III: READINESS AND MODERNIZATION

Even as the Naval Services continue the transition to the capabilities needed for the future, today's Navy and Marine Corps must remain ready for missions and tasks that may arise at any time. Indispensable to our readiness posture are the men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps. We also know that many in corporate America characterize their search for quality employees— like the ones we seek—as being "in a battle for people." Consequently, the Naval Services must be prepared to compete strongly in this "battle." We must continue to put in place the resources to attract, train, and retain the people we need for the future. That said, we must also ensure that our Sailors and Marines have the ships, aircraft, and equipment necessary for the complex and demanding jobs that lie ahead.

Strategic Manpower

The recruiting, training, and retention of quality people are key to the Naval Services' continued success. Maintaining our talented and skilled workforce requires constant attention. During the 1990s, we reduced our force structure, postponed some modernization and recapitalization, and redirected our resources to maintain operational readiness. At the same time, the pace of operations and deployments continued unabated, and we began to see growing challenges in meeting the professional and personal needs of our Sailors and Marines. Clearly, a more equitable balancing of operational requirements with responsibilities to our people is required.

One of the inescapable lessons we have learned from recent operations is that victory and success in the Fleet and field often hinge on actions taken at the lowest levels. To prevail on the complex battlefields of the future, Sailors and Marines will require judgment, strength of character, and the ability to make sound, timely, independent decisions. We must, therefore, invest wisely in the areas that together define not only the Quality of Life, but the "Quality of Service" in the Navy and Marine Corps.

"Quality of Service" has several aspects. Some aspects are tangible, such as adequate compensation, a guaranteed retirement package, comprehensive health care, and other benefits traditionally associated with Quality of Life programs. Others, however, are intangible—and in some ways more important. Indeed, they are cardinal factors that make a career in the Naval Services attractive to talented people relative to other options they may have.

These intangibles—job satisfaction, professional growth, high quality training and education, and personal recognition—comprise crucial elements of the Quality of Service. Sailors and Marines must have personal and professional pride and satisfaction from what they do throughout their service to the Nation. They must sense that what they do is important and worth the personal sacrifices they make and the "opportunity costs" they incur. Thus, we must ensure that they continue to hone their professional skills and enhance the combat effectiveness of their units. They must be afforded continual opportunities for professional growth and a physical working environment commensurate with those offered by competing careers. This is central to their Quality of Service—and ultimately to the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps Team.

Our recruiting efforts must extend to all segments of America's diverse population so that we not only get the people we need, but continue our connection to society at large. By making smarter and more effective use of our resources, especially technology, we will empower our people with rigorous and meaningful training and education, and help them increase their proficiency in the use of highly sophisticated weapons, sensors, and information systems. Regional experts must be cultivated: people who know the cultures of the world like they know their own. Finally, we must continue to act energetically to improve the Quality of Life of the entire Navy-Marine Corps Team—Sailors, Marines, retirees, civilians, and their families.

Pay Package Reform

The recent improvements in military compensation, including the "Pay Triad" (enhancements to basic pay, pay table reform, and reform of retirement benefits), and special and incentive pays, should have a positive effect on our ability to attract and retain high-quality individuals. Early feedback from the Fleet and operating forces on the financial initiatives passed in FY 2000 seems positive.

Such improvements, however, should not be viewed as a one-time fix. Rather, they are part of an ongoing commitment to a healthy standard of living for the members and the families of a smaller, busier force. In addition to special incentive bonuses for targeted specialties, consistent support for competitive across-the-board compensation will be a key factor in addressing recruiting and retention challenges for the total force. Continuous pay table analysis and, as needed, pay increases will be important in retaining Sailors and Marines.

Reducing the At-Sea Billet Gap

The Navy has significantly reduced its unmanned at-sea billets. These unmanned billets created additional burdens for units, often forcing other Sailors to be assigned out of their specialties or to be called upon to do double duty. As a result of our 1999 initiatives, we reduced that number by 35 percent to 12,000. This has already produced good results in the Fleet. For example, the John F. Kennedy battle group deployed in September 1999 with 95 percent of their billets filled. The remaining billet shortfall will decline further as we meet our recruiting goals, gain ground on retaining our top personnel, and better shape our personnel structure.

