

Center for a New American Security
Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Strengthening Regional Maritime Security
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert
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ROBERT WORK: That I get to introduce as the new CEO of CNAS, as chief of naval operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert. (Applause.)

ADMIRAL JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, folks, like a lot of things in my life, I wasn't sure the way this was starting out when he was gone, like a big disappointment, like the old 14th Street falling apart, or whatever the heck's going on out there. But above, I'm honored and pleased to be here. And this is our world.

You know, there was – most of the time I grew up as a Cold War sailor, the Atlantic was the center piece. You know, any time you'd go get a chart of the world or a map of the world, you always had kind of the Atlantic there. And it took a while. And when I went to be – when I was the deputy of Com-Pac fleet, Commander Pacific fleet, my boss, Admiral Walt Doran, used to call the CNO say, Vern, you just don't get it, do you? This is the center piece of the world right here.

So I want to talk about that. Bob asked me to come and talk about the Asia-Pacific and the Navy's perspective on the Asia-Pacific. And I'm very honored to be able to do that.

The president of the United States and the secretary of defense, not long ago, just over a year ago, directed in our 2012 defense strategic guidance to rebalance. And many other defense officials and government officials have spoken about that in some detail. We're supporting their effort and I want to talk to you a little bit about that tonight and offer some of the thoughts that I have the Navy perspective of that. Why we're rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, what we're doing to rebalance, or, if you will, the means to do that rebalance, and how we're – what I call kind of balancing the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, kind of the ways that we do it?

So the timing is good. I'm still getting over jet lag a little bit, but I just came from the Asia-Pacific. I was in Japan for a few days, met with my counterpart. We spent a couple of days together. I met with the minister of defense and some other folks there. Went down to Singapore, where there was an international maritime defense expo and an international maritime conference. They're getting geared up for the Shangri-La Dialogue here next week. And then of course, we'd go to Korea, where it's an interesting place, interesting kind of atmosphere there. And I'll talk to you a little bit about that.

I'll tell you. My sense is, having been over there, I was there just a little – maybe 15 months ago, I was in the Asia-Pacific region. The question sort of was are you guys going to be here? I mean,

things are changing over there. You're writing this new strategy and we're a little anxious about that. And I didn't catch any of that here. People thought, hey, we see it more often. I mean, Nimitz is over there. Stennis just left there. George Washington's coming out of refit. You know, there's activity over there, some not so good. And they're saying, OK, we got you, tangible presence. The Freedom just showed up in Singapore, and I'll talk a bit about that, our littoral combat ship, just a few weeks ago. But the question sort of became, good, you're here. We see that. So what's next? How is this – how's this going to evolve. Let's talk about that. What should our expectation be there?

And I would tell you, one of my takeaways from this trip is in order to balance right, we need to get cooperation from our allies, from our partners, and our potential partners. And we need to get coordination and we need to listen. The strength – we need to strengthen our alliances, no question about that. We're on that. We need to support partnerships, but pretty much we need to establish a pretty constructive and stable relationship all around the place, and I'll talk a little about that.

So why the rebalance? Well, our security and our economic interests are definitely inextricably linked to that region. Five of our seven treaty alliances are in the Asia-Pacific. Six of the world's top 20 economies are there. Four of the top 10 U.S. trade partners there. A third of the world oil passes through what I call the maritime crossroads in the Asia-Pacific region, and half the world's shipping travels in that very area.

So that's the today and that's been in the past, but in the future, over the next five years, for example, half of all the economic growth will be in Asia. The ASEAN GDP alone will probably double by 2020 at its current rate. And energy use in Asia is growing from a third of the world total to about half today, and it's – I'm sorry, half by about – in about 15 years. So what are we going to do and how we're going to do it, this rebalance from the Navy perspective?

Well, we, the Navy, had been in the Asia-Pacific for decades. After World War II, through the Cold War, we established relationships and alliances that we had to meet. And we've had about 50 ships, which is about a half of all the ships that we have deployed in the Asia-Pacific since the late 1990s. So we've been there in numbers for a while. Every year, we do 700 training events out there and about 170 exercises every year. For 40 years, we've been doing a pretty large exercise called Rim of the Pacific. And how large is it? The last one, in 2012, we had 22 nations there with 40 ships doing exercises in Rim of the Pacific. And for 20 years, we've been doing in Southeast Asia a large exercise called Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training. And that has expanded from the Southeast Asia region into the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh was there and will be there next year.

So given the many initiatives and given the activity there, I'd say the rebalance, how we do this right and what are we doing is going to start with intellectual capacity. Optimizing the rebalance, in my view, is going to require us to think about what the needs are and what resonates with

those needs of the nations out there and our needs at the same time. That resonance by region I think it's going to be important because the region you look at up here is not homogeneous in any sense.

