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DOUG LAMBORN:
Today's hearing will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be authorized to declare recess at any time without objection, so ordered. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the fiscal year 2024 budget request for US nuclear forces. Good morning to our witnesses, Secretary Plumb, Secretary Rosenblum, Administrator Hruby, General Bussiere, and Vice Admiral Wolfe.
I'm glad that we can have this hearing as informed by President Biden's budget request. My priorities as we put together the fiscal year 2024 budget are that we keep the current nuclear modernization program of record on track. Where there are delays or bottlenecks, we should identify ways to fix or circumvent them, and we will begin to examine new capabilities outside the current program of record.
We need to be thinking about the key infrastructure investments and capabilities we'll need in a decade and start planning and budgeting for them now. We are in a precarious time during our nuclear modernization program. Simultaneously, modernizing the ground, air, and sea legs of our triad was never going to be easy.
And we are past the point of no return to ensure new capabilities come online as old capabilities age out. I intend to be deeply involved in the schedules for the Columbia Sentinel and B-21 Raider programs as well as those for the associated warhead and missile systems. And this isn't even to mention the Russia -- excuse me, the Chinese nuclear breakout that we see taking place, which was never contemplated when New START treaty was negotiated.
There are three specific concerns that I would like to highlight today. On the Sentinel ICBM program, there have been some press statements that global macroeconomic issues, like supply chain, are causing delays to the program. I would like to thank Undersecretary Bill LaPlante for quickly reaching out to schedule a briefing on these challenges and happy that he will be here tomorrow to brief Ranking Member Moulton and myself.
Once we get that briefing tomorrow, we'll be sure to get an update in the works for members of the subcommittee as well. Secretary Rosenblum and General Bussiere, to the degree you can say anything about these delays today, it would be appreciated. And I'll let everyone know, we will have a classified portion of this hearing immediately upon recessing from this open hearing.
I'm also incredibly worried about the National Nuclear Security Administration's ability to recruit and retain people and how this is leading to delays in key projects. Administrator Hruby, we are obviously very concerned about the delays in plutonium pit production, but we're also tracking delays to the tritium finishing facility in South Carolina, and the pantex high explosive facility in Texas.
My understanding is that these programs are delayed, So I'm hoping you will explain why the tritium and high explosive projects didn't receive any funding in the budget request. Finally, I have some questions about AUKUS. There is broad bipartisan support across the aisle. For this framework. I would like to understand how AUKUS is going to impact US highly enriched uranium requirements.
Specifically, I would like to know if we need to begin thinking about and budgeting for a DOD specific program to sustain our requirements. With that, I'd like to begin welcome our witnesses. We look forward to hearing from you and about your efforts to develop these critical nuclear capabilities and how this subcommittee can be helpful.
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Moulton for his opening comments.
SETH MOULTON:
Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. It's an honor to work with you on such important issues and I want to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses. As we sit in this hearing room this morning, Putin continues to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and is talking about moving nuclear weapons into Belarus.
North Korea is undoubtedly readying for their next ballistic missile launch. IAEA inspectors are raising flags regarding Iran's ability to enrich uranium to the point of producing a nuclear weapon, and the Chinese Communist Party is conducting a nuclear expansion at a rate that aims to reach parity with the United States within a decade.
The jurisdiction of this subcommittee remains one of the most consequential of any in Congress and our nuclear forces are at the core of our national security, the bedrock, the foundation. I believe that humanity would be safer if we eliminated nuclear weapons. The sheer number of close calls with accidental launches we have had in the past seven decades should concern anyone who understands nuclear holocaust and a few shreds of statistical theory.
I hope we never lose sight of what should be a shared goal of all nations, But until we get there, we know only two fundamental ways to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used. The first is reducing the number we all have through arms control and the second is instilling confidence in our adversaries that the weapons we have are safe, secure, reliable and can be employed to devastating effect.
There's broad bipartisan support for the nuclear triad and ensuring that our systems remain safe, secure and reliable. In fact, it was Secretary Mattis who after publicly expressing concern regarding the land leg of the triad, ordered a review as to whether all three legs are still necessary, and the conclusion was, yes.
Our systems must check those three boxes, safe, secure and reliable to provide a credible deterrent as we faced a dynamic this country has never previously confronted, two nuclear peer adversaries. This is an area in which the chairman and I very much see eye to eye. This means making the significant investments across the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA, to produce new platforms such as the B-21 and Columbia Class SSBN, modernized delivery systems such as the Sentinel ICBM, long range standoff weapon, and the next Trident D5 life extension -- extension variant, as well as updating aging NNSA infrastructure across the national labs and production facilities, so that they can deliver nuclear warheads on time and on schedule to the services.
The chairman And I also firmly agree that a strong US nuclear deterrent is at the core of strategic stability in today's world. This is true not just with our adversaries, but because of the umbrella it provides to our allies and partners as well. Amidst Putin's nuclear saber rattling over Ukraine, US contributions to the NATO alliance have proven to be a stabilizing force.
With regards to the INDOPACOM region, President Biden has been crystal clear, the US has an ironclad and unwavering commitment to draw on the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear to provide extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea in the face of an increasingly antagonistic Pyongyang.
Without a reliable US nuclear deterrent to counterbalance our adversaries, the potential of proliferation to our allies is a real concern that we should take just as seriously as what Russia and the CCP are doing. While our adversaries are making significant qualitative and quantitative improvements to their nuclear forces, US programs, whether at NNSA or across the DOD, continue to face schedule delays and cost overruns.
