Admiral Greenert: Thank you very much.

This is going to be challenging in a whole host of ways. When I grew up and went to the Pentagon for my very first time it became very clear to me that the colonels and the captains were always gruchier on a Monday morning following a Redskins loss. So I don’t know where you guys stand. Thank goodness we have baseball in this town, winning baseball, so maybe there will be a decent balance here. I’m banking on that. So thanks a lot Dr. Paul for that introduction and thank you for your service in the government. I was talking to Doug, in fact he was serving as Director of the American institute of Taiwan during a very very key and critical part of our time within the Western Pacific. In fact a certain election had it gone in a different way history would show things very differently. But that’s history. You did well. We’re here.

This is a very prestigious institute now. I’m very pleased to be here, honored to be here. If I’m not mistaken it’s the oldest international affairs think tank in the United States and was in fact launched the same year as the first aircraft, Navy aircraft, launched from a ship in 1910, Eugene Ely’s flight from the USS Birmingham down in Norfolk, in Hampton Roads, across the Willoughby Bay. In fact if you go down there and you go down to Norfolk Station there’s a nice little plaque there that says that’s where the Birmingham was anchored the same year that this institute was launched and came across. So I’m thinking, you know, you’re looking across there years ago, it’s foggy, it’s misty, and somebody’s saying well what’s going on? Has he launched yet? And they say yeah, yeah, he’s launched. Somebody looks out through the fog and says, “Ely’s coming. Ely’s coming.” And at that very moment the way it goes, it is said that the grandfather of the writer for the group Three Dog Night was in fact in that crowd. And in 1970 his grandson wrote a very famous song. For those of you laughing, you’re just showing your age. If you believe that you’ll believe just about anything I say.

I’ll talk a little bit about what I call the presence mandate for the Navy, the Asia Pacific rebalance, and a little bit about the China relationship, delving of course into the Navy.

For us in the Navy, our mandate is to be where it matters, when it matters. And the question sometimes becomes well, where does it matter? We determined that in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. Where we distribute our forces including Navy forces.

If you can put up the first slide there.
I just have a few graphics to show you, so where are we today? Where does it matter out there around the world?

Well, you can see the distribution. You can see that the Asia Pacific remains. Over half of the ships or just about exactly half of the ships that we have, 101 ships deployed of the 291 that we have today. Oddly enough, 20 years ago we had 400 ships. We had 101 forward deployed.

Along those factors are how many we are actually putting forward semi-permanently, where those ships are there with sailors, the ships and their families in what we call the forward deployed naval force. A lot in Japan, some in Rota, some in Bahrain and other areas of the world. Or we’ll forward station the ship and we’ll rotate the crew. We’re doing that in Bahrain today. We’ll continue that concept with littoral combat ships, or we’ll contract a ship with civilian mariners and they’ll give us about 270 days a year forward deployed and we’ll rotate military detachments.

So this is where we are today. It’s about our missions, freedom of navigation and security in critical global regions. The area here, you can kind of see, some of you have seen me talk, I go through this every single time. Those are valves. They can be bow ties if you’re a political science major. Whatever. That is where a lot of the trade of our world moves. Trillions and trillions of dollars. I call it the maritime crossroads.

It’s Monday morning. Some of you ran out and grabbed a coffee. If you grabbed a coffee by that famous maker in the Pacific Northwest, they get most of their coffee from the East Africa region. It’s got to be fresh. It’s got to get from East Africa by Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab-al-Mandeb Straits, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar, and then the Panama Canal to the Pacific Northwest. It’s a long trek. It has to be open all the time. All the trade, as we’re hyper-connected, has got to move and we can’t afford interruptions.

Even the thermal sleeve when you got your coffee today, is coming from Scandinavia, and that’s got to get down through the Panama Canal.

So as you look up there and you look at where those crossroads are, where a lot of that trade goes, ask yourself if that’s a secure region. Or has it been, and will it be in the future? That’s why we’re out and about. To assure, to dissuade, to deter, and if need be- to respond. We’ve done that as needed over the last 18 months quite a few times.

About 18 months ago it was North Korea. It was Iran’s threat in the Strait of Hormuz. And it was Syria. We were ready in the Ukraine crisis. Now it’s Iraq. But also natural and manmade
disasters. The Philippine typhoon, the tragic loss of the Malaysian airline. Then Japan’s
earthquake and tsunami that took place a while back.

So our mandate -- where it matters, when it matters. We have to be out and about.

But a few words on the rebalance, as Doug said. I’ll talk about that.