Recruiting Outlook — Challenges!

Navy

The Navy's end-strength requirement for the next several years is steady, but any force structure increases above Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) levels will require an appropriate increase in end-strength. In the wake of a 7,000 recruit shortfall in FY 1998, the Navy met accession and end-strength requirements in FY 1999. In fact, we exceeded our single-year needs in some of the Navy's highly technical ratings.

Several initiatives contributed to this success. We increased the recruiting force by more than 30 percent in less than a year; we expanded the number of recruiting stations to improve accessibility and visibility; and we introduced a new series of Navy advertising "spots." Additionally, we implemented several new or enhanced programs to improve our recruiting performance. These include:

Nonetheless, the recruiting environment continues to be daunting. Unemployment is at record low levels, college attendance is increasing, and the propensity to join the military is decreasing. Although the Navy met end-strength and accession requirements for FY 1999, we were not able to improve our recruiting posture entering FY 2000 as the numbers in the Delayed Entry Program, our recruiting reservoir, are at a record low. To overcome these developments, the Navy will maintain the increased level of recruiters and expand the recruiter support structure.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has met or exceeded its accession goals since June 1995. The Marines, however, are undertaking several recruiting initiatives designed to ensure continued success. Working with their advertising agency, the Marine Corps has contracted with two leading generational scholars to better understand what motivates and appeals to "Millennials," the generation after "Generation X," and will use this insight to craft the Marine Corps' message to resonate with America's 21st century youth.

As demographics change and populations shift, the Marine Corps recruiting force will change along with it. This year, the Marine recruiting force initiated a nationwide restructuring effort, based on market research, advertising effectiveness, demographics, and the costs of relocating recruiters, to better align the distribution of its recruiters with target populations.

With increasing costs in the advertising industry, the Marine Corps is exploring new advertising venues to reach the youth of America. The Marine Corps' long-range plan and focused, consistent message has served recruiting well; future success will depend on continued hard work and robust funding levels.

Retaining Our Best People

Navy Enlisted Retention

Overall enlisted first-term retention during 1999 was approximately 30 percent, about eight percent below our long-term, steady-state retention target. Second- and third-term rates were also below steady-state goals. Despite these lower retention rates, the Navy retained enough good Sailors, in conjunction with a successful recruiting year, to end FY 1999 about 1,000 Sailors over end-strength. Short-term extensions continue to maintain a high "stayer" rate, especially among first-term Sailors. In fact, since FY 1996, the Navy has experienced a steady increase in the percentage of Sailors opting for shorter (less than 24 months) extensions. Our objective is to convert these shorter-term extensions into long-term contracts. Improving the Quality of Service in the Navy and Marine Corps, including overall financial compensation, better advancement opportunities, and maintaining personnel tempo within established goals, is fundamental to our efforts.

Marine Corps Enlisted Retention

Current enlisted retention is relatively stable. The Marine Corps is experiencing first-, second- and third-term reenlistment rates that are close to historical norms. In FY 1999, 23 percent of our eligible first-term Marines reenlisted into the career force. This represents 100 percent of our first-term reenlistment goal. Since 68 percent of our enlisted force is comprised of first-term Marines, in FY 2000, we will need to retain 26 percent of our eligible first-term Marines. With the smallest enlisted career force in the Department of Defense, retaining high-quality, career Marines is key.

Navy Officer Retention

During the past few years, reduction in the number of ships masked the adverse impact of reduced officer accessions and lower retention. As the Navy approaches a steady-state force, some 53,000 officers will be required. In addition to the "Pay Triad," the FY 2000 Department of Defense Authorization Act included new bonuses specifically targeting unrestricted line officer retention. These included continuation pay for Surface Warfare and Special Warfare Officers. It also included enhancements to other special and incentive pays, such as a restructuring of Aviation Continuation Pay and legislative limit increases to Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay rates. While it is too soon to gauge the full effect of these initiatives, we are optimistic that these positive steps, combined with specific community programs discussed below, will help improve retention in several specialized areas.

