ASW fight, but I think it's a pretty critical one.
GILDAY: Sir, we are not abandoning a P3s without a replacement. So the P8s are coming online and replacing those--those P3's in the late 20s. That inventory will be closed--fully closed.
WALTZ: Admiral, my understanding is that this--that reserve squadron in Jacksonville Florida is going to decommission before they get the eights. If we could--if I--I would be happy to be wrong on that if you could just follow-up for the record.
GILDAY: I will come back to you on that, sir, but I also take a look at whether or not that's being replaced and eight--in a different area with a different squadron.
WALTZ: Fair enough. Thank you.
GILDAY: But I'll get to back to you on specifics.
WALTZ: Thank you. And then on the Sonobuoy (SP) piece, and again, you could take this for the record as well if you don't have the detail, as we looked at it, you requested 49 million to recapitalize the newest version, the SSQ125A. Our understanding, my understanding, that's not in production yet, so we're confused on where, you know, basically, if you could come back to us and explain why we are recapping a Sonobuoy that's not in production versus replenishing the stocks and continuing to replenish the stocks, which I think this committee has supported you in doing in the last few years, but that seems to us to be a disconnect for replenishing something that's not in production yet. If you could come back to us on that, I'd appreciate that Admiral.
GILDAY: Yes, sir. I will.
WALTZ: And then, you know, I just have a broader strategic top line question that I'm--I'm asking of all of the services, I mean, and--and the--and the secretary and chairman. You know, we're looking at a flat top line budget. We're looking at increasing personnel costs. How--I still am not clear, and I think this is the broader strategic question we are all asking, how are we going to modernize, are we going to recap, and how are we going to procure when our personnel costs continue in the out year and the FIDAP to eat up more and more of a flat top line? It just--I'm having trouble kind of circling that square, if you could--if you could speak to that.
And then in the time remaining, I have a--I completely agree there's a--there's a quality and quantity. Are you looking at any types of pulling anything out of mothball (SP) or modernizing any from the hazard frigates or anything along those lines of kind of really getting out of the box to keep up with the pace that the Chinese are cranking out ships?
MODLY: So I think, sir, that the best way to answer that first question from my perspective is we have to look internally at our own organization and there are many things that we do, the way we operate, the way our business processes are set up, the business system structures that we have that inhibit our organization to be as agile as it needs to be, and there's cost associated with that. There--there are overhead structures that are associated with that we don't need to have and we need to--we need to funnel that in two modernization.
I think ultimately, we can dig very deep to find some of that, but at some point, there is going to have to be a broader discussion about the higher topline for the Navy. And that's-- that's something that I'm trying to queue up.
WALTZ: Thank you. Just in the time--thank you for that candor and the other piece, again, I'm on the future defense task force as well. In my remaining 10 seconds, if we are moving long-term to more and more likely manned and unmanned systems but we have the long-term personnel costs that are eating up that budget, how, you know, again, if you could come back for the record of how, you know, where those intersections come, is it 5 years, 10 years, and how do we accelerate it.
MODLY: Happy to do so.
WALTZ: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SMITH: And I think a number of members have put up on this point, but I think that is a crucial question is making the budget work for what we want to do, making sure we don't overextend ourselves so we wind up not--not doing anything well. You know, if we have the money, we have the money. If we don't, we have to figure out how to make it work, and I think a lot of us, and you as well are struggling to get the right answers on that, and that will inform a lot of what we do in this year's defense bill. Ms. Luria.
LURIA: Secretary Modly, I want to start with a comment that you made recently, and this is a quote. You said, "The service needs to settle on a north star and begin the research and development of construction to get the hulls in the water and then it could refine its vision as needed once fleet leaders understand how the new and old ships work together to bring naval power to a distributed fight."