Just last week, I read that Sentinel, which is planned to deliver just in time to replace the aging Minuteman 3 ICBMs, could be up to two years delayed. I am certain, any schedule shift will also be met with a corresponding price tag increase to the already staggering $96 billion program. Meanwhile at NNSA, the uranium processing facility is $2 billion over cost and is similarly delayed up to two years, and NNSA's plans to produce plutonium pits at the rate DOD requires have been delayed again by years until the mid to late 2030's, and we won't know how much it will realistically cost until 2025. We also made public a few weeks ago that the CCP has surpassed the US in their quantity of ICBM launchers and is exceeding its own nuclear modernization plans with a path to get to 1500 warheads by 2035. In the 2018 Chinese Military Power report DIA assessed that the purpose of their nuclear forces was to maintain a limited but survivable second strike capability consistent with their purported no first use policy.
There is no mention by the intelligence community just five years ago about the potential expansion of their nuclear arsenal, but yet in 2021 they released that they would more than double their stockpile by 2027. In other words, while US programs are several years behind, the Chinese are now several years ahead.
This is unacceptable and we don't know yet what a Moscow Beijing alliance might portend for all of this. While Russia is sabotaging the last real example of verifiable arms control, we have yet to see a clear strategy for engaging the CCP in arms control discussions. I hope today's witnesses can help this committee better understand what is being done on both policy and acquisition to ensure that US nuclear forces continue to keep us safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your remarks. We now turn to our witnesses. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record. Since we have a full house today, I would ask each of you to please limit your opening comments to five minutes. Because you don't have a clock in front of you, with one minute to go, I'll give a light tap on the gavel as a helpful reminder, hopefully.
And Assistant Secretary Plumb you're recognized first.
JOHN PLUMB:
Thank you. Thanks, Chairman Lamborn. Thanks, Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the committee. Good morning and thanks for inviting me to testify on the FY '24 defense budget request for nuclear forces alongside my colleagues, Secretary Rosenblum, Undersecretary Hruby, General Bussiere, and Admiral Wolfe.
As Secretary Austin has observed, the US is on the verge of a challenging and dangerous moment in which we will face two major nuclear powers strategic competitors for the first time, Russia and China. Both are investing heavily in nuclear weapons and forces to hold the US, and our allies and partners at risk, but neither is demonstrating the behaviors associated with responsible nuclear weapons states.
China is engaged in a significant, fast paced expansion, and modernization of its nuclear forces, but China has not shown interest in establishing dialog related to nuclear weapons. A lack of dialog breeds mistrust in peacetime and can lead to miscalculation in crisis. Russia has engaged in nuclear saber rattling throughout its unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine.
Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in their strategy, and we expect they will do so even more due to their conventional force losses in the Ukraine conflict. Russia's recent declared suspension of its participation and New START is the latest example of a pattern of irresponsible behavior. And in addition of course there are two near peer competitors, North Korea and Iran both continue to act as destabilizing forces in their own regions and present challenges for the global community.
To meet these threats, the 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review are both clear about the urgent need to strengthen and sustain deterrence. Now going back for decades, the United States has underinvested in nuclear modernization, but no more, and I think this committee for their help on that.
As a tangible sign of the administration's clear commitment to modernize the triad, the President's '24 budget request includes $37.7 billion to recapitalize, sustain, and operate DOD's nuclear enterprise. This is 3.3 billion more than the FY '23 request and it includes 4.3 billion for the continued development of the Sentinel ICBM weapon system, 6.2 billion for the Columbia Class SSBN program, 5.3 billion for the B-21 Raider bomber, almost $1 billion for the long range standoff cruise missile, and 456 million for the life extension of the Trident to D5 sea launch ballistic missile.
These investments will ensure that each leg of the triad is modernized and has the needed, adaptability and flexibility, to address a changing threat environment for the coming decades. The President -- The President's budget request also includes more than 7 billion to sustain and recapitalize our nuclear command control and communications architecture, NC3. And in addition, the President's budget request full funding for our nuclear security infrastructure to reestablish, repair, and modernize our production capabilities and infrastructure.
President's budget will ensure that our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible. Sustained and consistent Congressional support for this modernization effort is absolutely essential to ensure the security of the United States for the coming decades.
So I would like to thank the members of the committee for your support to this monumental effort and for your tireless dedication to the department. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you. Assistant Secretary Rosenblum, you're recognized.
DEBORAH ROSENBLUM:
Great, good morning. Thank you Chairman Lamborn as well as Ranking Member Moulton and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity today to be able to testify regarding the FY '24 request for US nuclear forces. It's a pleasure to join all my colleagues here to discuss all of the matters that undergird our US nuclear deterrent.
The President's budget request is just outlined by Dr. Plumb, reinforced the importance of these efforts by fully funding the nuclear sustainment as well as modernization efforts. It is no secret that we are navigating a decisive decade. The decisions that we make as a nation today will have profound effects on our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.
As the Assistant Secretary for nuclear chemical, biological, and defense programs, I serve as a senior advisor and technical expert to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on DOD's efforts to sustain and modernize our nuclear deterrent. I also serve as a staff director for the Nuclear Weapons Council.
As just well articulated by Dr. Plumb, the global security environment has continued to deteriorate and we are facing the prospects of two major nuclear armed adversaries, both of whom Russia and China, are growing and diversifying their arsenals. Our adversaries, however, do not represent our only challenge.