Aviation Warfare. As widely reported, Naval Aviator retention decreased significantly in the last four years. Various initiatives, including the enhanced FY 2000 aviation bonus program, are beginning to have a positive effect. While continuation of mid-level officers remains our greatest retention challenge, we have seen a significant increase in resignations of senior aviators— up seven percent in the last year for aviators with 14 to 18 years of service.

Surface Warfare. During the 1990s drawdown, the Surface Warfare Officer community had difficulty retaining enough junior officers to fill ship department head billets, reaching a low of 17 percent retention in FY 1995 and improving only to 24 percent last year. We recommended and Congress enacted the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay, which encourages officers to remain in the community through the department head milestone. As a result of this and other initiatives, Department Head School classes are full and the retention trend appears more favorable.

Submarine Community. Submarine officer accessions remain below requirements. While retention rates improved slightly (30 percent in FY 1999 compared to 27 percent in FY 1998) and remain adequate in the near-term, they must reach 38 percent by FY 2001 to meet steady-state manning requirements for a notional force of 50 attack submarines. The current Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) program remains the surest and most cost-effective means of meeting manning requirements. The FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act raised the limits of the NOIP program, providing the Secretary of the Navy a flexible means to meet future accession and retention challenges.

Special Warfare. Special Warfare Officer, or "SEAL," retention rebounded slightly from the downward trend of the past few years, reaching 70 percent at the end of FY 1999. Although this rate falls short of the required steady-state level of 74 percent, it suggests that the tide is turning. The recently enacted special and incentive pays, which include an increase in Diving Duty Pay, repeal of the restriction on drawing more than one Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay, and establishment of Naval Special Warfare Officer Continuation Pay are key factors in improving SEAL retention.

Marine Corps Officer Retention

Officer retention in the Marine Corps is stable, but we remain guarded about future trends. Although we attained our authorized officer end-strength for FY 1999, the more than ten percent attrition rate was higher than the historical average of nearly nine percent. Higher than average loss rates may lead to erosion of experience within the officer corps particularly in the mid-range, company-grade ranks. Many of our ground occupational specialties are already experiencing inventory imbalances, exacerbated by the higher than expected attrition rates. Our internal force management policies for assignments are sufficient, at present, to address these imbalances.

Fixed-wing aviators continue to be the most serious Marine officer retention concern. Overall, Marine Corps aviation officer inventory is at 90 percent of total requirements for FY 2000, with our rotary-wing and naval flight officer billets manned at near 100 percent. However, retention of both fixed- and rotary-wing aviators with 12-16 years of service is much lower than desired. We believe the restructured Aviation Continuation Pay program will address our present shortages.

Civilian Workforce Management

More than 27 percent of the Department's civilian workforce will be eligible for retirement in the next five years, including a large percentage of our highly technical employees. With challenges such as regionalization, downsizing, and competitive sourcing changing the way we do business, a viable, flexible, and multi-skilled civilian workforce will continue to be a critical part of our total force. Multiple, innovative recruitment strategies designed to attract and retain young college graduates as well as a highly skilled technical professional talent pool will be needed.

Smart Work/Smart Ships

As a matter of principle, we need to treat our people as valued professionals even as we seek to employ them in demanding jobs. The Smart Work and Smart Ship programs are two key initiatives that allocate the right resources to help our Sailors and Marines do their jobs smarter. In this way, we can enrich the Quality of Service in the Navy and Marine Corps while concurrently enhancing overall readiness.

Smart Work encompasses a host of initiatives that capture new technologies, seek better ways of doing business, and follow through on commitments we have made to our people. For example, Smart Manning entails improving personnel policies to achieve workload reduction through better use of manpower and enhanced training improvements. Substituting capital for labor means applying commercially available services for labor— intensive tasks such as painting. Sailor and Marine time is reserved for high value-added work and combat training—the sorts of things they joined the Naval Service to do. Acquiring off-the-shelf tools and ensuring safe, healthy, and efficient working conditions will save service members time and effort, and allow them the time to devote to their professional development. We will also invest in research and development to design laborsaving tools that are not commercially available.