Sometimes, we think, rebalance, get the stuff over there, count it up, good to go. And it's not like that. It's about forces for sure. Our presence has to be where it matters and we have to be there when it matters or we're not as effective as we should be. It's about bases – Guam, Hawaii – and it's about places. All around Japan, Korea, Singapore, Darwin, Diego Garcia, as it applies, a lot of places, where we rest, relax, refuel, repair. All of those coming together in the proper mosaic makes the forces come together. And we'll increase our presence out there about 20 percent, from 50 ships at any given time, about 40 there all the time, permanently located, to about 60 ships by 2020, as we evolve through forces and rebalancing.

It's about home porting, also. We are shifting our home porting toward the west. We'll have 60 percent of our ships home ported in the Guam, Hawaii, West Coast region by the end of this decade. Right now, we've got about 57 percent. And we'll continue that evolution through this decade.

It's about capabilities, rebalancing our capabilities, benchmarking our high end capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense, cyber, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, electronic attack. The high technology capabilities that we're developing are benchmarked to the Western Pacific. Our budget situation is going to get tough. There's no question about it. But I will tell you, folks, it's not going to stop the rebalance. It'll affect it, but it won't stop it.

Today, we have 47 ships under contract. They're under contract or under construction. And under ship building plan we have today and the inventory, we should have 300 ships by 2019. Of those, there are only eight that are not currently under contract. So that's kind of the momentum that we have under what as we rebalance.

Now, how do you balance this rebalancing? How do you make this thing all come together, so that it makes sense? One thing that I was – it was revalidated for me on this last trip was Northeast Asia is very different from Southeast Asia. And it's not just the weather. And it's just not the latitude. It's the approach. It's not about high end capability. Sending all that over there won't get it done if you get it in the wrong place. And it's not all about humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and theory security cooperation. You got to balance those two. You got to listen to the countries. And you got to listen to the leadership. We got to tailor to our allies for sure and work with our partners and understand that there are potential partners. You can't ask everybody to do everything all the time. Some will be there all the time, but we've got to continue that work on potential partners.

Looking at Northeast Asia, we will be strengthening our most robust alliances there. It's about Japan and Korea. Those are the key players. And in Japan and in Korea, they're predominantly shaped today by the threat of North Korea, the evolving threat and the capabilities needed in

ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and cyber. This is what my counterparts, this is what the defense establishment in both Korea and Japan are thinking about.

China was definitely important, but China was looked at more of an opportunity than a threat. The focus is on North Korea. And there're opportunities. We talked about opportunities when I was over there. We're working on opportunities.

For example, in Japan, we're going to – we should be able to evolve toward collective self-defense, a change in policy toward collective self-defense. But there's a lot of optimism in the Japanese defense establishment that the nation will head in that direction. That's a dramatic change in their constitution, but some feel they'll get there.

So what does that mean? That means operating with our JMSDF, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force allies as a task force, protecting each other in that task force, which is a change in their constitution. So think NATO, think U.K., think carrier strike group with JMSDF, high end ships operating with U.S. ships. That's a potential future in

that regard. Think BMD patrols together, Japan and the United States with collective self-defense.

We need to reconcile our BMD capacity and capability over there. In talking to both our guys and in talking to the Japanese folks, there's a potential to increase the FDNF, the Forward Deployed Naval Force, destroyer level over there, if you will, or capability and capacity. We'll look into that. There's a potential to do more of our standard missile maintenance over there, so we don't have to haul those over there and run to Guam or use other further waste sites. And there's the potential there to bring together with that collective self-defense policy, a command and control construct is more integrated.

We need to mature ourselves and the JMSDF our ISR approach and institutionalize it, so that we're sharing even more information and that we share the common operational picture across the fleet. We're doing a nice job undersea-to-undersea, surface-to-surface, air-to-air. We need to get that across the fleet. And we have an opportunity to do that in the future.

And something I thought was pretty exciting, advancing our expeditionary warfare, amphibious operations together. Here, in the next few weeks, we're going to be doing exercise Dawn Blitz, with the Japanese Self-Defense Force, a combined Japan-U.S. amphibious operation at Camp Pendleton area. An MV-22 on a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force amphibious big deck, in the future, an amphibious assault vehicle operating from a Japanese ship, so – and us doing combined operations in that regard.

So it's a measured and deliberate pace with our Japanese leadership, and I think we're in synch with their.

In Korea, a lot of opportunities still. We need to advance and we have opportunities to advance our undersea warfare together, particularly ASW and mine warfare. Torpedo, ASW, and mine countermeasure, unmanned underwater vehicles. Today, we're doing an exercise in the Arabian Gulf and we're getting great utility under new technology and undersea unmanned vehicles in mine warfare. These would apply in the West Sea and the East Sea off the coast of Korea and we're talking about that.

We need to reconcile our BMD construct with Korea and we're working that. They need to choose an interceptor that will – or they're considering, I should say, choosing an interceptor for their BMD capability. They can track and now they're going to think about and decide what might be the appropriate interceptor. And we need to look at our connectivity and our link construct. And in the end, evolve and toward a trilateral framework: Japan, the U.S., and Republic of Korea navy.