We’ve had a historic and enduring interest in Asia. In the Pacific Ocean and in the Indian
Ocean. Over half the world’s tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sumba and
Lombok down there in the Indonesia-Singapore region. A third of the global crude oil, half of the
liquid natural gas moves through the South China Sea. Five of the top 15 trading partners for us
are right out there in that region. We’ve been there for seven decades of continuous Asia Pacific
naval presence, and we’re going to be there in the future.

For us, the Navy, the rebalance can be kind of put into three basic areas. Three waves, I should say. Forces, capabilities and understanding.

In the area of forces, we put our most modern forces in the Western Pacific and we are
increasing the presence out there as we’ve moving forces out there. Next year, in ’15, we’ll have
two more destroyers; these are Aegis destroyers, high end fire control systems in Japan. Another
submarine in Guam. And many of you are aware, we’re working toward forward stationing four
littoral combat ships down in Singapore at Changi Pier.

Capabilities wise in the Pacific area of responsibility we benchmark our capabilities and it’s
about electronic warfare, undersea warfare, advanced anti-air warfare, and of course cyber. It’s
also about understanding, as I mentioned. It’s about relations and exchanges. I’ll get to that in a
little more depth, but it’s about allies and assuring those allies, developing new partners and
assuring them and figuring out how do we work with ad hoc partners. How do we gather
together as international, if you will, network of navies to work on a tragedy or something that
involves all of us such as the loss of an airliner or a natural disaster.

So we’re going to be in this region economically and politically. It’s critical. And we’ll be
staying in the South China Sea, and we’ll be staying in the East China Sea. But our collective
actions, all of us have to promote stability and trust.

Recently, April, in China, in Qingdao at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium I think we took a
pretty good step forward. We would be the 22 navies that border the Pacific that agreed to sign a
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, laying down the protocol that will govern our
interactions. It was voluntary. It will establish the professional behavior and the clear
communication that we need to help reduce the uncertainty of what’s going to happen when we encounter each other and increase safety.

We exercised this CUES as it’s kind of known recently at RIMPAC, just in July, where Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, the Chinese Navy and the United States, we gathered together. We met right around Guam and we sailed to Hawaii where we had the RIMPAC exercise, and we worked through these details and the different processes of CUES.

We’re going to meet again, as Mr. Paul mentioned here, at the International Sea Power Symposium next week. A hundred and thirteen delegates from the navies around the world. We’ll discuss the idea of expanding to our Coast Guards and other global regions this CUES concept.

With the multilateral exercises and standards of behavior we can move ahead, and I would say it’s a mandate for all of us to do this so that we can contribute to safe operations in international waterways and the airspace around there, prevent accidents, but most importantly, preclude miscalculation. We’ve got 38 to 42 year old commanding officers out there responsible for 300 to 700 people on average out there at sea, in various countries, steaming in various areas of the world, and it’s getting tense in some areas. They need to have clarity of purpose and an understanding of how we will interact with each other and having the right protocols, reinforcing international law and the norms we need there, and frankly, using confidence-building measures among all of us.

Now the rebalance, a little more on it.

We’ve been strengthening our relations in the Pacific region for decades.

Put the first build up there.

That has resulted I would submit to the vibrant part of the international economy that we have, especially in the Asia Pacific and especially in the East Asia Pacific. We have stalwart allies and interests in the region. About five of our seven U.S. treaties -- Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Southeast Asia -- are right out there in this region.

The United States and Australia just recently solidified and formally signed the Force Posture Agreement where we will provide, or we have been operating, and we will do rotational deployment of Marines to Darwin there in Australia. So we recently sealed a deal on that one, if you will.
We have critical alliances with Republic of Korea and with Japan and we’ve recently completed Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian. Some of you may have known that it’s Ulchi focus runs because it’s been going on for 60-plus years with Korea. We will continue to do that exercise.

With Japan, we’ve had a recent development that is still working its way through and that would be the idea of collective self-defense, enabling, in my world the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force to do more operations together with us in collective defense.

Our focus in this region is improved interoperability. To me that’s the number one thing we need to work on and we’re doing that.

As I mentioned earlier, we just completed RIMPAC in the July time frame. Just before RIMPAC the Republic of Korea Navy, the Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy did an exercise, prior to that exercise called Pacific Dragon where we shared the tracks for a ballistic missile launch off of the island of Kauai. That’s kind of unprecedented. The capabilities have been there, but getting together and doing those trilats is something we need to continue to do. Then we went ahead and did RIMPAC among the other 22 nations. Those three -- Japan, Korea and the U.S. -- working together.