In the Smart Ship area, the Navy is moving rapidly to apply the lessons we learned in USS Yorktown in 1997, and more recently in USS Ticonderoga, and the first Smart amphibious ship, USS Rushmore. Installation of seven core technologies—Integrated Bridge System, Integrated Condition Assessment System, Damage Control System, Machinery Control System, Fuel Control System, Fiber Optic LAN, and Wireless Internal Communication System—is planned for most of the Fleet. Innovative ideas such as new watchstanding regimes and expanded inport duty sections are already replacing old ways of doing business and are yielding tangible benefits. Given the program's success, the Navy recently chartered a Smart Ship Summit. This top-level approach will provide a mechanism to ensure efforts are coordinated across the Navy in the most cost efficient manner.

The Marine Corps is also looking for laborsaving investments and processes to reduce the time Marines spend in activities not directly contributing to combat readiness. As an example, the Marine Corps recently identified nearly 1,200 positions as candidates for replacement with civilian or contractor personnel. Manpower savings realized from this and other initiatives will result in increased manning levels in our operating forces.

Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) Workload Reduction

The imperative to "work smarter" is also being addressed by the Navy's Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (ITDC) Workload Reduction Initiative. Training and inspection requirements, many worthwhile, over the years became a burden on Sailors' time, generating a major Quality of Service issue for them and their families. This initiative has cut these requirements by 25 percent, thus helping to relieve the load on non-deployed crews. Commanding Officers have enhanced control and flexibility to maintain combat readiness. As such measures continue to come on line, Sailors will experience some relief, which, in turn, should contribute to higher morale and retention.

DoN Education Initiatives

The higher tempo and complexity of future operations will test our Sailors' and Marines' abilities to innovate, adapt, and apply their knowledge and experience to a variety of tasks in dynamic situations. Continuous learning is necessary for keeping our Sailors and Marines on the cutting edge, including an increased reliance on advanced distance learning systems. The Department will put career-long emphasis on each Service member's educational and training needs and accomplishments. Specific programs are described in Appendix A.

Similarly, in order to maintain our high level of performance and improve retention, we are committed to making high quality education programs available to our civilian workforce. Likewise, programs such as the Defense Leadership and Management Program, the Executive Leadership Development Program, the Department of the Navy's Brookings Institute course, and the Presidential Management Internship program will continue to provide valuable opportunities for the professional growth and enrichment of our civilian employees.

Quality of Life

An important element of our new approach to Quality of Service in the Navy and Marine Corps, Quality of Life (QoL) programs comprise numerous services that add to the well-being of our people and are important factors in both overall readiness and retention. QoL programs traditionally include compensation, safety and health programs, medical care, military housing, PERSTEMPO, and legal, chaplain, community, and family services. QoL elements provide support for our families and enable Sailors and Marines to concentrate on their prime responsibility— mission accomplishment. Specific programs are discussed in the Navy's Vision... Presence... Power and the Marine Corps' Concepts and Issues program guides.

Health care remains an integral part of our overall readiness. While TRICARE has been fully implemented, we have to do more before we truly deliver on our commitment to provide quality, accessible health services to the entire beneficiary population, including retirees. The Department of the Navy is working actively with the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other Services on ways to improve TRICARE and, while hard work remains, civilian and military leadership is committed to making the health care system responsive to its customers.

Readiness Posture

Deployed Versus Non-Deployed Readiness

To some extent, deployed naval forces are able to maintain a high level of readiness at the expense of non-deployed forces. However, the allocation of resources to meet the requirements of deployed forces creates difficulties for non-deployed units, which subsequently must overcome a larger readiness hurdle as they begin to prepare for deployment. The Navy's cyclical readiness posture is represented by the "Readiness Bathtub," which illustrates how combat readiness varies with time. While the "Bathtub" chart focuses on airwing readiness, similar challenges confront the entire force.


The readiness of Marine operating forces rests on four pillars: Marines and their families, current systems, facilities, and modernization. All need attention and resources in order to maintain a Corps that will be ready and relevant on the battlefields of the future. Similar to the ongoing trend in the Navy, the high state of readiness maintained for our forward-deployed forces comes at the expense of organizations with a lower priority, such as the supporting establishment. The pace of modernization efforts and the level of investment in infrastructure also remain concerns, affecting both readiness and Quality of Life. Indeed, projections of future funding levels do not fully support all that we know should be done.