So you know, I read this, and what do you think it sounds like it to me? It sounds like the LCS program, the DDG 1000, it sounds like the Ford, it sounds like the conversations we are having about unmanned surface vessels. So you know, I just wanted to point out the fact that, you know, we've had class after class after class of ship procurement entered construction that is essentially failed and its failed us in providing national defense, presence, deterrence, overseas and it's failed the sailors who are working on those ships. They're the ones who are doing the right thing but we are giving them platforms that can't do the job, that are not fully developed, that are not mature in design before we start building them.
And so in that discussion, I want to discuss the LCS. So in 2018, Vice Admiral Brown commander of Naval surface forces said these ships bring unmatched capability to our service Navy and provide flexibility to our fleet commander. So in your assessment, do you agree with vice Admiral Brown that these have brought us unmatched flexibility and would you say that LCS is a success or a failure?
MODLEY: Well ma'am, I think it's too early to say whether or not they are a success or a failure.
LURIA: No. it's too early to tell. You want to decommission the first four ships in the class and it's too early to tell. We're going to go through and we're going to start decommissioning them when the oldest one is 12 years old. And I'll--I'll quote Admiral Gilday gave I think a good assessment of what they turned out to be at the shipbuilding caucus breakfast a few weeks ago that they were just prototypes. Cause we built them and then we figured out that they didn't work. So is like a we'll build it and then they'll come mentality that the Navy has? Is this your plan for the FFG the large surface combatant? What is the plan of the Navy to develop platforms and ships to do the mission?
And I'm going to stop there because it's a somewhat rhetorical question and could never be possibly answered in five minutes. But what I'm going to move onto is this entire discussion about 355 ships. So, since I've been here what I've been talking about is how do we get to the 355 number? We got to it through the OFRP. And the OFRP moved us from deploying six out of every 24 months so 25 percent of the time to six out of every 36 months, 17 percent of the time.
I'm not that smart with math but I am a Navy nuke and I can do the math backwards and 355 if you do the math backwards, at 25 percent of the time it works out you only needed 282 ships to do the same thing presence wise before you went down in the amount of time they are deployed.
So, honestly, a four structure assessment and a 30 year shipbuilding plan that are based off of an assumption that we are only going to deploy approximately 17 percent of the time or six or seven out of 36 months you know, it doesn't work. It gets us to 355 and you know, I have been struggling to do your math because you said we can get to 355 ships by the end of this decade. I mean, do you have proof that our industrial base could even do that if we threw all the money that the taxpayers had at it? Would it even be physically possible?
MODLY: I think it's possible and I mentioned before ma'am, what it would take.
LURIA: So, it's possible in the plan that we haven't seen yet. It tells us how to get to 355 in a decade?
MODLY: I will be able to tell you how we think--how I think we can get there, yes, ma'am. But, you know, many of your points are valid but some aren't. The LCS, the first two LCS ships were not designed to be operational ships. They were test ships.
LURIA: Is that was testified to congress? When you came and asked us to pay a bill an American taxpayer to pay for ships you told us you wanted to build two ships that weren't going to be operational that were never going to deploy and then you send sailors there and expect them to operate these and put all of their blood, sweat and tears into operating ships that are never going to deploy?
MODLY: The first two were--were purchases with R&D dollars which meant they were research and development ships so I think I was not here.
LURIA: OK. So then, are they being counted if they're R&D ships and they are just prototype platforms are you counting them in the 293 of 55 that we have right now? Are they operational fleet ships?
MODLY:
Yes. Yes.
LURIA: Then I don't buy that--that answer. They're operational fleet ships that can't deploy. We are going to have warfare modules for them that are going to bring us a whole bunch ofc apability but guess what? We didn't even develop those and we are still not operational at this point. Is that correct?
MODLY: Some of them are. Some of them are operating right now. Some of them are doing operations out in--in South China Sea right now. So they're out there and they're doing things.
LURIA: So they're out there and they're doing things. So was it the--the agile, flexible platform that was going to solve all the Navy's problems? When I see this mystery 300--this mystery 30 year shipbuilding plan is it all LCS?
MODLY: No, ma'am.
LURIA: OK.