So that area is an important kind of a high end area but I think the key to this rebalance.

If you look down in Southeast Asia, the key I think down there is Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. We have an exercise series called Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training. That’s been around for 20 years, but we are stepping it up more recently down in the region down in there. There are possibilities out here with Vietnam. Recently deliberations with the Vietnamese have shown a willingness to develop a naval engagement activity strategy, something CARAT like, something like Cooperation Afloat like, but we’re going to work on this in a manner that makes sense with the Vietnamese.

Recently the Malaysians have offered us to fly detachments of P-8s out of, right down here in East Malaysia. So you can see the closeness for the South China Sea.

So we have opportunities here and I think we’ve got to continue to nurture them and that’s the region that we’ll continue to do that.

There’s a strategic partnership that I think we need to take a hard look at and we have a golden opportunity, and we’re going to take it. That’s with India. The new Modi government is an opportunity. We have had a long history of exercises, particularly an exercise called Malabar with the Indian Navy. And at one point about a decade ago, we were at the point where we had multi-carrier operations. We shared air wing operations, carrier operations and actually
conducted sub on sub operations with the Indian Navy. So I think if we can fine those opportunities and work through the issues that we need to work through with the governments to get through that, we’ll be further along. Much further along.

Recently, this year in July, the Malabar exercise was a trilateral with India, Japan and the U.S. including the George Washington carrier, and it was in the, if you will, in the North Philippine Sea, just south of Okinawa here earlier this year.

So the China relationship. If I were to summarize it I’d say we need to build a constructive relationship. That’s what we’ve been directed to do and that’s where my focus of effort has been and will continue to be.

Clearly we’ve got the potential to prosper with China. They have the world’s second largest economy and we’ve got a big stake in one another. They’re our number two trading partner, our number three export market, and our number one importing source. Our trade last year in 2013 was $562 billion and we have almost $1.3 trillion in U.S. securities with them.

So we’ve got to go to work, in my view, and it’s not a secret. It’s pretty well known. The Chinese Navy has expanded in to the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. They want to become a global navy, but they tell me very clearly, their chief, that they don’t intend to hold a global posture like we do. That’s not something they want to do or something they can do right now.

They have shown an ability to embrace international norms and standards. They do counter-piracy operations in the Aden area and they do them quite effectively, and we’ve done exercises with them there, in the Gulf of Aden.

They participated with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with their hospital ship in the Typhoon Haiyan in December of 2013. They participated in international naval exercise RIMPAC. Their ships that went there performed professionally and fit in fairly well and they were well prepared.

They have hosted, and as I mentioned before, we signed the CUES there in Qingdao, so they’ve hosted, they’re part of the international dialogue of the symposia that take place. And I think that’s commensurate with a rising navy. It makes sense.

I’ve had a lot of interaction with my counterpart, Admiral Wu Shengli, four times over the last year, which is more than I’ve had with other chiefs. But not to remove interaction with, not at the exclusion of other chiefs, I should say.
I visited their carrier, the Liaoning, and I happened to be the first uniformed American and uniformed officer and chief to visit the carrier. Held an all hands call and we talked about consistent issues that we have among our two navies. I was able to get underway on what would be a corvette, about a 2,000 ton ship, and take a two and a half our cruise with Admiral Wu and the crew of the ship. One of their newer ships. Visited one of their newer submarines and got a tour of a guided missile PC. So it was an interesting visit. I think there was more transparency, more openness than I had seen in the past. And Admiral Wu and I had some pretty frank and candid conversations.

But in the end we’re working on seven initiatives. I would characterize them as such.

To practice CUES in a deliberate and a structured manner. To move our navies ahead in this thing that we both agreed to continue on.

To increase the number of port visits between us, China and the United States.

To establish kind of a drum beat of regular communications between Admiral Wu and myself.

To increase academic exchanges, and I’m talking about at our academies, our fleet schools, and our war colleges.

To work on our human resource best practices as we -- he also wants it. He wants a diverse navy and I want a diverse navy. He has to build an officer corps, we’re building an officer corps. So to talk about how to do that.

And to work on improved exercises. We mentioned before, when two ships pass in the Gulf of Aden or somewhere, we can work, take that opportunity for two skippers of two big navies to work together and do an exercise that’s pre-approved. Today we’ve got to do an exercise; it has to go up through their Minister of Defense and to our Department of Defense.

So these are the issues that we’re working on.

As I said before, it’s not the exclusion of working with our allies and our partners out there. We’ll remain a strong Navy ally out there to our partners and although I have had some time, a lot of time with Admiral Wu Shengl in the last year, I’ve been to Japan twice to meet with my counterpart, Korea, the Philippines, two times to Malaysia and Indonesia and also to Singapore. So we’re keeping a balance as we work out there.

