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**Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
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“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready”

**CSIS
13 March 2015**

Dr. Hamre: I remember when the Navy and the Marine Corps loved each other like brothers. Cain and Abel, right? Each was going to try to kill the other to get his soup for the night. That’s changed. That’s changed because we now have truly visionary leadership that is looking forward and saying we don’t have enough resources as a country to do it dumb so we’re going to have to be smart. And being smart is finding the strengths in each other and finding ways to make those strengths come together. That’s what you’re going to hear today.

I deeply admire these gentlemen because they have been leading in a very important way to bring services together. I say this, there are two forms of athletic competition where you win by backing up. One is tug of war; the other is rowing. Competitive rowing.

Now everybody below these guys plays tug of war every day, right? And they’re the ones that are trying to get everybody facing in the boat the same direction, the oars synchronized so they can win. And it’s that kind of leadership the country needs right now. We’re very grateful to have them here. And before I turn it over to Admiral Stavridis, let me just say welcome to the Secretary of Navy John Warner. We’re delighted to have you here, Senator.

Now my very dear friend Jim Stavridis. He is never content to be just a military officer. He also decided to be a scholar and wrote books while I’m trying to get out a weekly memo. I don’t know how the hell that worked. And Jim is now heading up the Fletcher School and just doing terrific things. So I’m going to turn to Jim and Jim is going to lead this conversation. And thanks to all of you. We look forward to hearing this presentation. Thank you very much.

Moderator: John, thank you.

I’d just return the compliment, I don’t think there’s anybody in Washington, Dr. Hamre, who has deeper knowledge or more of the finger-feel for the Department of Defense, so thank you for your time in the building as well.

First of all, thank you all for turning out. This is absolutely an incredible turnout and it makes sense because this is an extremely important document. In the so-called Green Room, and of course these are three citizens of the Green Room here, beforehand I heard the Commandant of the Marine Corps, my very good friend Joe Dunford, a fellow Fletcher graduate by the way, Joe was quoting Jackie Fisher. He said now that the money's run out, it's time to think. And I think there is something to that in this strategy and so there are motivations for why now. Why are we rolling out this strategy now. Part of it is resources. But I think it would be fascinating to hear from each of the three service chiefs about why now.

If we look at the long throw of maritime strategies, go back to the Cold War, of course the maritime strategy pretty clearly delineated a world that no longer exist. We had the fall of the Wall, the end of the Cold War -- dot dot dot -- from the sea. It takes us, if you will, into the littoral. Then more recently, 2007, the cooperative strategy of which this one is a revision, but it appears to me in many ways to be quite a new document. So hopefully we'll tease out some of those things.

What I thought I would do is ask each of the three service chiefs kind of an opening question about why now from their service perspectives, and then give each of them a moment to simply talk about their particular service's piece of this strategy, then we'll open it up to questions and I know there are a lot.

If I can start with my very good friend Jon Greenert, our Chief of Naval Operations. Sir, why now?

Admiral Greenert: Why not? There you go.

Honestly, why literally now in the nearer term, because we had our thoughts kind of pulled together over a year ago. I wanted to be sure that my two colleagues here who, and we knew that changeover was going to take place, were fully on board, and I didn't try to clobber something. This is a sea service document right off the bat. That I didn't try to clobber that, so I wanted to be sure that they were fully on board and had the opportunity to consume it.

But why now, generally speaking. Where were we in 2007? We still had the John F. Kennedy conventional carrier and we're thinking we have one here coming under construction soon. We still have the Kitty Hawk in the Western Pacific. The Enterprise was nowhere near the decommissioned. Cyber wasn't a word yet. We were ramping up in Iraq and violence we're still thinking is coming up in Afghanistan. We never heard of ISIS, ISIL, Boko Haram. The Western Pacific was still in a different place. So you get my point. It was a very very different world and a lot of our missions were evolving during that time.

So I thought it was time to, in my view, redefine or define sea power as I see it, as we see it, looking now and out into the future. I thought it was important and we all agreed in the group that we worked to say what it was really about and put that foundation in its presence, to be out there and about. And to lay down, to explore and lay down our functions and be comfortable with them -- deterrence, power projection, sea control, and maritime security -- and what was felt very much in unison was all-domain access. To me that's taking AirSea Battle and what we now

call the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons -- I didn't even get the acronym, to lay that in and codify what we're doing.

Moderator: Wonderful. Let me turn it to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. How does this moment make sense for the Corps, Joe?

General Dunford: I think in addition to what the CNO said there are really three factors. One is the complexity of the security environment that he spoke about, and with that has come extraordinarily increased demand by the combatant commanders. Demand we can't meet if we do business the way we've historically been doing it. So I think what this document now does is drive us to a degree of integration that frankly is the next level from where we've been. And that's why I made the comment in the Green Room that you mentioned, is it's time to think. Because we cannot actually buy our way out of the security problems that we have right now. If you take the complexity of the security environment, the increased demand in the context of a fiscally constrained environment, with relatively fixed resources, meeting that demand is going to require us to do things differently. That's why in addition to the CNO's process comments and his comments about the warfighting aspect of it, I think that's why it makes sense for us to do it right now.