Today, we are faced with an unprecedented set of cross-cutting risks that affect multiple organizations tasked with sustaining the current nuclear stockpile and simultaneously modernizing the future nuclear triad. These risks reside in our nuclear industrial base, with our future warfighters -- workforce, excuse me, in supply chain security and in cyber security threats that require action in the near term in order to make lasting impacts over -- for the deterrent across the next 15 years.
Despite these challenges, we've made significant progress in our weapons modernization programs, and in my written statement, which I would ask be submitted for the record, contains further details, but I'm happy to answer any of them today for you. As staff director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, I am also pleased to report that the NWC is actively making decisions to modernize a modern, flexible, and balanced stockpile underpinned by a resilient and responsive production enterprise.
In addition to executing our statutory responsibilities, the NWC embarked on an endeavor this past year to think broadly about the necessary capabilities and capacities potentially needed for the future and to understand how future requirements may impact on current plans and schedules and the program of record.
The Council recognizes that it can no longer make individual decisions related to specific warhead programs, but rather the council, with all of the efforts of my colleagues here at this table, are focused on understanding a suite of decisions that reflect the priorities of the department and enable, the Council to trade and balance risk across the deterrent and between DOD and the Department of Energy.
Our adversaries technological advances also pose direct risks to both our legacy and future nuclear forces. To that end, I want to thank and acknowledge this subcommittee's support for the Department of Defense's ongoing 2022 failsafe risk reduction review. This represents an historic opportunity to conduct an enterprise wide review to rebaseline nuclear security.
Finally, as Vice chairman of the NATO High-Level Group, we are very focused on, and helping to lead NATO's modernization of the nuclear deterrent, and we are working very closely with our allies on the B61-12 and in close coordination with the US Air Force and allies to ensure the F-35 is operationally certified later this year for their dual capable aircraft role.
So with this, I'd like to thank the subcommittee for all of your support and I look forward to taking your questions.
Thank you. Administrator Hruby, you recognized.
JILL HRUBY:
Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to present the President's fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. Chairman Lamborn, a written statement has been provided and I respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
The deteriorating international security environment reminds us daily of the importance and urgency of the NNSA missions. The security atmosphere and the ramifications of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine are expanding the scope of our responsibilities. As a result, we are laser focused on the need to accelerate delivery in all of our missions while simultaneously advancing the foundational science and technology that provides the United States with comprehensive deterrence.
I am proud of NNSA'a progress. The B61-12 and the W88 Alt 370 are in full scale production and are achieving planned deployment schedules. The other three weapon modernization programs, the W80-4, the W87-1, and the W93 are making significant progress. Our investments and production have advanced the ability to produce 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible.
At Los Alamos, we have produced 40 developmental builds with the first production unit expected late in calendar year '24. The investments made at the Savannah River Pit production facility has accelerated progress by conducting early site preparation, removal of unneeded equipment, and procuring long lead items.
The uranium processing facility is over 50 percent complete with the first four non nuclear sub projects concluded. Nonproliferation efforts also continue to succeed with three disposals of surplus plutonium, removal of weapons, usable materials from countries around the world, and replacement of almost 100 cesium irradiated from US facilities.
We have partnered with Ukraine and neighboring countries to train emergency responders and we have provided equipment to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Additionally, the Office of Naval Reactors has completed the refueling and overhaul of the prototype land based reactor in New York, progressed development of the Columbia Class and SSA -- SSN(X) submarine propulsion systems, and supported AUKUS. I'm especially pleased to say the entire enterprise is energized because of the importance of our mission, our emphasis on accelerated delivery and our investments in science, technology, infrastructure and workforce.
NNSA's FY '24 budget request of 23.8 billion, an increase of 1.7 billion over FY '23 enacted levels reflects current national security priorities and remains consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review and other administration policies and strategies. The budget request supports the five ongoing weapon modernization programs, two phase one exploratory efforts and enhanced cybersecurity for our networks and digital assurance of our weapons and enterprise.
The request responds to inflationary pressures, supply chain and labor shortages in the construction sector, by prioritizing funding for ongoing large scale nuclear production modernization efforts and expansion of non-nuclear production capabilities while delaying some planned construction activities to maximize success.
The budget request and defense nuclear nonproliferation continues nuclear risk reduction work and supports our robust nonproliferation regime and international partnerships and advances associated research. Expanding nonproliferation portfolio priorities include the support for Ukraine and preparing for a growing and evolving civil nuclear power fleet.
The Naval Reactors budget request continues to support reactor designs for new systems, provides a qualitative edge for our naval fleet, and funds the recently rebaseline spent fuel handling facility. Before closing, I want to express my appreciation for my colleagues from the Department of Defense for their strong collaboration.
We continue to focus both -- on both short and long range planning to align our respective mission deliverables to maintain a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent at all times. The priorities and challenges for NNSA are clear and progress is being made. With your continued support, I'm confident we will succeed.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you. General Bussiere, you're recognized.
THOMAS BUSSIERE:
Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton and distinguished committee members. I'm absolutely honored to be here today to represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command and provide you an update on our mission, our airmen, our modernization efforts, and the challenges we face in sustaining our legacy weapon systems.
As you know, the world is a very different place than it was in 2019 when this command was activated. Air Force Global Strike Command was created to ensure the Air Force dedicated the appropriate leadership and oversight of our nation's nuclear mission. As the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I intend to ensure no one forgets why our command exists.