And, I don't think anyone ever said it was going to solve all the Navy's problems. I think it was a new capability that would address certain problems in certain areas that other, more expensive ships that--that it was too expensive to do with other ships. That is what it was (INAUDIBLE) to do.
SMITH: Gentlelady's time has expired.
LURIA: Yes.
SMITH: It is incredibly important point a much more forceful and articulate way of getting at what I was trying to get at in my opening statement is--the 355 number kind of offends me because it--it doesn't get into this. And this is what matters. You know, you can have 355 rowboats theoretically and you would have 355 ships. So, I don't even know why we put that number out there. I would much rather see here are the capabilities that we need to have and you know, yes, I take your point about R&D ships but you can't really count an R&D ship as part of the 355 ship--ship fleet if you're being honest about it--if you're not just trying to hit an artificial number. It's about the capabilities and I think you gentleman have worked very hard on this and made it better--it is about OK, we have it. Can we use it? And that's really important. And I know you focused on that. You focused on the maintenance, you focused on the issues, that just seems to me like a lot more important than spending all your time you know, trying to come up with some chart that shows we can get to 355 ships.
You know, the point is much more the capabilities and the deploy ability. Just my two cents worth. Mr. Bergman?
BERGMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I tailing Charlie here?
SMITH: Beg your pardon?
BERGMAN: Am I the last man standing?
SMITH: At the moment though you never know who is going to show up.
BERGMAN: Potentially then, the only thing standing between you all and what you are going to get onto next today I'll try to be short, sweet and to the point but it will take five minutes. So the point is, historically, we have heard the phrase used there as no one more adaptable and creative than a marine in a firefight.
Conversely, personal experience tells me there is no one less adaptable than that same Marine within a change resistant bureaucracy. As I look at today's DOD and service bureaucracies I see experienced, motivated, digitally savvy young service members held back by analog bureaucrats who are change resistant. That's just a perspective of 40 years in uniform whether it be active duty or reserve.
There is good news cause we have these service members these young men and women who they're--they're there to fight. They are there to protect our country's interest at all costs. It is up to us to do the right thing to enable them and then not stifle them after they have gotten the experience that they can be productive in a change--changing environment that is always going to be changing.
So, General Berger, I know it was mentioned before I got here you are going to propose some--the Marine Corps is proposing cuts about 2000 personnel in the FY21 budget request. You have indicated what your goal is. I guess my question is--with the proposed cuts to manning is the Marine Corps considering increased use of shared services whether it be on the admin side, the fiscal side where you don't need commands at all levels to have that completely filled out shop that you can actually streamline your--your outputs for again, HR stuff and--and fiscal stuff by utilizing the shared services?
And, can you--you want to make a comment are you ready? And if you're not we can talk about take it for the record because I'd like to hear what you are thinking?
BERGER: The force design efforts started with he warfighting end. So, most of the adjustments to how we're built had to do with warfighting and part of that--to your point, sir was where we would best--where we ought to integrate with the Navy in a personnel manner. In other words, in the numbered fleet do we have it right? Cause right now, today a numbered fleet has one marine Colonel. We--we got to do a lot different than that going forward.
So, it's--it's not for the sake of efficiencies it's for the sake of warfighting. After that, where do we go inside the Title 10 headquarters all of the headquarters between us and a battalion squadron we have to look at all of that, yes. Have we looked at it through the lens of where we could deliberately look for services elsewhere we have not yet, no.
BERGMAN: OK. Thank you. And also, for both and again, not necessarily to be answered right now but for both Admiral Gilday and General Berger, we use--now use the term operational reserve. Because since we can go back in the history--since after Korea where we didn't--we didn't populate the guard and reserve with equipment or resources necessary to keep them ready to the point where if we needed to use them they were ready to go when we needed them. Well, the last 20 plus years we have seen the value of an operational reserve.
So having said that when we--when we think about HDLD assets high demand, low density, quick turn on the deployments things--now we're talking active component assets, intel, cyber, IT, for example, we know we are not going to keep those corporals and sergeants because the--the pay is too good and the opportunity is too great in the outside world so we train them up, they serve their time honorably, they do the job well. So, I would--I would just encourage you to be looking at how do you take those highly trained capable assets and keep their viability?