Now this is kind of a step way into the future because there're culture issues. But while I was there, folks thought we'll never get a trilateral exercise off with those three navies, but the Nimitz was out there with a JMSDF high end destroyer and a Republic of Korea destroyer doing operations out at sea. And so it can be done. There's movement in that direction.

It takes listening. It takes cooperation and a deliberate, relentless approach to this, and making sure we're in synch.

If you shift to Southeast Asia, it's about forging deeper partnerships and building new ones. And it was clear to me, as if I didn't know before, that Singapore is a center of gravity in Southeast Asia. Now, one look at the chart, Strait of Malacca, I think you can see geography plays a big piece of that. They're really a networker. As I mentioned before, they hosted the international maritime expo. We had nine ships there for six countries. We had 30 heads of navy. And just in a few weeks, they're going to have the defense ministers from around the world at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

So they get it done. They are the leaders in security cooperation in Southeast Asia. They have what I would consider maritime domain awareness university in an area – an institution they call the Changi Command and Control Center, large, large command and control center. I walk in and you've got drops of common operational pictures there across all different navies – how many – 19 different navies were folks sharing their location, if you will, at sea, and getting ready to conduct an exercise as part of that international maritime expo.

They nurture it. They bring it along. And they bring that cooperation among the countries, not just in Southeast Asia, because there's more than 19, really around the world.

They brought to us what I call kind of the littoral combat ship initiative. They invited us to bring up to four littoral combat ships and to station them there down in Changi, in Singapore. And I tell you that the Freedom was there. She was looking good. She brought a lot of attention and did

a lot of tours, not just of citizens, but of heads of navy and of heads of defense establishments, who were very interested in that ship and its modularity.

Malaysia and Indonesia are two emerging nations that I found – emerging navies, for sure. I met with each of their chiefs and I got a very, very kind of different approach than I did, say, seven years ago, when I was commander of the Seventh Fleet. It was very much, hey, bring your ships to Jakarta, bring your ships to Kuala Lumpur, especially that thing over there, the littoral combat ship. That makes sense. It resonates with our area. It doesn't alarm our folks, doesn't alarm our politicians, and this is the kind of operations that we think are important as we establish – we, collectively, I'm talking about the Malays and the Indonesians, as we establish relations down there.

They like our new ship, the Mobile Landing Platform, which we delivered, which we accepted, I should say, the Navy, a large vessel, former oiler that we can use for running equipment ashore. They like our concept of the Joint High Speed Vessel, the Afloat Forward Staging Base, and Littoral Combat Ship. And today is Brunei, it is Malaysia, it is Indonesia.

So we're starting to get things down there that resonate and it's by thinking this through that I think we can take this to the next level.

And speaking of Brunei, they're hosting an exercise here in June. The participating partners are the People's Liberation Army navy, the U.S. Navy, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. And it's a humanitarian assistance, disaster relief scenario, bringing the Chinese hospital ship. We're going to bring an auxiliary ship where we put a fleet hospital aboard, use rotary wing to provide lift of medical facilities. And the JMSDF is

going to bring an amphib ship to provide comfort ashore. Combined operations of those three countries, doing command and control, hosted by Brunei, again, another pretty good moderator there, in Southeast Asia.

Brunei will be the ASEAN chairman this coming year, hosting, when it's all set and done, about 130 different meetings of countries. And I had a chance meeting with the chief of the Myanmar navy, and we chatted about the potential future interactions with us. As you know, their head of state was meeting with the president here yesterday. And we talked about building confidence – conducting confidence building measures maybe in the future, as we look ahead.

So there's a lot of activity in Southeast Asia, a lot to be done as we balance this rebalance.

I would, of course, be remiss if I didn't mention China. Was there anything going on out there? Well, I met with the – we all met – the commander of the commander of the South Sea Chinese fleet. And he gave me his coin. And their fleet's getting big and so are the coins. (Laughter.) This is perhaps the biggest coin that I've laid my hands on.

But we talked about very interesting things. We talked about their commitment to getting interactions right in the East China Sea, in the South China Sea. That was one of the points that the commander made in his presentation, commander of the South Sea fleet in China, in his presentation at the conference. The need to get the proper protocols and get cooperation for, as we meet in there, and preclude miscalculation in Southeast Asia and in the South China Sea.

We all talked about the need for what they call conduct for unanticipated or unexpected encounters at sea. It's called CUES, down there. And it's a well-known term. There's also an initiative for conduct for the South China Sea, which I think all the nations, all the heads believe this is what we need, but how do we put it together so that everybody agrees?

And the chief of the Malaysian navy has taken the lead. Everybody voted yes, except for the Chinese navy on one set of protocols. So we handed it to him and we said, we all agree, except for you. Write it. Write it the way you want it and bring it back at next year's Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and make something we can all vote on and move ahead.

So there's a lot of effort going on out there, a lot of activity as we do the rebalance. We have to do it right. The place is not homogeneous. It's fundamentally, I think, about aligning ourselves in pursuit of not only our interests, but also our allies, and of course, our partners.

I think we have the ways. I think we know how we want to do this. I think we have the means like what we want to do to rebalance. And overall, I think, in the end, we'll seek the end, the right end state, if you will, a stable, secure, prosperous region.