For the first time in history, the US faces two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors. China continues to expand, modernize, diversify their nuclear forces and is the foremost country positioned to reshape its region and the international order to comply with its authoritarian purposes. Meanwhile, President Putin has engaged in reckless rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons as Russia persists in their unprovoked attacks on Ukraine in an attempt to expand their power and influence.
Air Force Global Strike Command remains the bedrock of our nation's defense in the international assurance against these threats. We are postured to respond to the strategic competition our nation currently faces. We are responsible for the air and land based legs of the nuclear triad, and fundamentally we are the long range strike force for the free world.
The entire inventory of US bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles rests within our command. I'd like to thank the members of this committee for your steadfast support, for our continued efforts to modernize our weapon systems. I will briefly highlight some of our ongoing initiatives. We continue to maintain and sustain our current Minuteman III ICBMs, and we already are preparing our wings and their surrounding communities to receive our future ICBM, The Sentinel.
Additionally, our bomber fleet, including our B-1s and our dual capable B-2s and B-52s, are being sustained with innovative solutions as we prepare for the future bomber fleet, including the B-21 Raider, and the modernized B-52J. In addition to the ICBM and bomber fleets, we continue our efforts to modernize our nuclear command, control, and communications or NC3. As you know, NC3 is integral to the national military command system, used to exercise and conduct continuous survivable and secure nuclear command and control.
We are at a critical time for the United States. The threats we face are more complicated and more dangerous than any time in my career. The evolving global environment demands a credible strategic deterrence, and to achieve this Air Force Global Strike Command must continue to modernize at the speed of relevance.
Unique to our command is our requirement to maintain full operational capability where are legacy nuclear weapon systems, to answer the President's call until the new weapon systems are fully operational. The nation's nuclear enterprise is the foundation of our nation's defense, and integrated deterrence will not operate as designed without the stability it provides.
To maintain the security of our nation, and of our allies and partners, the US must ensure our weapons are capable and ready, our airmen are empowered and equipped. The airmen of Air Force Global Strike Command continue to fulfill our mission with discipline, excellence, and pride. However, a number of our airmen also face personal challenges, including health concerns, housing, and child care availability, and we are working to develop prompt and comprehensive solutions to ensure our airmen are getting the care they need and deserve.
Last December, I was honored to be confirmed to be the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. There is no other job I would rather have. Strategic deterrence and long range strike are foundational to our nation's defense and Air Force Global Strike Command is the backbone of these mission sets. Where their legacy platforms and our modernized forces and our devoted people, we safeguard our nation now and the decades to come.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you. Vice Admiral Wolfe, you're recognized.
JOHNNY WOLFE:
Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's budget priorities for nuclear forces. I'd like to thank this subcommittee for its continued support of the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission.
The mission of my command, Strategic Systems Programs, is to provide credible and affordable strategic solutions to the warfighter. To quote from the administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and has said many times already this morning, in a dynamic security environment, a safe, effective nuclear deterrent is foundational to broader US defense strategy and the extended deterrence commitments we have made to allies and partners.
For nearly seven decades, the Navy has provided unwavering support to the sea based leg of the nuclear triad. The coming year will build on this remarkable history. Later this year, the Navy will conduct the final demonstration and shakedown operation for an Ohio class ballistic missile submarine, demonstrating the unmatched reliability, of our sea based nuclear deterrent.
Alongside our partners in the UK, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Polaris Sales Agreement. In coordination with our colleagues at NNSA, W93/Mk7 program continues on schedule further demonstrating our commitment to responsible stewardship of the nuclear stockpile. As this work shows, we must continue to sustain today's deterrent while modernizing for the future.
The Navy continues to manage the nuclear strategic weapon system across three main mission priorities, sustaining the current weapon system D5LE through Ohio End of Life, developing the Strategic Weapon System of the future D5LE2 for the Columbia Class, and safeguarding our special relationship with the United Kingdom embodied in the Polaris Sales Agreement?
First and foremost, we must maintain the current D5LE missile inventory and provide the necessary operational support to sustain Ohio class submarines through the end of their life in the early 2040s. All of our life extension efforts remain on track and our current program will support -- the support the deployment of all existing warheads.
We must also recapitalize our supporting Navy nuclear deterrent mission infrastructure to support and sustain nuclear weapons and SSBN operations that enable sea based strategic deterrence. Secondly, we must continue to ensure the transition between Ohio class and Columbia class submarine stays on schedule for my command, SSP, this requires a seamless transition of the current Trident 2D5LE weapon system and missile inventory onto the new Columbia class ballistic missile submarine.
We have already started the work on the next variant of Trident and its corresponding weapon system. This next generation of D5LE missile, D5LE2, will continue to meet required missile performance while providing flexibility in the system to adapt to meet future warfighter requirements. D5LE2 will be necessary to outload the Columbia Class SSBNs starting with hole nine, ensuring that Trident remains credible until at least 2084. In order to achieve this requirement, we must design, develop, produce, and test this next generation Trident over the coming decade with the first flight test scheduled for 2023 -- or 2033. Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States has is its alliances and partnerships.
As the US project officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, I will continue to support the UK's sovereign deterrent for today's Vanguard class submarines and their successor, the Dreadnought Class. For decades, US policy had recognized that the independent British nuclear deterrent adds to NATO and indeed global stability.
Execution of these three mission priorities is only possible through investments in our people, our infrastructure and our industrial base. Our government and contractor teams are working hard to deliver a safe, secure and effective strategic weapon system that will ensure sea based strategic deterrence.