As I close here, let me tell you that we’ll continue to engage, to shape and to lead. We’ll continue to be where it matters when it matters.
As was mentioned earlier, next week we’re hosting the biannual symposium called the International Sea Power Symposium. We’ll host it at Newport at our War College. We’ll have 113 nations with 78 heads of Navy and a requisite number of heads of Coast Guard. And we’re going to talk about the shared challenges to security and prosperity. So it’s global solutions to common problems. That’s what we’re going to talk about. Because to meet the challenge, no one nation can do it alone. In my view we’ve got to use this network of navies.

Thanks very much for listening and I look forward to your questions.

**Moderator:** Admiral, thank you very much for those remarks. I think we all benefit from periodic exposure to the amount of activity that you and the American armed forces are engaged in around the world. Thank you. You hear about it when somebody’s dispatched a carrier to the Gulf or something like that but you don’t realize the day to day hard work that goes on to be prepared for those tasking’s.

This is the year everybody’s talking about what happened in 1914 in the area of World War I. I’ve been a long time this year reading about the beginning of the 2nd World War, 1939 to 1941. One of the things that really struck me was how the internationalized navy, experienced navy officers in Japan who were most reluctant to support the effort to go to war with the United States back then. They had seen the U.S., there had been a lot that had gone to school in the U.S..

When you jump forward to today and you talk about getting to know the Chinese, trying to keep people from misunderstanding each other and I have a good appreciation of your potential adversary. If you think China basically took itself out of the Navy game 600 years ago when they scuttled the world’s best fleet in the 1400s. Now they’re coming back. They’ve got a long way to go. I’m sure you’ve experienced this yourself. When people call for us to be cut off for this reason or that reason, I say we’ve got a bigger game at play here and I hope we can keep it up. Thanks for letting me say that.

I wanted to ask you, sir, you haven’t mentioned it today but one of the things that were a signature initiative of yours on arrival in your present position was the AirSea Battle Concept. I wonder if you can give me a sense of how you see the AirSea Battle Concept today.

**Admiral Greenert:** Well, as we talked about it before, it is truly a concept. It’s a way to think about what I would call joint assured access. A lot of people say oh, so you’re talking about the Western Pacific. It would certainly apply there, to get where we need to get, to get the things done we need to get done. But more than anything I would say is a way to put into place a concept, a mindset among out officers who are dealing with getting access.
We applied it in Japan to get access to a radioactively contaminated power plant, to measure those levels. So how are we going to get in there to do that? We sat down to do that planning. It would be effective in the Strait of Hormuz, it would be effective clearly in the Western Pacific. So it’s getting the mindset right, doing the exercises and thinking about that. It’s about using cross-domain capability and turning to the air and the sea, below the sea, space and cyber, and saying what’s the best domain to get this done? Maybe it’s a missile from a submarine, or maybe it’s an air-to-surface missile from an aircraft, or maybe it’s turning to a cyber solution. But until you sit down and have that kind of mindset from the very beginning and bring that all home, you’re going to start turning to your traditional manner.

We do pretty well today proceeding with the forces that we have and figuring out how to operate jointly, but it’s what we have and what we bring there. What we don’t do as well is in our war colleges, sitting down with our folks and training our kids and doing our programs that we built here at the Pentagon, thinking in that kind of joint and interdependence manner. That’s the foundation and what’s going on in AirSea Battle. So we’re looking much more at it as a broader concept than just what are the Air Force and the Navy doing. We’re bringing in the other services and the cyber element. And that’s what the team is working on today. So thank you for that.

**Moderator:** I will open the floor to questions. Reminder please wait for a microphone so the cameras can hear you, and please identify yourself and your affiliation. Back here.

**Audience Member:** Thank you, Admiral. I am with China Video News Agency.

What is the goal of U.S. and China with discussing the code of conduct in Washington just after the encounter incident nearby Hainan Islands? I’m wondering what progress you have made in an area in this regard, and particularly on the issue of the U.S. surveillance activities nearby in the international space near by China.

Are you concerned about that this similar encounter will happen more frequently in the future? Thank you.