That's why from a Marine Corps perspective we're excited about it, because I do think there are things we can do better than we've been doing in the past. There are modifications we can make to the way we're doing business to better take advantage of the resources we're going to have. And frankly, this document also might inform the prioritization and allocation of resources in a different way in the coming years that would get us to build a force that's more capable and more relevant to the security challenges we confront.

Moderator: That's a wonderful point. I happened to have breakfast this morning with Brent Scowcroft, one of the great strategists I think of our times, and he said something that stuck, with me. We were talking about in today's world the strategy even makes sense because it's become such a tactical world. And he said well, if all you do is crisis management all you're going to get is more crisis. That's a pretty powerful point.

Commandant, let me turn to you, sir, and say from the perspective of our Coast Guard, how does this moment feel for you in terms of the right time?

Admiral Zukunft: To follow on the biblical Cain and Abel reference, I'm David trying to take down a Goliath.

We've had a convergence of Goliaths since 2007. One is the Arctic. It's an ocean, but it's become a much more open ocean. We've seen military gestures by Russia in the Arctic, but really one of the biggest concerns in the Arctic, someone's going to fall in it or oil spills in it and it affects the way of life up in the Arctic domain. So I look at the Arctic, the nation right now. We produce more oil than we import, and by 2020 we will be a net export nation. We produce the most oil and gas in the world. The Panama Canal opens, it's going to change sea lines of communication. But the Coast Guard as a regulatory agency, guaranteeing the safety and security of that maritime transportation system, we have a vital part there as well.

Intel now drives most of our operations. We no longer go out and do random patrols and we have awareness through whole of government on about 90 percent of the drug flow destined to the United States. On the best of days I can probably put planes and ships on about 20 percent of that flow, at a point in time when the Western Hemisphere is besieged by organized crime. Eight out of ten of the most violent nations are here.

As we look at this cooperative strategy, the Navy has to rebalance when you look at the threats across the world, so it's imperative that the Coast Guard provide some of that filler, if you will, to stay focused and maintain the momentum that we have in the Western Hemisphere.

Moderator: Perfect.

Let me kind of spin the order and ask each of you to just say a word about as you read the strategy and you think about your service, it's one thing to have a strategy. Now you've got to execute it. So what are the keys for execution as you look at the strategy going forward? Can I ask you to go right back again?

Admiral Zukunft: I'll go way back in time, 1890, Alexander Hamilton chartered a fleet of 10 revenue cutters, and I'm sure the right number back then would have been about 20, but we made do with 10. [Laughter]. But we've always been very platform centric. Give me a budget and I'll figure out what to do with it. You really need to have strategy drive your budgetary process.

This strategy comports very well, the Coast Guard has several series of strategies. We have an Arctic strategy that aligns with a national strategy for the Arctic region. I just released a Western Hemisphere strategy that aligns with our department strategy for southern borders. And we now have a national strategy for Central America.

Within the next month I will then release an all domain, a cyber strategy, because the Coast Guard operations in three domains -- dot mil, dot gov and then dot com in our relationship with the maritime industry. So this really comes at a very opportune time for us to align our strategies with the higher level and especially among the three sea services.

Moderator: That's an interesting way to approach it. So you're creating and already have, if you will, some sub-strategies, both regional and functional. Interesting approach.

Commandant, what say you? What's the execution?

General Dunford: The strategy outlines for the Marine Corps, which should be no surprise to anybody that follows the Marine Corps. One, we should be forward deployed, forward engaged, and able to respond to crisis. And secondly, we should be part of what the CNO has described as all domain access. We provide a forcible entry capability that is a key piece of all domain access.

So the next step is, which we actually are in the midst of anyway, is reviewing the capabilities that we have to support those. And as I mentioned today, if you met the combatant commanders' requirements you'd need something over 50 ships. We don't have 50 ships. So we're going to have 33 amphibious ships. That's the fiscally constrained requirement. So the first step is to take a look and say look, we have a requirement to be forward deployed, forward engaged. We have a requirement to respond to crises. We have a fixed inventory of amphibious ships. So what else can we do to put Marines at sea, to put Marines and Sailors at sea, to be able to respond to crises in a timely manner?

To put that in some perspective I use two models. There are really two models of crisis response. There's the model of conducting evacuation operations this past year into Sudan and Libya and Yemen where you're on the front page above the fold for about 24 hours, and then you've moved on. Or there's the crisis response model of Benghazi which never goes away. Of course in one case you respond within hours; in other cases you respond within days. The American people I think have an expectation that it's the former not the latter that Marines and Sailors will be able to do.

So in terms of where we go next, I think one of the more important things we do is we take a look at how do we fill that gap that we currently have? We are doing some of that shore-based. That of course is suboptimal from my perspective. The one thing you have when you have naval forces is you have a piece of U.S. sovereignty out there. You don't have to ask permission to do things. You can do whatever the nation needs you to do. So although we have special purpose MAGTAFs that are currently filling that gap, I think there are other things we can do to fill that gap and the strategy outlines that.