Nuclear modernization will take time to complete, so sustained resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely essential. Chairman, as you said, we can no longer put off recapitalizing the nuclear triad. Our strategic competitors are not idle. Ranking Member, As you said, Russia and China's nuclear arsenal is our nation's -- nation's biggest existential threat.
It is only through your continued support that the department's top modernization program priorities can be achieved and the Navy can deliver a reliable sea based strategic deterrent capability. As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent the men and women of SSP. I echo General Cotton's comments before this committee recently where he said I quote, our people are the foundation of every capability that enables strategic deterrence, end quote.
My number one priority is to ensure that they are poised to execute the mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor that is characterized our workforce since our program was founded in 1955. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the dedicated Americans that make deterrence a major power conflict, their life's work.
I look forward to your questions.
All right, thank you. And thanks to all of you for being here this morning, and we'll now start with our questions. Administrator Hruby on the topic of NNSA workforce in our office called you and I discussed earlier the trouble we're having recruiting and retaining enough specialized craft and trade workers across the country at locations like New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas.
The NNSA facilities in these states are critical for reconstituting plutonium pit production, assemble tritium packages, and modernizing our high explosive science capabilities. If recruiting is so hard, why can't we just pay potential workers more? Wouldn't that save money in the long run?
Yeah, thank you for that question. You're absolutely right of all of the issues that we have with construction and labor shortages are our biggest concern and the biggest cost driver, and to craft workers are a large part of that. We will look at all options for attracting more craft workers where for example, we're actively recruiting people who are coming off the civil nuclear power plant Vogtle to work at Savannah River, which is relatively nearby.
We're working with all the union shops. We have apprenticeship programs that we're funding and we will look at paying higher wages. So we'll -- we'll look at all of those options. We have now that we are tracking very closely our craft worker shortage, I think we can tailor the solutions in a more effective way.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you. On the Centennial delay, I want to ask several questions here, Secretary Plumb, I'll start with you. Um, from a policy point of view, recapitalizing the land based leg of the Triad with the Sentinel program is something this administration is completely committed to, isn't that correct?
Absolutely, sir.
Thank you, and Secretary Rosenblum as the witness from the Acquisition and Sustainment Office, is it correct to say the changes in the Sentinel schedule are the result of macroeconomic factors and that the need for the program remains unchanged?
Yes, that is true.
Okay, thank you, and General Bussiere, let's drill down into this just a little more. You're responsible for sustaining the current Minuteman III system. Do you agree that the need for the Sentinel program has not changed?
Chairman Lamborn, absolutely not, It hasn't changed. We -- we struggle with our current maintenance and sustainment of the Minuteman III. I mean it's a very old weapon system. In the last five years, we've had 2.5 million maintenance man hours, which is a 30 percent increase over the previous five years, and we're anticipating a 25 percent increase in the next five years.
So, the solution to that aging weapon system is the Sentinel.
And with some delays in the Sentinel, will these life extension programs that you've just articulated be enough to say that we have a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent in the meantime?
Yes, Chairman Lamborn, I would -- I would agree with that statement. So, I know you're going to get a lot more information from Honorable LaPlante tomorrow, but the -- the size, scope, and scale of the Sentinel deployment over as you know, a ten year period and the unique aspects of having to maintain full operational capability of the Minuteman III system until replaced by the Sentinel.
So, we'll have both systems as we transition over a essentially a decade, and the unique aspects of that is as we field Sentinel, we are going to harvest the parts that we can from Minuteman to maintain the Minuteman completely replaced.
Okay, thank you. Admiral Wolf, can you describe the need for a Second Life extension for the D5 missile and why production of additional DSLE missiles is not practical?
Yes, sir, thank you for the question. Yes, so if you look at where we're at with our industrial base, we have -- we have gone out of production on essentially every major component of the Trident D5 life extended missile. So that's the first issue, we've got to address obsolescence and life issues of the current system.
Additionally, as we start to feel Columbias and if you remember in my opening statement, I talked about the ninth hole of the Columbia class. The reason that is so important is because at that point the current inventory of Trident D5 life extension missiles that we've got, will not be sufficient to outfit from Columbia Hole nine and into the future for the remaining platforms, and then back fit where we need to get on the first date.
So, both of those are driving the need for us to have additional assets to light both life extend and provide those to Columbia for the future.
Okay, thank you. General Bussiere back to you. How are you preparing to field the Sentinel missile and what investments in equipment and personnel will be necessary to meet the planned deployment schedule?
Chairman Lamborn, there's a -- there's a lot of facets for fielding this weapon system. The first point I'd like to make is the -- the full operational capability is a unique part of any weapon system in the Air Force or in the department for that matter where you have to maintain full operational capability versus off ramp and on ramp typical of other weapon systems, so that's a unique aspect of it. It'll require increased manpower for that transitionary period.
It'll require our -- our operators, our maintainers, our defenders to have to maintain those two weapon systems. as we transition. It will -- it will take a great partnership between Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Materiel Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, our communities and partners, members of this committee as we -- we take on what's been reported as one of the largest work projects in the last 50 years for our nation.
All right, thank you, and while I've got you, can you update us on something that's come out in the news recently, and that is the possibility of a higher cancer findings with people that have been involved in these programs? What -- where do we stand on researching and getting to the bottom of that?