**Admiral Greenert:** I’ll answer your last question first. Yeah, I am concerned that such unprofessional activity, and we’ve had clear documentation that it was unprofessional, I am concerned that that would happen in the future. But I will say this. That incident, and you’re talking about the incident where one of our maritime patrol aircraft flying in international airspace, well over 100-plus miles from the coast was intercepted, and that’s fine. That incident was inconsistent with how we’ve had air encounters in the future. Many of them, the vast majority of them are professional. The Russians flying near our airspace, we intercept them,
there is a norm for activity and for two aircraft entities operating safely and as I said with due protocol. That is pretty well known by all our pilots. So it shouldn’t have happened, but it shouldn’t also define our relationship. But we will continue to operate in international air space. We’ve made that clear and we’ll proceed ahead from there.

We will continue the dialogue. We have to have the dialogue with our requisite counterparts, and I might get that opportunity next week when I see Admiral Wu in Newport to discuss this with him.

**Audience Member:** China Daily News.

To continue on that, because you have, as a U.S. official seems to avoid, whether U.S. views which Chinese have expressed being offensive or provocative. Many experts also say something like that.

The other, from your talk, is China Sea maybe some of your strategy may be very differently than say you say going to strengthen military cooperation with Vietnam. But certainly it’s not directed to North Korea. So how you convince Chinese it’s not threat to Chinese? Thank you.

**Admiral Greenert:** Well, that will be an interesting conversation which I assure you I will have with, we will have with the Chinese Navy. The first step would be what is the interest of Vietnam, and we’ll have to have that conversation. I have not had that conversation. For example, what kind of skills would we want to work on with the Vietnam Navy, as an example. We work on predominantly counter-piracy. We work on counter-terrorism. We work on search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. In that CARAT series that I referred to before, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, down in Southeast Asia, that would be the consistent kind of skill that we would work with with Southeast Asian nations, what I just said. Which is a common purpose for a common problem. As opposed to working together to target some other navy or nation. That’s not consistent with how we do international operations in the U.S. Navy.

**Audience Member:** Surveillance?

**Admiral Greenert:** You mean with Vietnam?

**Audience Member:** No, I mean reduced surveillance around off Chinese coast.

**Admiral Greenert:** There’s no intention that I’m aware of to do that. We’re finding international airspace, that China comes and steams in our exclusive economic zone. We don’t
make a big deal out of it. The Russians have in the Cold War flown in international airspace, and so this is not new. The whole concept of it.

**Audience Member:** I’m Admiral Hoyt Cole, National War College.

One of your predecessors once said that if full sequestration takes effect that the Navy’s not going to be able to maintain the usual sort of constant deployments that you mentioned, but would have to go to sort of a fire brigade reaction. Would you agree that’s one of the dangers or do you believe the Navy’s modified operational context enough that that would not be a factor?

**Admiral Greenert:** I don’t know what a fire brigade, I think that’s what you said, fire brigade?

**Audience Member:** Yes, sir. Everybody’d be home port and you’d only deploy when there was a crisis.

**Admiral Greenert:** I see. No, that would not be my approach. I believe our mandate is presence and during my tenure and as I’ve studied this before and as I look into the future, we have to be, as I say, we have to be where it matters when it matters. If we go to Budget Control Act numbers, that presence, we will work toward the same principles that I described before. Our strategy won’t change. So we’ll be in a tremendous struggle to maintain an industrial base, to maintain an appropriate size navy and we won’t be able to maintain the strategy, that is the Defense Strategic Guidance missions that we do today. It will be a completely different look. And we’ve been pretty clear in testifying to that. All of the chiefs.

But no, I wouldn’t propose that we would go to, if you will, a more, where we would return home and only respond and surge.

My experience as I’ve watched the world today and I look around, and I rattle off all those things that happened just in the last eighteen months on that slide. If you’ll put the Navy Today slide up there, please. On the lower left hand corner there you see how long it takes to get from CONUS -- three weeks to get somewhere, two weeks. I mean it’s either festered into a really bad situation or it’s over. And I don’t think we can do that.

**Audience Member:** Admiral, Sidney Freeburg, BreakingDefense.com.

You mentioned electronic warfare, you mentioned the AirSea Battle, and I wanted to get your reaction, your thoughts on an issue that Allen Chapper from Department of Defense Research Engineering raised the other week. He said we have lost the electromagnetic spectrum that we need to regain dominance or at least parity. He was deeply concerned about the proliferation of
affordable low cost jamming, for example, around the world. An issue beyond WestPac but clearly Asia is where a lot of the trends come from.

How concerned are you about having lost parity or losing our edge in the electronic spectrum?

**Audience Member:** I disagree that we’ve, if you will, lost parity, but we have lost momentum. I would put it that way. But I think we can redeem it. This is not a new realm for us.