From a warfighting perspective, we have some capability gaps inside the organization right now, and frankly, that's something we've been looking at over the last couple of years and what the document now does is just provide even more clear focus on the need to move forward with those. Again, to make sure that we can do all the things we need to be able to do across the range of military operations which really runs from that day-to-day engagement that the document lays out, and then supporting the all domain access which in my mind a subset of that, an important subset of that is the nation's forcible entry capability from the sea, and we are the only forcible entry capability from the sea the nation has.

Moderator: Thank you, sir. How about you, CNO? Execution, as Vern Clarke always used to tell us.

Admiral Greenert: Yeah, the most important part of it, I suppose.

Where it codifies I believe what we're doing in the Navy, especially the organize and train and equip and then the deployment. What we've done is sort of captured what we're doing out there.

However, it has to be consumed and digested internally, externally, especially with partners and allies and to that extent we have it being translated in several languages and we'll send it out to, in fact it's in progress as we speak today to get out there. I need to listen to them and say so

what does this mean to you? Because partnership is a huge part of this. So they are obviously a major player or they're not a partner.

I will look at the building of the next POM Through the lens of how this is laid out. It's not designed to build a budget right on top of it. There's a layer in between. But it defines that fairly well on our endeavors in that regard.

Then lastly I would say there's a classified annex or two or three to be put together here. To go to the next level and say okay, how do we, and probably regionally. So how do we deal with this regionally in more detail at a higher classification?

Moderator: I think even in the title, cooperative strategy, I think there's an international component as CNO indicates, an interagency cooperative component. And hopefully over time a private/public one which I think Commandant of the Coast Guard mentioned the Arctic and in a number of ways pulled all that together.

And I'm glad you mentioned, CON, the strategic communications piece of this. What's more important than using this as a lever to tell the story.

With that, let me open it up for questions and comments. Please indicate who you would like to address the question to, or to all three. We'll look for fairly crisp answers so we can get a lot of people in.

Question: [Captain Wentz]. Thanks, Admiral.

In today's Washington Post there was an opinion piece by someone named Jim Stavridis about the soft underbelly of Europe. So I'd like to have all three panelists maybe look at what we can do to help the underbelly of Europe, the Italians in particular, protect against ISIS and other terrorist organizations.

Admiral Greenert: I think a good point Jim made right off the bat is maritime domain awareness, and Jim made it clear. This is a collective effort that needs to take place out there. We have an Ocean Shield effort, we have an Operation Atalanta. Both NATO, both a little bit, in my opinion, legacy that can be reapplied for that area. So I think sharing as much information as possible to help the Italians in this would be a great first step. And perhaps the least effort needed.

Moderator: Commandant, you know the Italian Coast Guard is deeply involved in this effort across that strait which has humanitarian aspects. Are we working with them, cooperating with the Italians in particular or in a general sense?

Admiral Zukunft: We have a North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, and they had 170,000 migrants leave the north coast of Africa, and then they arrived in Italy. Some from Syria. There's very little biometrics, but there's also very little unity of effort within the European Union. So whoever takes receipt is now the owner.

We want to make sure there's a clear end game as you deal with a mass migration, is what is the end state. We certainly have a model that we use here in the United States. Does it apply in the European Union? Right now it doesn't. So there really needs to be an authorities piece that goes with that.

You don't want to go in, start something that doesn't have a clear end game to it, especially if you don't have the authorities. But we have that very frank and open dialogue.

Moderator: Commandant, anything you'd like to add?

General Dunford: I think that question gets at what I alluded to earlier which is in the European Command we have a gap in frankly AFRICOM, we have a gap in our ability to do crisis response from the sea, and we actually expect, the CNO and I expect from both commanders a letter that will request a mobile landing platform afloat staging base to help fill that gap. So that's one of the ways that we can help out. The whole first part of my career, going to the Med was a routine occasion. We always had strong naval presence in the Mediterranean. We don't have that today as a result of the challenges in the Middle East and the presence required in the Pacific, so EUCOM and AFRICOM have been the bill payer, if you will, for our presence in the Middle East and in the Pacific.

And I think back to the point of the strategy and causing us to think differently with the resources that we have available, there's a perfect problem that you're already working. In other words, we're in dialogue right now with the combatant commanders. They've articulated the gap in crisis response.

I mentioned one material solution. That's not the limit of the material solution. But the point is, trying to figure out how do we get Marines and Sailors back into the Mediterranean to support what you wrote about this morning in the southern flank of Europe, because there are obviously very real security challenges and forward presence is a key piece of addressing those.

Moderator: I agree. In particular I want to underline this afloat forward staging base, because it's also an opportunity for private/public partnering. It's a creative idea. I've seen it bouncing around.

Admiral Greenert: I would say that within the strategy we talk about a global network. On any given day, we took a muster one time. There are about 600-700 ships underway within what we would call the freedom-loving nations around the world. So if you take the full inventory, it's well over a thousand ships. So we have a thousand ship Navy, potential energy out there.