Thank you for asking that question Chairman Lamborn. It was -- it was illuminated in January from a member in Space Force that used to be serving in the Air Force as an ICBM operator at Malmstrom Air Force Base. And this member had been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and several of his colleagues that had served at Malmstrom about 15 to 18 years ago had also been diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
So, although there had been previous studies specific to Malmstrom, I asked the Air Force surgeon general and the chief and the secretary, if I could do a more comprehensive study that looked across all of our AFC's Air Force specialty codes that serve in the missile field operations, at all three of our bases to make sure we have a deep understanding if we're putting our airmen at risk, and if we are, we're going to mitigate it. So about two weeks ago, we started our efforts.
The first phase is to look at all the cancer registries in the Department of Defense as well as those that are available from the state level and see if we have higher incident rates within the areas that we do missile field operations. And if we do, then we're going to go down into the next level of the study to assess what is causal and then hopefully be able to mitigate it.
Do you have a timeline on how that long -- how long that's going to take?
We're anticipating getting the data out of the database is going to take anywhere from six to ten months, but we're not going to wait until that's done. If we find something, then we're going to drill down into that causal area
And please keep the subcommittee and full committee informed on that.
Absolutely chairman.
And lastly my last question will be, who can update us on -- we've talked about the other programs in more detail about the LRSO, who would like to give us a breakdown on where that's-- where that stands right now?
Yes, I can representative. The LRSO achieved milestone B in 2021, it remains on track. It's currently in the EMD phase, and I'll ask Administrator Hruby to provide detail with regards to the warhead for the LRSO, but the big takeaway is it remains on track.
Okay, Thank you. Representative Moulton?
Thank you Mr. Chairman. General Bussiere, you have detailed how tricky this transition is from Minuteman III to Sentinel, and how Minuteman III is aging quickly. So, how are we going to deal with this two year delay?
Ranking Member Moulton, I wouldn't necessarily characterize what was in the press as as equating to a two year delay. So, what I think the program office is doing very innovative is they've bundled the weapon system into kind of three different areas. So, there's the -- the missile itself, Then there's the command and control architecture or the launch facility and the -- the -- the, the construction, the Milken, and then there's the support equipment, and they've kind of bonded all that.
What I think the article kind of illuminated was potentially the macroeconomic impacts to the missile itself, as well as some workforce challenges the contractors having. But, what it doesn't illuminate is the success not only in organizing this large project the way this -- the project office has done it, but also the fact that they've moved certain things left of schedule and had great successes.
For example, recently with the stage one rocket. So, there's a very discrete challenge in the missile based on workforce and technology, but other facets of this program are actually moving left of schedule. I, right now, I am not, you know -- three years into a seven year developmental process of this program, I'm -- I have confidence that the program office and again I believe Dr. LaPlante will provide more illumination of this tomorrow, is able to take that program and where it needs to go.
Do you think there's anything more important for our national security as a nation that we are doing than -- than this -- this kind of program?
No, sir, I think, in my opinion, this is our nation's most important mission.
Okay. So if it's our most important mission, I hope there is a plan to not just limit further delays but to actually get us back on track. Because I would point out that the macroeconomic challenges that you describe the -- the troubles because of COVID, the supply chain issues because of COVID, worldwide COVID economic recession, those are all challenges that our adversaries have faced as well, and yet China is exceeding their schedule there -- they're getting ahead well, we're getting behind.
I mean, I like to think that we can outcompete China at everything, and yet here we are just trying to build a technology that fundamentally has existed for 60 years, and we're way behind, That's just at the macro level is fundamentally unacceptable. So I appreciate all the hard work you're doing. It's encouraging to hear that some things are left to schedule, but I think the goal has to be to 100 percent get this back on back on track.
Ranking member, well, I couldn't agree with you more and I -- I believe the Department and the Air Force has made this a priority, and I would absolutely love to see the nation make it a priority also not just department priority.
Well, I think the nation has made it a priority because taxpayers are funding this to the -- to 100 percent.
Yeah ranking member, and I wasn't referencing the funding stream I was referencing you know, great innovative minds and wanting to come and work in this business -- got it -- etc. where the nation are talented youth go, I want to go serve in that capacity to defend our nation.
Well, that's a very good point,
and we should -- we should continue that discussion. ASD Rosenblum, do you have anything to add to this?
Yeah, no, thank you very much, and I know you'll hear tomorrow from Dr. LePlante along with Chairman Lamborn. Just a few highlights with regards to this, this remains absolutely one of the Department's top priority, so that we have a sustainable ICBM leg. There have been a number of constructive recommendations that the Air Force has made to Dr. LaPlante by way of buying things and lead -- lead -- long lead items and a variety of different acquisition mechanisms that he has approved last night, he'll be able to detail those for you tomorrow.
The department has also used to full effect the Defense Production Act in giving the Sentinel program, the DX rating, which means with suppliers, it will be referenced and we are also working hard along with the Air Force, with regards to some of the workforce challenges, so it is really a combined OSD and Air Force effort to make sure that this program remains on track.
As of now, we believe we're still aiming for the threshold objective date of 2030, but it would be premature to let you know the degree to which these particular actions will move the schedule further to the left.
Okay, thank you very much. Dr. Plumb, what specific options is the administrator or -- the ministry -- is the administration considering to respond to Russia's suspension of news start?