The first thing you’ve got to do is you’ve got to be able to maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum. You’ve got to understand your emissions, your potential adversary’s emissions, that would be frequency, wave length, where they’re using it, and then you’ve got to get out there and manipulate yourself in it. So there are a lot of programs in that direction, Sidney. We have got to inject adrenalin into the whole concept. You know that, I’ve been talking about this for a while. That’s my view of it. But I believe we have to remain focused on it, both investment wise and operational wise. We have lost momentum, but I don’t think we’ve lost parity.

**Audience Member:** John from CBI TV. Thank you, Admiral.

Two questions. First, I know you are not in charge of arms sales to Taiwan, but Taiwan has been trying to buy submarines for many years to no avail. As a mariner yourself for many years, do you have any suggestions for the people in Taiwan or your colleagues in Taiwan in terms of building submarines on their own? That’s the first question.

Second question, I know you were saying that incidents like the South China Sea standoff between Chinese and American navies and the intercepts over the skies of the South China Sea do not define U.S.-China mil-to-mil relationship. But you know, apart from expressions of constructive relationship from both sides want over here in the past is the kind of you know standoff or intercepts. What is the new situation? What is the current state of mil-to-mil relationships between the two?

**Admiral Greenert:** I’ll tell you, yes, I’ve had conversations with my Taiwan counterpart. I won’t discuss them here, I can’t. So I’ll leave it at that and I’ll leave that there.

But I don’t think this this air incident should define the relationship but I think it should be noted. So I’ll go on and say, remember the Cowpens incident. That would be before everybody goes whoa, how about that. Well, what happened after the Cowpens puts on the brakes and comes to a halt is the commanding officer of the Liaoning gets on the international circuit and said what’s going on over there? And he and the commanding officer of the Cowpens have a conversation. On the Cowpens’ intent, the Liaoning’s intent, and what operations they’re doing.
They work it out and they find mutual protocol, if you will, or mutual understanding of what who’s going and doing, the whole thing diffuses.

There are examples, I’ve given some, I can connect you with my public affairs officer, where we’re at sea and our two commanding officers -- Chinese ship, U.S. warship -- have a conversation and go their ways.

Now I may note that this agreement is between two navies. That doesn’t mean Coast Guard yet is going to comply or that we’re going to all speak English or that some auxiliary or supporting ship on both sides, but we’re working toward that. But what we’ve seen examples of, again my public affairs can help you, are Chinese Navy ships coming in to help preclude, to help if you will, run block, a blocking maneuver to keep somebody from getting in too close. Complying with the international norms out there.

So this is going on. I just gave you the exercise when we went to RIMPAC. It’s not going to happen overnight but I think we are on, we’re progressing ahead.

Bottom line, we cannot have miscalculation. As Dr. Paul mentioned opening this up the beginning of World War II, the beginning of World War I. A lot of miscalculation, the more I read about it. People not understanding the intention of somebody else. I don’t want to be a part of that and I think it’s my job to keep the South China Sea calm and the East China Sea calm, and I think working together is a step in the right direction to do that.

**Audience Member:** Christy Wortheim with the Naval Post Graduate School.

I’m thrilled, frankly, to hear what you’re saying because somehow I haven’t picked up your behavior in the press.

**Admiral Greenert:** That’s usually a good sign.

**Audience Member:** -- as a member of the Joint Staff. Last week I heard Michelle Flournoy talking about the QDR. To be quite honest, from what I understood from her it sounded like the stuff that was going on in the Pentagon when I was there 30-some years ago. And I kept thinking, doing the QDR do you start with what are the lessons learned we’ve acquired in the last ten years and how would that apply to creating our thinking for a new plan? And if that’s going on I would feel much better, but I certainly didn’t get that from Michelle, and so much -- In an institution that’s so big, it’s so easy to fall back on this was last year’s budget, this was last year’s plan, we’ll just continue to do that.
Admiral Greenert: Well I’d say process wise we have learned a great deal from things like counter-IED, how to stand up an organization which can take a today problem and we need to stop casualties on the battlefield today, and if you read Mr. Gates’ book you’ll see details of that, how he fought through that, and then put together a means to get what I call speed to fleet. Gary Roughead actually started it. I should give credit where they below, to carry that on. So how do you quickly acquire something? How to put together an office to go out there and find, and Frank Kendall talks about this a lot today, find capabilities that are coming forward out of research and development and get them into test and evaluation. We have learned a good deal from that and that is being brought forward.

Audience Member: And into training.

Admiral Greenert: And into training.