So my point would be these are the kind of opportunities, kind of a common problem. Nobody wants this to happen, right? Here's an ally, a friend that we could get together. How hard can this be? And we have the ships. So bring it together, get the common network and go to work. That's kind of the point.

Moderator: Great point.

Question: Sidney Freedburg, Breaking Defense.

A question first for the CNO, but I think both commandants can probably add to it as well.

The one thing that seems new in sort of doctrinal terms is you have these four traditional functions, you've added all the main access which is admittedly a very vague term but intriguing, as a fifth. It's a long list of things but A, what's the unifying idea of all the main access? It seems to imply a somewhat scarier world if we have to fight for access. And what does it mean institutionally in terms of how the three services actually allocate resources and train people for it to be elevated to a fifth core function?

Admiral Greenert: You have to think about, it's all well and good to want to project power, be deterrent and all of these things. If you can't get to where you need to get, which could be on the surface, under the sea, in the space, you get my point. All of the domains including cyber, you'll be ineffective. In the world that we live in with the means that we are being tasked to project power and do the things that our military is required to do. It's more conceptual, Sidney, in our approach and it captures the very essence, in my opinion, of what started out to be the AirSea Battle concept.

If you don't have that and it's not a primary function that all of our kids are thinking about when they develop, when they organize, train and equip and operate, we will not necessarily be successful. That's what that means.

General Dunford: I think for Marines it really codifies the way we think anyway. We've never associated ourselves with a specific domain. We've always thought of ourselves as having a lane within both the sea, air and land domain. What this really is, I think is another way of looking at combined arms integration, but now it's both traditional and non-traditional combined arms integration to ensure that we can do whatever we want to do whenever we want to do it. I think that's an important piece of -- There is an offensive warfighting tone to this document that says where the United States has interests and needs access it can have that access. I think that's what that concept captures.

Question: Hank Hendrickson with the U.S. Philippine Society.

To turn towards Asia, if I may, I'd be curious to know how you see evolving relations with the Philippines in light of what's going on in terms of both the rebalance to Asia and in the South China Sea. Thank you.

General Dunford: I'm actually encouraged, and you probably are tracking it pretty closely. Our relationship with the Philippines, particularly over the last two or three years, the military to military engagement has really improved quite a bit. I can foresee now operationalizing some of the ideas that we're discussing with the Philippine military. You've seen more Marines in and out of the Philippines lately than we have for a few years. We provided good support to the Philippines in dealing with their own insurgency, and so I think consistent with the overall rebalance to the Pacific, and consistent with developing strong partnerships and relationships, Filipinos have been strong partners for many years. We had a little bit of a dip in the

relationship, but I think there's a compelling reason for us to cooperate more closely in the future than we have perhaps over the last few years.

Moderator: Commandant, I know your three star command was the Pacific for the Coast Guard.

Admiral Zukunft: It was. We do a lot of work with the Philippines. Two of our former Hamilton class cutters are now painted gray and they're in the Philippine Navy. But at the same time we have very frequent dialogues. We have Philippine cadets at our academy that when they graduate we've had several rise to be chiefs of their respective services so it's a strategic relationship. But then you've got places like Mischief Reef -- 120 miles off the coast of Palawan that the Philippines can't access. And then what is the role of ASEAN? So not just the Philippines. Vietnam and others that have been more vociferous over the nine dotted lines, and what they clearly see as encroachment on their territorial and their economic exclusion zone in this case.

The real challenge for us is what is the role of the United States? Right now our policy is one of non-intervention. We would like to see this resolved amicably, without any miscalculation. But how long does this go on, and at what point, what instrument might you use for U.S. diplomacy? Maybe it's a white ship with a Coast Guard stripe on it. Maybe not a gray ship. But all of those conversations we continue to have in a very open, transparent dialogue with the Philippines.

Moderator: Let me ask a former 7th Fleet commander who knows the Pacific as well as anybody. What are your thoughts, CNO?

Admiral Greenert: First of all there's a defined treaty, so we have treaty obligations with the Philippines, one of the five in the Western Pacific that we have. But then when you go beyond that you say what do they want to do? What are their aspirations? And how do we make our opportunities resonate with that at a pace that makes sense with them? We have to enable them, as my colleagues have mentioned before, we're in the process of doing that.

I get back to maritime domain awareness and the willingness of that group, as Paul mentioned, to be a network in this whole thing. There's an amazing deterrent effect, intellectual deterrent. When folks see us all getting together and they're not, that's uneasy to them. What does that beget?

Moderator: Let me take the moderator's prerogative and since we're in the Pacific let me ask each of you to comment on to what degree was China and China's military in your minds as you worked and crafted on this strategy?

Admiral Greenert: Oh, a major part. They're in there. We have taken the opportunity to lay in by region and in some cases by nation. They weren't the only one, but they were a large part of it, and I think it's, I hope people would read it and say yeah, I see that right here.