Thanks for that question, Ranking Member Moulton. So just to lay the base work, on February 28th, as I testified last time, Russia passed its law and suspended -- declare they were suspending participation in New START and we have not received any daily notifications from them since that time. Just this week, which yes, that's yesterday, we had a further interaction with Russia, pressing them on the upcoming -- end of the month, there is do a semiannual data exchange every six months under the treaty, we exchange data on kind of high level numbers.
Russia responded that they will not be providing that information. And so, as a diplomatic countermeasure, the United States will not be providing that information back. We are going to continue to examine what other diplomatic countermeasures are appropriate. And what we're trying to do, sir, is balance both responding to Russia's irresponsible behavior, but to continue to demonstrate what we believe are responsible, nuclear powers action should be.
Okay, with respect to to China, there are a lot of analysts observers who think that China is not going to be willing to enter arms control discussions until they essentially reach parity with the United States. Is there any daylight there? Are there any places where we might be able to convince them to come to the negotiating table before that point?
I mean I think we should all hold out hope and we should continue to pursue. I do believe there are track two which is you know non governmental conversations that go on, but as far as track one, I'm not aware of any progress on that front.
Okay, this is something that the chairman and I have discussed is we -- we would like to see a real strategy here for how we're going to and even just imagine an arms control framework that encompasses dealing with two pure adversaries, and now I'm just asking how do we even start the discussion with China?
But, to -- to -- to think behind the scenes about how we get to this point where we have some trilateral arms control agreement, it's something that we should be thinking about today even before they're willing to come to the table. One final question for Administrator Hruby, your FY '24 budget request shows increasing costs schedule slips for many of the programs and projects that are key, as as you've detailed.
Will NNSA's enhanced mission delivery initiative outlined in the September '22 report allow the agency to recover schedule and cost overruns? And can you provide specific examples of how NNSA will hold contractors accountable for their performance, including cost control?
Yeah, thank you Congressman Moulton. The EMDI initiative stands for Enhanced Mission Delivery Initiative, it was aimed at making our enterprise more efficient across the board in many ways. With respect to construction projects and the delays associated with that, there's one specific recommendation that has to do with the inefficiencies involved in acquisition that we're working very hard.
That should save us weeks or months every year in the approvals between the people doing the work, the contractors doing the work, and the government. So it is specifically aimed at improving the schedules for the construction projects and all the efficiencies across the enterprise.
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. And by way of reminder upon every member here asking their questions in this open hearing will immediately go into recess for a brief time and reconvene up in 2337 in the skiff for everyone who has the appropriate clearance. Representative Wilson.
JOE WILSON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you for your service, and I'm really grateful. Chairman, Doug Lamborn was correct, concern Secretary Hruby about tritium production. I'll be getting to a question on that. And then it's really bipartisan As you see our hopes for all of you to succeed of the American people.
And in particular, I agree with Ranking member Seth Moulton that we've got a situation obviously with war criminal Putin, where he just this week has aside from murdering people in Ukraine. He's now threatening the security of the people of Belarus by placing nuclear capabilities there in that, should be sovereign country, which has been virtually annexed by Putin?
And then we have the Chinese Communist Party obviously making threats to Taiwan to America. And then it was disconcerting to me that the Chinese spy balloon could easily have been monitoring the Savannah River site as it traversed across North and South Carolina. And then with the regime in Tehran, the threats that they make their capabilities of developing ICBMs in the midst of anything else.
And -- and they have a goal, and it's the vaporization of Israel, the vaporization of the United States. And so as we have democracies the rule of gun facing the authoritarian rule of law -- by rule of gun and democracies rule of law. Again, I just want to thank you for what you're doing, and Secretary Hruby, I'm really grateful that the communities of South Carolina and Jason Georgia are extremely supportive of the plutoniumitt production mission at the Savannah River site.
And maintaining the enacted levels for this is necessary for nuclear deterrence. With that, sadly the NNSA will not be able to meet the requirement of producing 80 pits per year by 2030. How critical is it that we do everything we can to minimize the delay and reach the requirements as close to 2030 as possible?
Well, thank you, and -- and I appreciate the question and I definitely appreciate the support from the local communities in South Carolina. The pit production -- recreating the ability to make pets in the United States at the rate of about 80 per year starting in 2030 remains important. We also have known for a couple of years now that this -- the 2030 date was going to be complicated for us. The 80 pits -- were going to make 80 pits per year.
In fact, we're likely to make more than 80 pits per year because of the demand once we get up and running. But the time requirement is very difficult for us. And while we continue to try to do everything we can -- and we've made some important decisions, thanks to the support last year, the funding last year, we're doing some acceleration activities with pre buying equipment with doing demolition and the existing building that needs to be done before We can start new construction and some other site preparation work and training facility -- in high fidelity training facility.
So we're -- we're doing lots of things to try to accelerate progress. And most importantly is we're working with my colleagues here on the Nuclear Weapons Council to make sure that we have a credible plan to keep our our -- and then in this case its associated with the ground based ICBMs, to keep those systems, you know reliable at all times.
And so we have -- we're accelerating pit production and we're working closely to make sure our schedules stay aligned and that our nuclear deterrent is effective.
Thank you, and again, Chairman Lamborn is correct again, his concern about the tritium production, and this is so important because it makes nuclear weapons a thermonuclear weapon. It boosts the chain reaction inside the weapon and increases magnitude dramatically. The tritium finishing facility is being -- is replacing a part of the overall Savannah Riverside Tritium Enterprise, which was built in the 1950s And now it's been zeroed out and there's been $120 million already spent on this.