Audience Member: -- story about building your --

Admiral Greenert: So AirSea Battle is an example of the collaboration among the services. Not just on getting together when you operate. That’s when you already have all your gear. But it’s backing up to the, if not the gestation of the program, the concept, and then starting to share that and putting that together. We call it interdependence. Joint operations is great, but interdependence among each other.

We have Army-Air Force, we have Navy-Air Force, Navy-Army, warfighter talks where we get together and take action on that. This is going on, but as you said, you don’t read about it out there but its happening. A lot of it is fiscal survival, being able to continue to get that capability out there. And if it really resides in the Army or the Air Force, you know, then they ought to be the ones to bring it forward, and then we have to make it compatible. So compatibility.

Moderator: You mentioned, Admiral, Carnegie is the oldest think tank. As a representative example we have in the front row here Michael Swayne.

Admiral Greenert: The oldest.

Audience Member: Thank you, Michael Swayne, Carnegie Endowment.

I’d like to ask you a question that’s sort of two questions but they’re related, because I ask you to look at little bit into the future.

One of them is to do with Japan. You mentioned in your remarks about Japan’s move towards collective self-defense and the interpretation. What would you like to see happen in terms of
U.S. Navy and Maritime Self-Defense Force capabilities that the Japanese can’t do today that you’d like to see them doing in the future. Perhaps under collective self-defense or even further. How would you like to --

The other question is, can you see a time in the future when the U.S. and Chinese Navies would work together in a really interoperable nature to do things like slot defense? In other words, that that task would not be entirely left to the U.S. Navy in the big sense. Not just Gulf of Aden, counter-piracy sort of thing, but the basic capabilities of keeping Straits of Malacca and other things open. Can you foresee a time when the U.S. and China work together to do that sort of thing?

**Admiral Greenert:** Yes. I’ll answer the last one first. I can. I can see that. Those are the kind of skill sets that we exercised in RIMPAC. Although China came and did some very complex, from simple to highly complex gunnery exercises and maneuvers and all that, what we did together is sort of an ad hoc coalition, was maritime security operations. That would be what you described. Boarding, visit, board, search and seizure. Then you have levels. You get up to the third level where somebody is opposing that, and we worked at those very high levels. Yes, I can see that. I think that’s what responsible navies have to do.

I think that the neighborhood of nations would turn to us and say hey, we don’t have what you have, so you guys should be keeping this place free, freedom of navigation.

To answer your first question, two examples off the bat that I think would be, should be I think non-concerning to other nations for us and Japan. Ballistic missile defense. We have a North Korean threat and it’s an international threat. They have the missile, Japan does, and they have the fire control program and they have the proven ability to use it and we are interoperable as I described earlier. That would fit in well.

The second would be counter-mine, and in particular, keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. We are about to do an exercise here in November called, what else, International Mine Countermeasure Exercise. Pretty simple. You get more people if you give it a simple name. We will have 40 nations there, which is extraordinary, because two years ago we had 20, about 24 actually. So I think those are two clearly defensive, clearly international interest items that we could operate with.

**Audience Member:** Mike, PBS On-Line News Hour.

In 1995 President Clinton ordered the deployment of two carrier groups to the Straits of Taiwan with relative assurances from your predecessor at the time of the relative safety of those ships.
Given what the Chinese have been doing with missiles in the area of denial, et cetera, would you or your successor be able to offer the President of the United States the same assurances for that kind of a deployment?

**Admiral Greenert:** Well, it’s always dangerous to take something in history and then bring it into today, but I’ll speak capability wise.

We’ve been working very hard. You’re talking about anti-ship ballistic missile predominantly, which is the target, many say, towards the carrier. And in some degree anti-ship cruise missile. We work very hard on defeating that. It is the kill chain that has to take place. What I mean by that is you have to have the capability to detect ship and aircraft carrier, anything that large, from quite a distance if you’re going to be effective. So you have to detect and you have to know that’s what it is that you’ve detected. Then you have to track it long enough to be confident enough to go ahead and launch this ballistic missile. Then the ballistic missile has to travel far enough to turn its sensor on, turn and look and find what it’s looking for, then track it, then move in and get a final strike, if you will.

Any breakage in that chain or confidence therein is a mission failure. So I’m confident that we’ve made terrific headway in this direction and we’ll continue to move in that direction.

**Audience Member:** Leandra Bernstein, International News Agency.

I would like you to address some more of these potential miscalculations. I know that you did just refer to China as a potential adversary, obviously not an adversary right now, but there is a perception that this pivot to the Pacific was for the purpose of containment, as far as I understand it, still a perception.