General Dunford: This is about projecting U.S. influence in the Pacific where we have significant political and economic interests, and for Marines this was a natural piece of the

strategy. We view our contribution as the 22,500 Marines west of the International Date Line. I think that sends a clear and unmistakable signal to anyone in the Pacific that's the U.S. commitment in the region, and I think certainly we want that to be part of China's calculus.

Admiral Zukunft: As we talked about earlier, about partnerships and relationships. The Coast Guard has a longstanding one with China. They're modeling their Coast Guard after the United States Coast Guard. Four of the five Dragons are now China Coast Guard, complete with the paint scheme, racing stripe. Not our people, not our authorities, but they're replicating the United States Coast Guard.

Each year we do a combined operation. It's not an exercise. It goes on for about two months where we share information, we put Chinese ship riders on Coast Guard cutters and then we direct intercept operations. China is signatory to the UN Convention on High Sea Drift Net Fishing. So we seize vessels and we hand them over to China for prosecution. So it's a good news story that we have with China. This month I will host the Director of the Maritime Safety Administration which is not a member of the China Coast Guard but they have the greatest presence out in the East and South China Sea to address the issues of CUES, as the CNO has brought up, to socialize that aspect so we don't have miscalculations between China and the United States.

Moderator: Thank you. Senator Warner, Secretary of the Navy Warner?

Question: Thank you very much.

You opened with a reference to the Cold War and I remember it quite well. [Laughter]. At that time we had off the coast of the United States Soviet submarines with a full load, not more than 400-500 miles off our coast. Patrolling. And every morning in the Pentagon when we started the day, we were briefed on the positions and what our collective ASW capabilities were and the status.

My question, with all due respect to you, Admiral, you've devoted your life to the silent service, and our triad -- land, sea and air -- of that team the survivability of the submarine force is the highest. To the extent you can share with us today, the cutting edge that we had in the late '60s and '70s kept that Cold War from becoming a hot element. Do we have that cutting edge technology today in our combined ASW forces given the advancements of today's Russia in the submarine business?

And the last question, they had an interesting military general staff and there was a strong link of communications between our military and Admiral Gorshkov and [Gretchko]. Those chains were kept open. Now given the mystery surrounding Putin today, are those communications still there? And do we have that cutting edge as a deterrent from letting this current situation get hot?

Admiral Greenert: Thanks, Senator. And thanks for all the things that you do. We very much look forward to delivering the John Warner in the not too distant future. Just a plug. I'm just saying. [Applause].

I summarize it by saying we own the undersea domain today. I am very comfortable with where we are today. I am very uncomfortable with where we're headed when I look at the budgetary situation. And I don't want to turn this necessarily into a budget question, but we have the advantage in the undersea today. We will not enjoy that advantage if we head down the budget world that ends with the Budget Control Act levels of funding because we just aren't keeping up with the movement of technology today.

With that said, we have it intellectually, we have it in the culture, and we have it in the technology. And I'm talking not just the submarines, I'm talking about the network of systems under the water and the new P-8 aircraft which is a quantum leap in our anti-submarine warfare capability.

Senator, just a few years ago in my [dingy] house there in the dining room I was drinking a vodka toast with the Chief of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov. And he was talking about how I'm headed to St. Petersburg and I was so excited. And just like that, months later, no communication. So we are frankly cut off. I worry about it very much so, because I've seen the opportunities and you have too, sir, in the Cold War that present themselves when you can have engagement as we've been able to have with China and some of the movement we've had, spoken to in this room, about what we've been able to do. But we have no engagement with Russia right now and no engagement with Iran which bothers me. And I think if we could work to that regard it would be best for our security situation.

Question: Thank you and good morning. Jack London.

In the creation of any strategy one always thinks in terms of threats and challenges and vulnerabilities. And following on Senator Warner's question and others, maybe you could focus for a moment on what are the higher priority threat profiles for which this strategy has been created to give us some perspective.

General Dunford: I think what it outlines, at first, obviously, violent extremism is one of the threats that's outlined. Certainly Russia and the developments that we just alluded to is part of it. An earlier question was China. You'd have to think about North Korea, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles. Those are probably some of the top challenges that the strategy outlines and addresses.

Admiral Zukunft: For me it's the role of non-state actors in the maritime domain. When I look at organized crime, it's a \$750 billion enterprise. And what's the second order effect of that? Rule of law, good governance, regional stability. And where are they most vulnerable? They're most vulnerable at sea.

So the Coast Guard has 41 treaties with other countries to be their law enforcement arm, while using military authorities right into their territorial sea which is unique. There's no other set of authorities like it around the world. So for us it provides us that emphasis, if you will, on non-state actors and their role with regard to regional stability.

Admiral Greenert: Nation state, I'd say North Korea, Iran, Russia, and the non-state actors stated by my colleagues from Boko Haram to ISIS to al-Qaida, IM, AP.

Subject wise, cyber. We have to grasp what it really means and what we have to do in the mechanics of that. There's a host of weapons I won't bore people with that we're working on.