But I close with just a comment here. Executing this strategy and doing all this high level stuff is astounding to me as a service chief. But it requires working through today's challenges. And there're four areas that I as a chief of the Navy are focused on and have been really for about six or seven, eight months. Our manning at sea, our operational tempo, the resiliency of our Sailors, and most importantly, sexual assault. That's a safety issue, an issue we are dealing with very deliberately and very focused. And it's probably the challenge of our time, probably my time here that we have got to deal with and we've got to overcome. It's about investigation and prosecution, prevention, and setting the right culture and a culture of dignity and respect.

The rebalance is only possible with that safe, resilient, and effective force, and we need to work toward that.

So thank you very much for listening. I appreciate your attention. It's an honor and a privilege to be here. And I look forward to your comments. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. WORK: Yes, sir.

Q: Should we wait for mike or –

MR. WORK: I can repeat the question, if you choose.

Q: (Off mic.) – remember this, but he taught how to spell UCAS for carrier operations a few years back. I noticed a week ago exactly today that we had the first successful launch of the X-47B. I wonder how – what the prospects are that that can help us out in meeting some of the challenges that we might face with China and their new systems. Of course, I'm glad to hear you talk about other cooperation with China, but we still have to worry about that aspect of it.

ADM. GREENERT: Yes, thank you. This is really the introduction of unmanned – the UCAS is Unmanned Carrier Aerial System. And it's the introduction of unmanned aerial systems on and off a carrier, huge difference, because what it gives you, it gives you persistence. And it gives you payload. I, as a non-aviator, but studying the problem, I'm amazed at the weight that goes on an aircraft due to the fact that it's manned. You replace that with other things: sensors, potentially weapons, fuel, just as a tanker, and the fact that you can put that out anywhere in the world without worrying about sovereignty is a whole new chapter to aviation.

It is my opinion that the unmanned aerial system, whatever it turns out to be right now, we call it UCLASS, which would be the extension of this, where we'd build a program – is a part of the Air Wing of the future. Because as a minimum, it will help you with logistics, but perhaps, more importantly, it will give you that persistent ISR with the potential delivering effects of different areas.

So I'm very much for it and this is a great opening to a new chapter, I think, in carrier aviation. And the air boss is totally onboard. That's important.

Yes, sir, in the back.

Q: (Off mic.) – Ed Steigman (sp), a – (inaudible) – from the 1980s, little bit old. I know this isn't quite Pac Command, but would you care to comment on India, Pakistan, and Australia?

ADM. GREENERT: Good point. I actually was moving along and so I cut out the Australia part, my bad. Australia has been a big player and remains a big player as an ally and as a partner, both, in the Asia-Pacific region. They have and they continue to develop what I call asymmetric capability in submarine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and stealth, as they pursue the fifth generation Joint Strike Fighter, and also in electronic warfare, and cyber. So their navy, the Royal Australian Navy, its size being whatever, they have a unique set of capabilities that I consider asymmetric. They are partners there, well-regarded, well-renowned, and willing participants in all of those fora that I mentioned before.

Pakistan, I will have a counterpart visit with my counterparts soon, as their chief of navy comes over here. And they are responsible and consistent participants in our coalition task force for counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in the Gulf of Oman region. So they have been very steadfast in that regard.

We've exchanged programs and we continue to cooperate in that arena of naval warfare.

The Indian navy, I would say very much the same, as we expand not just only the exercises that we do with the Indian navy, but the complexity. It wasn't long ago, when I was a senior captain, when we would go over to the Indian Ocean and do an exercise called Malabar. We would pass and raise flags up and down, give it the thumbs up, and have a reception and say looking good. Every year we do this.

Now, we are doing undersea warfare together, very complicated undersea water space management. We do carrier exercises. We're carrier-on-carrier. And we exercise together with the air wing. So we're into a very high end comprehensive state of operations with the Indian navy and I think the future's pretty bright.

It has to be at a deliberate pace that makes sense with their government and how they want to move ahead. But at my level, certainly, we are committed to continuing to move ahead.

Yes, Sidney.

Q: Admiral, Sidney Freedberg from what's now Breaking Media. Let me ask, sir, the House Seapower folks just put out their markup. Obviously you have probably not sat there with a microscope going over it before you came here, but certainly they're very unhappy about the carrier cost, about all sorts of cost increases in shipbuilding. You know, the chairman of the subcommittee has called the 30-year plan, quote, "a fantasy," and they're going to impose, if it's get through all the listed hurdles, a requirement for the folks to come with an alternative plan based on basically current funding levels, extrapolate out, which of course is not what your 30-year plan counts on.

You know, you can't do any of the strategy if you don't have ships to do it. So you know, how would you address those concerns from Congress and would such an alternative for your plan, you know, a \$16 billion a year, be useful exercise for you to do?

ADM. GREENERT: Well, what we provide for the Congress is what the requirement list as stated, which is a extension of a plan, if you will, a plan that lays out to meet the requirements that we have. And then we certify that we have enough money in the year that we deliver the plan. And we've done that.