What’s the potential for miscalculations? What’s the actual threat that we’re looking at in our presence in the Pacific? Then also if you could just address this upcoming symposium also.

**Admiral Greenert:** And hurry up will you? All right.

I’ll leave you with a few things. I think China is an opportunity, and I underline that, and we have to take that opportunity. So I think that’s very very important right up front.

Two I’ve had, as I said, numerous conversations with my counterpart, Admiral Wu Shengli. And he’s told me repeatedly, he understands we’re going to be there in the South China Sea. He understands we’re not going anywhere and he thinks we ought to be able to interoperated together. His point to me is, I’m going to be there too, by the way, because my nation says these are our near seas, these are of interest to us.
Then we look at each other and we say, so we’re going to have to figure out how to do this right, and we both agree, you say what’s the potential for miscalculation? The potential for miscalculation is not educating our commanding officers and giving them the means and the protocol so that when they meet instead of the first thing coming out of their mouth in a different language, it’s something saying what are you doing here you don’t belong here, and the other one’s saying in accordance with whatever. And where do we go from there? It’s just not good.

It should start with two seasoned professional mariners who are responsible for, like I said 300 to 500 of their nation’s folks aboard, having a professional dialogue of what they’re doing in this international medium called the sea. And as I’ve mentioned, there’s trillions of dollars and economies at stake here. We can’t screw this up through miscalculation. That’s my view.

**Audience Member:** Ken Marker, .

I thought it was instructive on your map of deployments in the Western Pacific that the United States is nowhere to be seen. You said a long way from our shores. Can you envision a world in which the Navy is used actually to defend our shores rather than threaten other people’s shores? Other than because of budgetary constraints, or is that above your pay scale?

**Admiral Greenert:** Well, what I didn’t put up there because I didn’t want to clutter it with numbers, there’s roughly 200 ships back in the United States on the East and West Coast. Put that slide up there. The dots are, there it is, 190 ships. They’re on the East and West Coast, and they are assigned to the commander called NORTHCOM, Northern Command. They are operationally upon his need, he says I need these whatever it is, and we say they’re yours. So there are a host of ships operating usually about 40 on the West Coast and about 20 to 30, I can get you the numbers if you’re interested, on the East Coast. Operating. And they’re readily available for defense of the United States. The number one mission of the Department of Defense in the Defense Strategic Guidance, which is the foundation for all our programs, is homeland defense, and that’s just not strategic nuclear although that’s a key and critical part of it. It’s what we would provide which is presence on the East and West Coast. And by the way, I failed to mention my little friend down there at Guantanamo Bay. Don’t forget that. You have to pass within tens of miles of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, our U.S. base, that’s a dot, when you go through the Panama Canal. That’s an important site.

**Moderator:** Admiral, you’ve been terrific with your time, you also have been sharing so much information with us, but you also have a regular job. So let’s one last question.

**Audience Member:** Thank you, Admiral. Janine Winn, the voice of Vietnamese Americans.
I thank you, Admiral, for the very challenging job that you’ve done very well.

Admiral Greenert:  Thank you.

Audience Member: You made the statement that the U.S. has been in the Pacific for the last many decades. And actually the U.S. has done all it can to maintain peace in that area that China conducts. To this present day when it’s expanding its naval forces, and from what you say, we’re still looking to embrace China, to maintain this community, especially in the South China Sea.

Recently you also mentioned we should know the Cowpens situation and the recent almost collision in the air and in the sea in the different incidents, but the U.S. still trying to embrace China.

The questions raised by many of our Chinese news reporters say that China did not appreciate that and they questioned the U.S. being in the international air and they wanted U.S. not to be there, so they wanted to set up a new standard.

The reason --

Moderator: I’m sorry, can you please get to your question.

Audience Member: Yes. In the South China Sea, what they doing in the Johnson rift in the James scholl and what they do in other areas and islands. Many they not are honoring the international law.

So to what extent with our sequestration the U.S. can continue to support China to violate international law? And to what extent allies including Vietnam can understand your purpose? In peace and stability in the region.

Moderator: I’m sorry.

Audience Member: -- almost 500 million Chinese. Thank you.

Admiral Greenert: Well, we need to, I think, bring the Chinese in all areas into the table of international meetings and norms and fora and have these discussions to your point on what precisely, and then we’ll be clear with each other and everybody, what are the international laws, because I think they’re getting fuzz here and there on what’s a law, what’s a local law, a country law, a nation’s claim, and what the international, the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea.

That tends to be the best means, what it means and what it stands for. Thanks.
Moderator: Thank you, Admiral. Please join me in thanking the admiral [applause].

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