Moderator: I completely agree on cyber. In my time as the NATO commander, that kept me more awake than Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans and a number of other challenges.

Question: Thank you very much. China News Agency of Hong Kong.

I have a question of U.S.-China military relations. My question is particularly for Admiral Greenert. We know a couple of weeks ago the two warships of the U.S. Navy and PRA Navy for the first time conducted the COC of the Unexpected Encounter in the South China Sea. So how significant it is? And what kind of military exchange programs will be going on in this year between U.S. Navy and PRA Navy? Thank you.

Admiral Greenert: This year, 2015? Not a lot. Not as much as I had hoped. There are no big multilateral exercises this year. We look ahead to RIMPAC 2016, toward that and see where that goes. But we have occasional bilaterals. We do them in the Gulf of Aden with PLAN ships. Admiral Wu Shengli and I would very much like to and we are in the process of getting what we call modules. Simple exercises so that when our two ships pass in the East China Sea, South China Sea, wherever, those commanding officers have the authority vested in them to say hey, let's do common book, and you call it out. We do it with NATO ships all the time. I think it's called ATP1 Alpha, it used to be the old book. You're laughing. You know how old we are, right? So we can do this.

There are others. There are some multilateral exercises in the South China, I should say the ASEAN area that we work. Brunei hosted some, and there are others in the mix. But I think basically we are looking for those opportunities, tactical opportunities as well as broader multilateral. I think you'll find 2016 will be a better year than '15. It tends to go in cycles.

Question: Good morning. My name is Colin Steel. I work at Georgetown University. I'd first like to thank all the panelists, and then ask all of them about evolving cooperative strategies between the sea services as we transition out of land based warfare, particularly with respect to non-state or even non-war operations.

Moderator: Transitioning out of land warfare. I think we're probably going to continue to do some land warfare, but cooperative strategies, please. Between the services. Anything in particular that jumps to your mind, Commandant?

General Dunford: First before the strategy maybe just the process. One thing we revived a couple of years ago was the Naval Board. That's got both the senior leadership of the Marine Corps and CNO, senior leadership of the Naval Board. And that Board really is designed to drive better integration between the Navy and the Marine Corps, both for day to day operations, but as well on initiatives like the cooperative strategy. Where are we going in the future?

What's going to be the capability development we need to have in the Navy and Marine Corps and want to have in 2020, 2022.

I would just say I think the comment you made probably captures my sentiment. Land warfare is not going away, and the Marine Corps never left the sea. So there's an overstatement on both sides. We throughout the last 14 years of land warfare, if you will, we've remained at sea. Our Marine Expeditionary Units have continued to be out there. It's been an issue of capacity, number one, and it's also been an issue of level of warfare. Where we've suffered the most is not in our day-to-day, forward deployed, crisis response capability. The ARG MEU capabilities are still what they need to be. I think it's probably in the high end warfighting where it's suffered a little bit because we haven't had the opportunity to conduct the kind of exercises and training necessary to do that. I think that's where really our focus is right now.

But I would tell you I think the Naval Board, which has historically been something that's brought the Navy and Marine Corps together, revitalizing that under Admiral Greenert's leadership a couple of years ago with my predecessor, I'm certainly committed to that. We'll continue to do that, and I think that's the right vehicle to get to where we need to be.

Moderator: Commandant, in my strike group we deployed with a Coast Guard cutter. Is that kind of integration still in progress occasionally?

Admiral Zukunft: Very much. We meet and we've been meeting probably for over two decades now on an annual basis -- CNO, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and our very senior staffs, NavGuard Board is what it used to be called. So we look at regions of the world. We look at the Arctic. We said what is the greatest risk in the Arctic right now? And it really speaks to Coast Guard like equities as the Navy developed a road ahead for the Arctic region. We have Coast Guard law enforcement teams fully integrated doing Oceania maritime security initiatives as we look at threatened EEZs in that part of the world. No different in Africa as well. So whether it's law enforcement teams or fully integration with our Navy counterparts.

Our newest national security cutter was the SAG Commander for the PLA during this last RIMPAC. It was a good fit for us.

So wherever we can support, but we've had -- It's been in our DNA for probably well over, probably since 1790, quite honestly.

Moderator: CNO, anything to add on that?

Admiral Greenert: I'd say the U.S. Navy is very much a supporting entity when it comes to warfare ashore. So our job is to be out and about where it matters, when it matters as I like to say. If something erupts, put it up. Put that fire out right away using, with my two colleagues as a partnership. If that doesn't get it done and we've got to go to war at sea, we establish maritime superiority which means you can go where you need to go with acceptable risk and prevent another country or an adversary from doing the same. Then establish a sea base and support land operations with either the Marine Corps or the Army as the case may be. The Air Force and air power.

I'm not trying to wrap it up in some perfect thing, but all I would suggest is it isn't that clear-cut. As my colleagues have said, we're still intertwined in this land warfare piece and a major supporting entity. Supporting, I emphasize.

Question: Meghan Eckstein with USNI News.