Nevertheless, the enhancements provided in the FY 2000 budget have already begun to address some of our most pressing needs. With the help of Congress, we have applied considerable resources to ameliorating the problem, but it will take time for the positive effects to be reflected throughout the Fleet and operating forces.

Training Range Availability

The use of live ordnance is a vital means of training our forces in combined-arms operations in preparation for deployment. The inability to train at the Vieques range has degraded the combat readiness of deploying Atlantic Fleet ships and air wings since the spring of 1999. The ability to conduct coordinated live fires from ships and strike aircraft is particularly crucial, given that four deploying battle groups during the past 15 months engaged in combat operations shortly after arriving in theater. We are also concerned that if our friends overseas see that Americans are unwilling to support live-fire ranges at home, they will be less inclined to share their ranges with us.

Force levels

The Navy and Marine Corps continue to meet their commitments primarily by drawing upon forward-deployed, "rotational" forces rather than requiring additional deployments of units that have just returned from or are beginning to work up for deployment. We have been able to do this mainly by demanding more from our people and our equipment. But this cannot go on indefinitely. As we approach the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy and Marine Corps will make the point that our force levels need to remain balanced with usage expected in the future security environment. For example, the Marine Corps' latest internal study suggests that an end-strength increase may be necessary to bring all units in the operating forces to a manning level of 90 percent. However, before formally requesting an increase, we are ensuring that all personnel policies serve to employ our current Marine manpower in the most efficient manner.

Already, there is growing evidence that our forces are stretched. Carrier underway time during deployments has risen steadily from historical norms. The aircraft carrier homeported in Japan had unplanned deployments to the Arabian Gulf twice in the past two years to cover our commitment there. While the last QDR specified a 50 attack submarine force, the engagement plans of our regional Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) and the 1999 Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study suggest considerably more are needed than the 56 boats we have today. Further, a recent surface combatant study indicates that more ships could be required than the current QDR force level. On the aviation side, the Kosovo campaign illustrated the extraordinary demand for certain high demand/low density assets like EA-6Bs. Furthermore, as a result of the high operational tempo of the 1990s, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters are more quickly reaching the end of their service lives than projected just a few years ago and must be replaced.

The 1997 QDR stated that a fleet of slightly more than 300 ships was sufficient for near term requirements and was within an acceptable level of risk. Three years of high-tempo operations, however, suggest that this amount should be reviewed in the next QDR. Many analyses point to a need for more ships than we currently have. Certainly the specific numbers and types of ships will—and should—be debated.While the capabilities of tomorrow's netted sensors and weapons will increase the potency of each ship and aircraft, numbers will always matter.

Mid-term Modernization

Although sustaining current operational readiness is a prime priority, maintaining equipment and infrastructure and modernizing our forces are growing concerns. The understandable call to pay for readiness first must be balanced with the imperatives to improve the equipment we have. Modernization enables our current forces to continue to be valuable warfighting assets in the years ahead while concurrently trying to mitigate escalating support costs of aging equipment. Also, as technological cycle times are now shorter than platform service life, it is fiscally prudent to modernize the force through timely upgrades.

Solid, proven platforms are the best candidates for modernization. We plan to modernize the CG-47 Aegis cruisers and several aircraft types (F-14, P-3C, EA-6B, E-2C, and AV-8B), and extend the service life of our fast attack nuclear-powered submarines. SH-60B/F helicopters will be upgraded to SH-60R models, while the CH-60 will replace several older helicopter types. Additionally, the Marine Corps is upgrading its "Hum-Vee" (HMMWV) fleet of vehicles, modernizing its main battle tanks and Light Armored Vehicles, and upgrading its current MM88 tank retrievers to the Hercules (Improved Recovery Vehicle).

Infrastructure

Shore facilities are important, but only select facilities (bachelor quarters, utilities, and waterfront, airfield, and training facilities) can be maintained in conditions of readiness that enable them to meet mission demands with minor difficulty. All other shore facilities are funded to lower readiness levels. Backlog of maintenance and repair of real property is currently over $2.5 billion and is not projected to stop rising until it reaches $2.8 billion in FY 2004. The Navy plans to demolish 9.9 million square feet of excess or obsolete infrastructure by FY 2002 to help reduce infrastructure operating costs.