We look very closely that we have through the Future Year Defense Plan, the FYDP, and we feel very comfortable with those numbers. When you could be on the FYDP and you get into the 15-year, 20-year, certainly the 30-year, it becomes an extrapolation. So if asked to do – to hold, if you will, or constrain the numbers, we can certainly do that. We have done it in the past. And we'll comply with directive language.

MR. WORK: Yes, sir, in the back.

Q: (Off mic.) – Corps of Engineers. I was wondering, Admiral, if there're 20, 30, 40 years of growth and bringing 300 million people out of poverty, why the Chinese need a navy?

ADM. GREENERT: Why they need navy?

Q: Yes.

ADM. GREENERT: Well, they believe that they need a navy to ensure very much like we do that they have freedom of maneuver for their commerce. They have an enormous amount. In fact, I forget the number. Some of you – many know – already know – of import for their energy alone. And it has, to your point on their growth, overall, their economic growth, it's about energy. And so they feel very, very set on that the – if you will, that their maritime crossroads and their sea lines of communication remain open and free. And their white paper that they published, which describes their strategy is very clear that that is one of the main, main reasons for their navy.

MR. WORK: There was another – yes, sir.

Q: Hello, Walter Lohman, the Heritage Foundation. I wonder if you could expand some more on the impact of sequestration. Six months ago, the ships were ringing alarm bells over the prospect. Now, we're in the middle of it. Could you comment on what real impact it's having?

ADM. GREENERT: Sure. The, quote, "alarm bells" we were ringing was Budget Control Act caps applied over 10 years. And I think if we were sitting here, having a longer discussion on that, I would tell you, that's very disruptive. Sequestration as an algorithm applied to all programs, without ability to redirect, if you will, afterward, unbalances all of our programs because it gets in and algorithmically reduces everything.

We managed to get through, if you will, we're not completely done yet, we're still assessing the impact one year. For us, it's about a \$9 billion carry-over into FY '14, things

we didn't get done in '13 that carry over into '14, some of it readiness afloat, readiness ashore, and investment bills that we'll have to pay sooner or later.

In the interest of ensuring that we could complete some aircraft construction and some ship construction, we and some of the other services did similar, deferred payment on what we call cost to complete. And these are things like documentation, ancillary equipment that goes with aircraft and ships. We deferred that to take a look and see is there going to be a resolution to this or are we going to carry this on.

So what we've got, as I said, is 9 billion (dollars) carried over into FY '14. If we sequester, in '14, which we are looking at and making – you know, preparing ourselves for that, if you will, that 9 becomes an additional 14 or 23 billion (dollars). That kind of change, if continued to roll over, I think you can see or imagine the cascading effect will severely disrupt all the investment and readiness programs. So we'll be fundamentally different in that scenario.

MR. WORK: Yes, sir, in the back.

Q: Marcus Lee. I'm actually a contributor for a working group here at CNAS on the Asia-Pacific and climate change. So if I can give a shameless plug for the good work that CNAS is doing on this part. And I'm just wondering what about your thoughts for the future of the Navy, having to deal with the outlook of climate change induced events, natural disasters, or sea level change, partnerships, capacity, and of course, shortfalls that you hope to overcome in the near future.

ADM. GREENERT: OK, Brian, can you get like the MLP and stuff like that up there? We've got to take into account the fact that we've been doing a lot of HADR in the future. And although we don't necessarily build specifically for that, what we do train our people to is if you're going to deliver an effect, you could project power, you got to deliver comfort and be able to project that. And so this is just an example of the kind of ship – as we look to the future, we don't design a ship for climate change, but just say, well, how you're ready to deal with it.

We think there's going to be problems in the future. It's hard to predict, but I think you sort of get the picture. That's one. Just go ahead and show a couple more of these.

This is the same ship with a flight deck on it for an additional 100 million (dollars), you get a flight deck. (Laughter.) So this is working with industry.

Next one, please. OK, go to the Arctic slide. The Arctic is another one and I was just casually commenting about this. I think, Sydney, you brought it up, that working with the Canadian navy, this is becoming a topic of big conversation, as well as my partner in the Coast Guard. We've got to figure out – a lot of times, I show a slide up here and it says, hey, this is where your Navy is today, how many ships we have here and there. Well, this is what we have right now, if you look out there, and if you look up toward Norway. Here's what we got in the Arctic region, like one SSN. So we've got some work to do.

And it's about when we build new ships or new gear, how does it operate in the Arctic? That has to be taken into account. We learned the hard way how's this going to

operate in the Arabian Gulf, and we built a lot of things in the '70s and the '80s, and then we started operating a lot in the Arabian Gulf. So sand, heat, different salt conditions, et cetera.

Similarly, severe cold has its own issue. Satellite footprint up here. What's that going to look like? So as we build things, as we design things, and as we evolve our CONOPS, we have to deal with this.