Admiral Greenert, you mentioned earlier that you were going to be looking at the next POM cycle through the lens of the strategy. So I wonder for all three of you if there are any areas that you see now where the FY16 budget may not mesh up perfectly with this strategy, and where you may need to kind of tweak the budget.

Admiral Greenert: I'll start off with strategic deterrence. The sea-based strategic deterrent is our number one mission that we provide the security of the United States. That's homeland security. We have to replace the current Ohio class submarine, Senator Warner kind of eluded to it earlier, the survival piece. We don't have the money associated to do that without ruining the shipbuilding account which permeates all that this strategy is about for the future. That is my number one conundrum right now.

General Dunford: I think probably one of the key areas that's not properly aligned and we've got to work on is command and control as a whole. This implies distributed operations to a degree probably greater than we've been doing historically. It's a trend that's happened. We used to talk a lot about split Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary unit operations within the same COCOM and we used to argue as to whether or not that ought to be a good thing to do or not and whether we ought to train, organize and equip to actually be able to do split ARG operations.

It's now the routine. It's always going to happen. And not only that, we now have what we call disaggregated operations which means routinely we're going to have naval forces that are operating simultaneously in two separate combatant commanders' area of responsibility. And I'm not satisfied that we have actually addressed the organizational implications, the equipment implications and the training implications to fully realize the distributed operations that are captured inside the document. That's actually a huge focus for us.

It isn't so much about POM '16, to be honest with you, because it's not just going out and buying things. It's actually thinking our way through this and making sure that what we're doing is fully integrated and develops a capability. So it's just not about going and buying more radios, I wish I could do that in '16. It's about us coming together and identifying a capability that we need to have and making sure that's properly resourced.

And I'll finish by saying there are two questions I asked my team the other day as we did the POM '17 review. The first question was, does this fully support distributed operations at the company level, which for us is one of the concepts. The second question was, does this fully support operational maneuver from the sea, and do we actually realize then in the context of CS-21 what we're saying we need to be able to do.

So this is really not just FY16 or POM '16. This is about capability development over the next three, five, frankly seven or eight years.

Moderator: Commandant, you're of course in a different department. I assume Secretary Jay Johnson has had a good look at this strategy. How about you? How would you answer the question in terms of the needs and supporting that cooperative strategy that's laid out here?

Admiral Zukunft: With respect to the Department of Homeland Security, tremendous, tremendous support from my Secretary. Because we're on the threshold of what will be the largest recapitalization effort in Coast Guard history. We have three bids that are out. We will down-select next year. Then we need to move ahead on recapitalizing a fleet of ships that today is 50 years old. When that first ship is delivered they'll be 55.

So I explain to people that are not familiar with the maritime domain, when you get to the sea buoy and then you go beyond that, I will say it gets very lonely. It gets lonely because we are the only entity in the world that has three sets of authority, 61 bilateral agreements that cover counter-drugs, fisheries, but even more importantly, weapons of mass destruction on every flag state of convenience. So if you have a shipment destined for the United States, do you want a goal line defense inside the sea buoy, or do you want the ability to exert U.S. sovereignty into the territorial seas of where that ship departed? The answer is I'd much rather have the latter. But we're not going to have that as a nation if we don't make this investment to build affordable ships, most importantly with the authorities vested in the United States Coast Guard to be able to exert our sovereignty well beyond the sea buoy.

Question: [Ray Dubois, CSIS]. Thank you, Jim.

Your strategy in Section 4 addresses building the future force, and obviously all strategies to be compelling and to be strong must address the issue of people.

With respect to the advances in science and advances in technologies, how are the sea services addressing incorporating those advances into the professional military education issues, War College curricula, to assist our future leaders in appreciating those technologies and how they impact our strategy, and how they might enhance our ability to think strategically.

Moderator: Can I just ask as you answer that, incorporate cyber into it specifically. I know CNO you're doing some exciting things at the Academy with cyber along those lines.

Admiral Greenert: Let me start with the Academy then. We have a, some call it a Cyber Center. I think we need to rename it. It's an Information Dominance Center because it's more than cyber in the essence. But I think it connotes the point.

What does that mean? Well, we need some very basic training here. The midshipmen must have embedded in them, inculcated in them an understanding of what all this means, including the protection, simple cyber hygiene which remains 70 percent of the problems we have. Somebody is phishing and you get sucked in and boy, you've infected it.

So to raise a point where we entice people into that technological piece. We have very smart people coming in the Navy, but as Bill Moran is working with, we need to manage our talent requisite to today's folks. What does that mean? We come in and we're sort of in a conga line. What year group are you in? And whatever amount of years you will make JG, lieutenant and whatever. It doesn't really matter how talented you are for a while. Then at some point you might get deep selected. We don't have as many of those as we used to. Why is that? Then we'll say I'll tell you what. You're so smart, we're going to send you away to school, maybe Oxford, and when you come back you're two years behind your year group. How did that happen? Now it's time for you to go before a Board. He didn't select, she didn't select. Uh huh. It happens. So they're saying why do I want to be in that unit?