Part of the problem, however, is that the Navy has excessive infrastructure. While the number of ships and Sailors has been reduced by 40 percent and 30 percent respectively since 1988, infrastructure decreased by only 17 percent. As a result of four Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, we will spend more than $5.6 billion less on infrastructure through the year 2001 and $2.6 billion less per year thereafter. However, additional closings are the surest way to bring infrastructure needs and costs into balance.

Environmental Challenges

The Department continues its active program of environmental compliance and stewardship both afloat and ashore. We are pursuing research and development of technologies and innovative pollution prevention strategies to meet effectively our environmental requirements. This research has focused on marine mammal protection, contaminated site cleanup, and hull paints and coatings. Also, environmental planning is now an essential aspect of our acquisition efforts. Environmental considerations are explicitly taken into account when acquiring weapon systems and platforms and are reviewed periodically throughout each program's life cycle.

Long-Term Recapitalization Challenges

We must recapitalize for three basic reasons. First, the risks to our future military preeminence described in Chapter II require prudent investment in new capabilities. Second, the aging of many of our ships, aircraft, and vehicles, coupled with the added wear and tear associated with use, mandates their systematic replacement. Third, the industrial base that supports our armed forces is still largely unique and, absent new programs, would likely not remain economically viable.

To some extent in recent years, however, we maintained our near- and mid-term readiness at the expense of investments in longer-term capabilities. Resolving this tension between current imperatives and long-term requirements has been, and will remain, a challenge. In fact, it is becoming apparent that what was a long-term issue is now attaining some urgency, as we seek additional funding to keep current and future shipbuilding plans on track.

Nonetheless, we are making substantial investments in programs that will be the core of our forces in the first decades of next century. The DD-21 destroyer, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), CVN-77 and CVN(X) aircraft carriers, MV-22 Osprey, Virginia-class SSN, LHA Replacement, the San Antonio-class LPD-17, and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) are examples. Additionally, the Navy is studying the concept of converting four Ohio-class SSBNs into cruise missile carrying submarines (SSGNs) with special operations capabilities. These programs are profiled in detail in the Navy's Vision... Presence... Power and the Marine Corps' Concepts and Issues program guides.

Lift Requirements

The Marine Corps amphibious lift requirement remains at 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). The current plan is focused on the formation of 12 ARGs, which achieves the fiscally-constrained amphibious lift goal of 2.5 MEBs. The plan shapes the future amphibious force with the number and type of ships required for a flexible, crisis-response capability. Ultimately, the amphibious force will consist of 12 Tarawa- and Wasp-class LHA/LHDs, 12 San Antonio-class LPD-17s, and 12 Whidbey Island- and Harpers Ferry-class LSD-41/49s, capable of forming 12 integral ARGs or operating independently in a "split-ARG/MEU(SOC)" configuration.

Strategic sealift assets include afloat prepositioned stocks maintained around he world as well as ships earmarked for rapid surge deployment of forces from the U.S. Prepositioning supports all four Services and the Defense Logistics Agency. For example, each of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and Eastern Pacific Ocean, carries unit equipment and supplies to support a brigade-sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force for 30 days of combat. Enhancing our capabilities as defined in Operational Maneuver From the Sea, we continue to pursue both our Maritime Prepositioning Force Enhancement (MPF(E)) and Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future (MPF(F)) programs. With the fielding in FY 2000 of the first of three ships, the Maritime Prepositioning Force Enhancement program will add one ship to each MPF squadron, creating space for a Navy Fleet Hospital, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion equipment and an Expeditionary Airfield. MPF(F) will combine the capacity and endurance of sealift with the enhanced speed and flexibility of airlift to marry-up forces and equipment in a forward area. With onboard cargo handling systems compatible with existing MPF ships and commercial systems, we will increase the speed and efficiency in reinforcing our assault echelons ashore.

Surge sealift includes roll-on/roll-off ships, self-sustaining container ships, barge transport ships, crane ships, hospital ships, and other specialized craft that support contingency deployment of all Services. Nineteen Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships are being delivered through FY 2002, adding approximately five million square feet of additional lift to current Army prepositioning and surge capacity, while a 20th LMSR will provide additional Marine Corps lift as part of the MPF (E) program.

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