We're in conversation with the northern NATO, the far north countries, so you've Switzerland, you've Denmark, and you've Norway, and Canada. They've got a lot of experience on that and so we're talking quite a bit about how to do this.

And lastly, we have a – if you will, we have a kind of the pathway or the road, if you will, to the Arctic, how we're going to deal with that. And that's been laid up by our oceanographer.

MR. WORK: Yes, sir. Go ahead if you – whoever gets the mike, wins. (Laughter.)

Q: OK, Admiral, I'm Dan Martin with Woodrow Wilson Center. When you were talking about the Northeast Asia region, I didn't hear any comment about the capacity and situation of the Russian navy. I'd be interested in how you assess that and what if any relationships we have with them.

ADM. GREENERT: Well, we have a good relationship with them, and what I mean by that is we have slowly growing number of exercises with the Russian navy, mostly search and rescue, humanitarian assistance. And every other year, they'll come down to Guam and we'll do an exercise down there.

The other exercises we're doing, that I mentioned, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok area. Most of their focus has not been in the Asia-Pacific region. They are flying increasingly their Bear aircraft, remember those guys. Well, they're out and about. They've got fuels. They've got parts. They've got them airborne. But again, most of their development remains in their northern fleet, their Baltic fleet, and the Black Sea. They're operating in the Mediterranean, in and around Syria – the Eastern Med, I should say, just Syria – to the tune of like five ships. And that's been a long time since they've done that. But not a whole ton of activity in the Pacific region.

MR. WORK: Yes, sir. Whoever gets the mike. I've got two gentlemen here. I'll leave it to you, now.

Q: Thank you very much. Dieter Dettke, Georgetown University. Sir, how worried are you about the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in China with regard to the defense of Taiwan?

ADM. GREENERT: Well, they're certainly capable. And in the classification of this forum, I would tell you that when we look at threats like that, you got to consider sort of the chain effect that needs to take place. You got to be detected. They have to recognize if they've detected you, if that's who they want to shoot. They have to be able to track and be confident that whatever it is they launch can also track you, gets you, not be spoofed, not

be jammed, and not be shot down either in route or to the end. And we work to all threats and we work our missiles, if you will, and our effects the exact background.

A good bit of their development and really development writ large in seekers and in radars is getting to a higher band and a lower power level, i.e. harder to detect. And that's my focus when I talk about the EM spectrum and things we need to get much more involved in and look at more of a – some would call it a soft kill. You can call it whatever you want. But that other end, that non-kinetic end of – so I'm vigilant of this, but within the confines of this forum, I think I have to leave it at that. We're working pretty hard on it. And I'm comfortable with where we are on it.

MR. WORK: Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry. Sir, do you have a mike? Are you ready to go? You want me – I can repeat it, too, and then Miss –

Q: Sir, Collin Agee from Army G-2. You mentioned ISR a couple of times and we've been fighting for more than a decade in places where we've had pretty much unlimited access to the aerospace. And as we look at this map, we can see it's going to be very different and we're going to be contending with tonight aerospace. So could you address that aspect to the rebalance?

ADM. GREENERT: Sure. We have two systems coming in that I think will dramatically increase our IRS. One is our P-8, which is our maritime patrol aircraft, which we go from a four propeller engine to two jet engine. It's a 737 sort of tricked out. The sensors on that and the expense and the depth that they can see into that region is dramatic. And what it can do in four hours versus four-hour on station, P-3 is amazing.

Next is – we call it BAMS, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance. And that kind of quadruples the area that we can see. And so being able to see in that area of space that we fly, we continue to fly our P-3 and EP-3 down through the South China Sea and we're insistent that that's international aerospace. And you know, we talk about it with the Chinese, and we have lots of conversations about it. But I think we're fine now in that regard. In a conflict, in a contested situation, we'd have to deal with that and understand it. But some of the looks that we're being able to develop from standoff are really encouraging right now.

Yes, ma'am. Congressman, you're up. I didn't know you had the mike. I'm sorry. I think in fact you can karaoke or something.

Q: Hello. Christine Rogish (sp) from Aveson (sp), thank you for being here. A simple question. We all know that sequestration's probably affecting programs and projects that you have going on and would love to see grow in the future. So pie in the sky, sequestration aside, what programs and projects would you like to see thrive? And in your opinion, what sort of cost effective measures could be implemented to make them succeed?

ADM. GREENERT: OK, pie in the sky, I really get that question. We have got to get our nuclear deterrence follow on right because it's kind of existential and it's key to the United States. So the SSBN – the Ohio replacement has to be done right. We have got to be very deliberate and very – how do I say it – I guess, suspicious of all cost and requirements in that and make sure we get that right.

The undersea domain is an asymmetric capability that we the Navy have, and so I would like to make sure that we build two Virginia class a year, and develop that, but also large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles, to get those going because they bring persistence for – and you can go to far reaches and deliver effects, sensors, be able to network those, and then we can see vast areas of the undersea domain. Fix systems on the bottom, get those right and once again, continue to own that undersea domain. Bringing in unmanned aerial vehicles, the fifth generation

Joint Strike Fighter, into an air wing of the future that has that combination of electronic attack, electronic warfare, standoff weapons, as well the stealth, and of course, the ability for ISR. Those are my pie in the sky right off the top of my list.