So we've got to work our way out of the year group mentality, get some flexibility into that, allow them to blossom off and take maybe some time to go off and do other things somewhere else in that career. We call it career intermission. It's a pilot now. We need it to be a program. So we're taking the Hill on and we're getting some reasonably good support. We need a bill with it in there.

We need many more females in the Navy than we have. Look at society. If we don't represent it, where's the intelligence out there? A lot of it is in the female population graduating from college. We need to mine it, bring it in, and allow them to be able to feel that they can do this career, still have a family, and do whatever else they need to do.

So lastly, how do you get them to understand the science and technology of it? STEM. To get people out there to infuse that into the 10, 11, and 12 year olds so that they have that kind of interest in that.

Last thing. I was like stunned and amazed. I met somebody the other day, a guy who introduced me to his son and I said so what are you doing? He said man, I'm in STEM, and I almost fell out. I wanted to hug that kid. That would have been too freaky on him. It's out there and it's starting to work and he was interested in the Navy as a result of STEM. So anyway, just a few thoughts there.

General Dunford: You asked the question about institutionalizing the curriculum in our education. I'm satisfied with that piece, but I've got a different problem. Some of you probably don't know this. Sixty percent of the United States Marine Corps is on their first enlistment, and 40 percent of the United States Marine Corps is in the bottom three enlisted grades.

So as we look at the challenges that we're speaking about, as we look at the requirement for cyber capabilities, as we look at F-35 mechanics, as we look at some of the more technical occupational fields, and as we look at the challenges, frankly, on our small unit leaders to be able to integrate all of that, even at the sergeant, squad leader level. As an example, our front line leadership has typically been three to four year sergeants. Today if you compare the challenges, without taking too much time in answering the question, if you compare the challenges on that front line squad leader in charge of 13 Marines today to what it was when I first came in the Marine Corps, there's no comparison.

So one of the things that we just did actually, I released a message last week where we're moving that front line leadership from a three to four year sergeant to a five to six year sergeant so we can better integrate what I call maturity, which is experience, education, and training. We're now remapping, frankly, all of our occupational fields, all our enlisted fields. In fact where I'm going immediately after this is down to our manpower section to talk to all of our folks down there about this problem. Because we're going to do what we call mature the force. So at the end of the day I'm hesitant to give you a percentage, but I will tell you that the composition of the force in the coming years will be much different than it is today. And that 60 percent first termers, that number's going to be reduced. The numbers of lance corporals we have relative to the numbers of sergeants, staff sergeants and gunnery sergeants that we have is going to change. And part of that is because the skill sets that you need and the time you need to integrate, again, education, how to think; training, what to do; and then experience. The time that you need to integrate those three components into what I call professional maturity is just much greater than it has been in the past. So the demographics of the force are going to change so that we can take advantage of the curriculum changes and the education pieces which I think are much easier to do. It's much easier to put that in there than it is to have human capital strategies that support that.

Moderator: Commandant, from the Coast Guard perspective?

Admiral Zukunft: Flip the Marine Corps the other way, and the nucleus of my service is in that 8-15 year range. We're bringing in some of the brightest talent that this nation can bring to bear. From time to time I sponsor a recruit company. The last one I sponsored, 30 percent had Bachelor's degrees, 15 percent had Master's degrees, one had a PhD, as an E2 in the United States Coast Guard. Our retention rate over the last four years, 93 percent.

So as I look at who's my competition, it's the private sector. They are cherry picking the best talent that I have, and I've got tremendous talent. We are now specializing in the Coast Guard in cyber and intelligence, acquisitions. As we're bringing more complex systems, we're not bringing on the F-35 -- I want to go on the record on that.

Admiral Greenert: You're the only one. Get with it.

General Dunford: We are bringing the F-35 on. I want to go on the record on that.

Admiral Zukunft: But our ships, our sensors are much more complex. So our technicians that maintain those systems, when they leave that platform they need to go to a shore installation that's going to maintain it. When it's time for them to go back to sea again, that's exactly where they need to go. So we need to put better circuit discipline into our human resource capital plan, which includes education, which includes staying in a chosen field long enough so you really become masters of that chosen profession.

The good news is, we have people that have a passion for each and every one of these and I just need to make sure that I hold onto them.

Moderator: Wonderful, and I think a terrific place to come an extraordinary event, with our people. We all know that's really the future.

Let me also thank the U.S. Naval Institute, but particularly CSIS for hosting this, and Lockheed Martin, speaking of private/public cooperation, who has helped put this event together today.

Lastly, before concluding with a round of applause for the service chiefs, I want to just say I suspect there are a lot of people in the room today who worked on this strategy. A lot of O3s and O4s and O5s and some brilliant O6s in each of the services who were like Cain and Abel, working every sentence and every line. If you worked on the strategy, could you just raise your hand? If you worked on this strategy in some way.

So I'll conclude by saying that we should feel wonderful as a nation and as citizens to look at these three officers who lead the sea services of the United States of America. Well done, gentlemen.

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