It's different in an infantry battalion but those kind of assets we need to keep for as long as possible. And there's only one--one place to keep them if they leave active duty and that's a reserve capability appropriate--appropriately led by people who understand what it takes to be a--a reservist who is committed to a career after their service. With that, I yield back Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
SMITH: Thank you. I believe we are done, but thank you gentleman, very much. Appreciate your service. Appreciate your testimony and we will continue to work on this as we prepare the bill for this year. And with that, we are adjourned.
List of Panel Members and Witnesses
PANEL MEMBERS:
REP. ADAM SMITH (D-WASH.), CHAIRMAN
REP. SUSAN A. DAVIS (D-CALIF.)
REP. JIM LANGEVIN (D-R.I.)
REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WASH.)
REP. JIM COOPER (D-TENN.)
REP. JOE COURTNEY (D-CONN.)
REP. JOHN GARAMENDI (D-CALIF.)
REP. JACKIE SPEIER (D-CALIF.)
REP. TULSI GABBARD (D-HAWAII)
REP. DONALD NORCROSS (D-N.J.)
REP. RUBEN GALLEGO (D-ARIZ.)
REP. SETH MOULTON (D-MASS.)
REP. SALUD CARBAJAL (D-CALIF.)
REP. ANTHONY G. BROWN (D-MD.)
REP. RO KHANNA (D-CALIF.)
REP. WILLIAM KEATING (D-MASS.)
REP. FILEMON VELA (D-TEXAS)
REP. ANDY KIM (D-N.J.)
REP. KENDRA HORN (D-OKLA.)
REP. GIL CISNEROS (D-CALIF.)
REP. CHRISSY HOULAHAN (D-PA.)
REP. JASON CROW (D-COLO.)
REP. XOCHITL TORRES SMALL (D-N.M.)
REP. ELISSA SLOTKIN (D-MICH.)
REP. MIKIE SHERRILL (D-N.J.)
REP. KATIE HILL (D-CALIF.)
REP. VERONICA ESCOBAR (D-TEXAS)
REP. DEB HAALAND (D-N.M.)
REP. JARED GOLDEN (D-MAINE)
REP. LORI TRAHAN (D-MASS.)
REP. ELAINE LURIA (D-VA.)
REP. MAC THORNBERRY (R-TEXAS), RANKING MEMBER
REP. JOE WILSON (R-S.C.)
REP. ROB BISHOP (R-UTAH)
REP. MICHAEL R. TURNER (R-OHIO)
REP. MIKE D. ROGERS (R-ALA.)
REP. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY (R-TEXAS)
REP. DOUG LAMBORN (R-COLO.)
REP. ROB WITTMAN (R-VA.)
REP. VICKY HARTZLER (R-MO.V
REP. AUSTIN SCOTT (R-GA.V
REP. MO BROOKS (R-ALA.)
REP. PAUL COOK (R-CALIF.)
REP. BRADLEY BYRNE (R-ALA.)
REP. SAM GRAVES (R-MO.)
REP. ELISE STEFANIK (R-N.Y.)
REP. SCOTT DESJARLAIS (R-TENN.)
REP. RALPH ABRAHAM (R-LA.)
REP. TRENT KELLY (R-MISS.)
REP. MIKE GALLAGHER (R-WIS.)
REP. MATT GAETZ (R-FLA.)
REP. DON BACON (R-NEB.)
REP. JIM BANKS (R-IND.)
REP. LIZ CHENEY (R-WYO.)
REP. PAUL MITCHELL (R-MICH.)
REP. JACK BERGMAN (R-MICH.)
REP. MICHAEL WALTZ (R-FLA.)
WITNESSES:
U.S. NAVY ACTING SECRETARY THOMAS B. MODLY
U.S. NAVY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY
U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER
Adm. Mike Gilday
27 February 2020
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