Congressman.

Q: Thank you, Admiral. I'm Congressman Sam Farr from California. I'm very interested in your collaboratives and partnerships with the countries. And I wonder how you might mature the education of those officers, both our and foreign officers and whether the assets of this country and our training facilities will be utilized to mature these partnership relationships.

ADM. GREENERT: Sure. Thank you very much for that because those partnerships that you mentioned enable service chiefs to – you know, the future service chief to perhaps know that future other service chief. And if I may, because I have a microphone, I'm taken back to as the Seventh Fleet commander, remember the great tsunami of 2004, it was a relationship Admiral Fargo had with the chief of defense of the Indonesian defense force. That he was able to pick up the phone and say we need to get into Banda Aceh with air to provide relief. And we couldn't get in there until he made that connection. And that's just a small snippet of the importance.

Two important institutions, the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School. The Naval War College gives us that – if you will, that war – if you will – or operational related issues in military, understanding each other and our concept of operations. The Naval Postgraduate School brings us together to solve technological problems and to share items anywhere from cyber to undersea warfare and all the specialties that we develop. And we're populated pretty well at this place, but we've got to continue to expand it.

Also the Naval Postgraduate School gives us that cultural – has a cultural expertise embedded in it that is very attractive and it's starting to grow.

So I think those two institutions are key and critical. I like the path we're on, but we've got to maintain it.

MR. WORK: Yes, sir. In and right across the aisle.

Q: Sir, George Mickleson (sp), excellent presentation. Air-sea battle concept. You and General Schwartz gave excellent presentations over the past couple of years, but there seem to be a continuing concern on the part of two other services that this was an issue that's on the part of the Navy and the Air Force. It's a budget thrill to get a larger share of

the budget and was too focused on China. Has there been a better acceptance of the air-sea battle concept?

ADM. GREENERT: I think so. Because – now, I can tell you – and it has certainly in the Marine Corps. And we've talked with – well, let me just put it this way. The air-sea battle office is

populated by four O6s, OK, one from each service. And they each have a task that I don't think one is bigger than the other, although I haven't measured it. So there's that aspect. We have assimilated that and put it under the umbrella of the joint concept, the joint Capstone Concept for assured access. And so that gives it a joint oversight to ensure that it doesn't drift a little bit. And that's fine. We're fine with that because that's what this is all about. And if you – you know – article we recently published, it's getting out of the service proclivity and that service paradigm and looking outside, both your domain and your service. So I think we're just going to have to keep working at this. Nothing happens quickly. But we've got to get it – to me – as far as I'm concerned, down to the O4 level and have those folks think about it in that regard, so that as they grew up and get command, they think in that direction. It's conceptually embedded and they're not ad-hocing things, you know, rushing to do it by mission.

Yes, sir. Yeah, on the end there.

Q: (Off mic.) – interoperability question, one looking – (inaudible) – and more inwardly and the leverage off of air-sea battle. As U.S., particularly U.S. Navy, becomes more sophisticated, you have to – (inaudible) – our allies, our partners – (inaudible) – and then inherently within the construct of the air-sea battle – (inaudible) – across the service – (inaudible).

ADM. GREENERT: Yeah, that's a great point, one we talked about in Singapore, this 30 heads. And in October, we, the U.S. Navy, host the International Seapower Symposium, and we should get about 90 heads of navy. And we do is we sort of start at the bottom. We say what's important to everybody? Right now, counter-piracy very much resonates, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. And we say how do we talk to each other? First things, you know, what do you want to talk about? What are the protocols? And then we figure what are the means to talk? And we start at the most basic and work our way up. The Internet, getting our kids to chat with each other, because if you're providing relief, what do you need – what do you need, a classified information, you know, memorandum of agreement, a CISMOA. Those are complicated. And then you work your way up and you start breaking into enclaves because some folks say, hey, I don't want to get involved in this particular coalition or that, but others do.

An example, counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The combined task force that was mentioned before. So we have a thing called Sentric (sp) and I can't remember what it stands for, but it's a means to get an enclave of folks to talk. It's expanding that – I go back to Changi – with regard to information, finding the means of the network to pass things like automated information system, AIS, and all that, injected into a network which will then portray it, so that all can then plug into it.

So it's agreeing to those protocols, either conceptually and then go by them, establish, you know, what are the requirements for that. It's not all that different in the joint arena. Obviously, we're talking more complex. But the point of air-sea battle is why

should I go design a missile that Mark Welsh's folks have, if what I got to really do is get it to be compatible with a Hornet? Why should I buy, you know, something different, a small diameter bomb if they're ahead in something like that? And say, well, I'll tell you why, because we didn't think of it. And so we've got to get over that because we can't afford to do otherwise. And it's the right thing to do.

Q: Thank you very much, sir.

ADM. GREENERT: You're welcome. In the back, sir.

Q: Thank you, Admiral. My name is – (inaudible) – with China – (inaudible) – News Agency. President Obama and President Xi will meet in June in California. From the military perspective, what do you expect from this summit? And secondly, what kind of military confidence measures could be built in the West Pacific area, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea? Thank you.

ADM. GREENERT: Well, I – far be it for me to define what the heads of two states are going to talk about, but I'll tell you what I hope. Commitments to dialogue and continued interaction, you know, through our two governments, including what we have building, which is an improving and a more engaging mil-to-mil interaction that is going on.

My counterpart, Admiral Wu Shengli, is coming here to visit. I'm looking forward to hosting him. I spoke to the interaction we had with the South China Sea commander, the South China Sea fleet there, you know, having a reception on the USS Freedom. It was very good. Where he was exchanging coins, big coin, with the chief of the maritime staff of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. So it's a commitment to that engagement, setting the agenda that we can continue to meet. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks, you may be familiar with, those are between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy. We're making headway on this. We've just got to continue to be deliberate.

Chinese Navy and China have agreed to join RIMPAC, Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2014. And we kind of sealed the deal that they would attend – the Chinese navy would attend the planning conference while we're done on Singapore.

So these are things, in my view, we just got to keep being persistent on to continue to engage in because I think we want the same thing: prevention of miscalculation. So – yes, sir.

Q: Ken Bayer (sp) – (inaudible). Could you correlate the Foal Eagle exercise with the bellicose statements made by North Korea in March and April?

ADM. GREENERT: Well, I would say the provocations have routinely followed examples of commitment by the allies. For example, it's not unusual that these things happen after an exercise, such as Foal Eagle, which is the fleet training exercise and also field exercise, if you will.

There's an exercise called Ulchi Focus Guardian, which is a command and control exercise, and that's in August. Provocations, sometimes, follow after that. So it's not

exactly predictable, you know, like a sign wave or something else that you could say, but I think it does correlate. I base that on, when I went to Korea – that's what I was told, that they anticipated some element of provocation and they've been vigilant on a provocation since about January, and as they are moving toward – through their exercise cycle. I'm talking about the Republic of Korea and U.S.

Q: (Off mic.)

ADM. GREENERT: No, I'm saying that the provocation following – followed Foal Eagle.

Q: (Off mic.) – Foal Eagle as a provocation.

ADM. GREENERT: No. No, that's been – through North Korea's eyes, no I have trouble with that because, gee, we've been doing it for about 50 years, and so –

Q: With B-2 bomber?

ADM. GREENERT: Pardon me.

Q: With B-2 bomber?

ADM. GREENERT: That wasn't necessarily a part of the event. And I can't speak to that in Foal Eagle. Foal Eagle was typically out at sea. It's a sea exercise. So I don't know that the B-2 was part of that or not and I didn't ask.

Yes, sir.

Q: Good evening, Admiral. Mike McCarthy, "Defense Daily." Your recent trip, lots of countries, lots of discussions with your counterparts and other representatives of the countries. And I'm wondering to what extent those conversations explored other potential locations for forward staging littoral combat ships.

ADM. GREENERT: We didn't get into the specifics of staging ships. There was a lot of interest in the concept of modularity and is there an explore version of this thing and can it be sized, you know, differently, and the whole concept. There was a lot of interest in that, particularly the Malaysian navy head, the Indonesian navy head. Both of those economies are doing reasonably well. Both of those navies are recapitalizing to a certain extent. So no direct conversation on the LCS, but the concept, way – you know, we would use that speed, volume, and modularity. They said, wow, that has – that's new. We haven't seen such a thing. Most are so used to that integrated destroyer or whatever that we bought for years.

MR. WORK: Ladies and gentlemen, I think we have time for one more question.

ADM. GREENERT: Oh, can somebody pick? Would pick, Mr. Chairman. All right, Ma'am.

Q: Thank you. My name is – (inaudible) – and I'm a law student. My question was about U.S. naval force involvement in providing security to Arab oil tankers. If you can just comment a little bit about that.

ADM. GREENERT: Well, that mission – our commitment, if you will, is to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz and free traffic flow. Really, what I call the maritime crossroads of importance, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, and there – and we're tasked, along with the coalition to see to it that free passage is enabled there, and that is the case. We're not escorting tankers. We're not assigned any specific – to any specific country's tankers or anything like that at this time.

So – hey, thank you all very much. I appreciate your insightful questions. Bob, thanks again for the invitation. And thank you. Hope to see all of you again. (Applause.)

MR. WORK: I'd just like to say, in the last hour, you've just got a small example of what I got to observe for four years, just wicked smart, great sense of humor, inspirational leader, absolute command of the facts, and inside the Pentagon, Admiral Greenert is known as someone who will look at every side of the issue objectively. And as I said, when I introduced Admiral Greenert, I can't think of any other leader that I'd rather have in charge of the Navy right now in this time, so much upheaval in our finances.

I'd like to thank you all for coming. And again, I'd like to ask you to join me in a warm round of applause for a true American patriot. (Applause.)

(END)