And it's unlike most radioactive elements, tritium decays very fast, and therefore, the stockpile must be replenished frequently. And so, what's being done, because the tritium finishing facility for funding in the future?
Yeah, thanks for that question. We did -- We have -- we did zero out so to speak, but we haven't canceled. We're delaying the tritium finishing facility for one reason, and one reason only is, so that we can concentrate on getting the Savannah River pit production facility as close to -- to be finish as close to 2030 as possible.
We have a significant craft labor shortage. If we have two big projects going on at once, we're going to have a bigger craft labor shortage. So we're delaying the training and finishing facility, we'll restart it, if you look at the fence up, we started in 2027 with construction expected to start again in 2029 as the -- as as as it fits into the overall construction plan with SRPPF. So we -- we -- we know the -- we -- we know we can maintain the current trading facility.
We will not -- we will have a tritium for our gas bottles. We're just trying to update that facility, make it more modern.
Thank you very much.
JOHN GARAMENDI:
I'm just trying to get my head around all the happy talk that I've heard. The fact of the matter is every single one of these systems are behind schedule and over budget, every single one of them. And the happy talk from each and every one of you doesn't get down to the detail. I'm going to delay my questions until we can get into a classified session, when we can get past the happy talk and get down to details.
For example, not one word about the cost of the infrastructure for the Sentinel. No information at all about what it's going to cost to build the infrastructure or when it would be completed. On pit production, good luck on south -- on the Savannah River. If there's ever a place that's delayed, and Joe, well, now that he's not here, I'll just unload.
It has never been on schedule for anything, and here you go again with another delay. With regard to the -- the Sentinel, delay, delay, delay, command and control, which is probably the most important, we just get happy talk, we don't get any detail. The Columbia -- oh, now we're going to have to -- We're going to have to refit the Ohio because the Columbia is delayed.
Pit production, at Los Alamos. Where is it? What is it? When will it be and at what cost? No information from any of you, but then this is public. I yield back my time. I'm going to go look forward to the classified.
Thank you, Representative Turner.
MICHAEL TURNER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to defend South Carolina for Joe Wilson in his absence. But the second thing is, is I want to say this is the first time I think I've been in a strategic forces subcommittee hearing where I can actually say I completely agree with everything Mr. Garamendi has just said because there's a lot of things that we disagree on, but I completely agree with him on our being behind and over budget and how critical this is.
You're going to ruin your reputation and mine.
Yeah, that's right. Well, we're good friends, so that -- that -- that helps that we can agree on this. So in the Intel committee just yesterday, we had a hot spots and Ms. Houlahan serves with me on the Intelligence Committee, on focusing on Russia and China and their -- their nuclear weapons, both deployed stockpiles and their research projects.
Of course, it's classified. I want to talk about classified things, we're going to have the opportunity later to talk about classified things. But there's a number of things that are not classified that General Admiral I want to discuss with you. The -- in general, you said for the first time we're going to be facing -- and it's not in your written testimony, but I want to highlight in your -- in your testimony that you read to us, you highlighted the fact that you know China is in the midst of strategic breakthroughs, rapid nuclear expansion and that Russia is doing the same, that our environment has changed.
So I want to focus on that with -- with the two of you. Would you both agree that in the aggregate that China and Russia are increasing there are a number of deployed nuclear weapons, their stockpiles that that both are increasing? General.
So Congressman, as it relates to Russia, if you believe what they stated they're going to comply with the New START treaty deployed operations.
That's just strategic, I'm talking about aggregate.
For non treaty accountable weapons they've expanded and diversified that portfolio. It's not accountable under any treaty program. The unclassified numbers are around 2000 and we can discuss other things in the closed hearing.
So back to My question, do you agree that China and Russia are increasing their aggregate deployed nuclear weapons in their stockpiles?
So that was Russia, as it relates to China, absolutely, They're rapidly diversifying, and modernizing, and deploying.
General, I really would like a yes here. -- Yes -- Thank you. Admiral, do you agree that China and Russia are increasing their aggregate deployed nuclear weapons and stockpiles? -- Yes -- Excellent. General Admiral. we signed the New START treaty in 2010. Russia, since that time period has announced Skyfall, which they tested in 2019 post New Start, Poseidon, their underwater, unmanned or torpedo, however, you want to refer to it, 2023, Avangard, their hypersonic weapon, and what we call Satan their -- their larger merged -- they could have up to 15 nuclear warheads.
All of those are since New START. The China is also developing a hypersonic nuclear weapon that would orbit the earth. They've tested it most recently. General Admiral in, in our plans for modernization, are we -- are we planning new nuclear weapons, new nuclear capabilities, or are we modernizing the capabilities we have.
Because these are new. Many people call these novel nuclear weapons, these are new capabilities. Do we have on the board any new capabilities?
Congressman, no.
Congressman, I agree with the general, I would say no, except for the fact that for the Navy, the W93/Mk7 will be a third variant of warhead that the Navy will deploy as we work within NNSA. Our focus in is on just modernizing what we have and Trident today.
So, Ms. Hruby, Dr. Plumb, we have I believe as a -- as a fallacy pursued the -- the view in policy that if we constrict if we go down in our numbers that others will follow. Clearly China and Russia are not following their -- their reaching new capabilities, their increasing their overall numbers. Why then when we get our nuclear posture review that there's no change other than the fact that you're recommending that we get rid of Silcom?
The -- why is it that in a period of expansion and as we look in the future, we're going to have expansion that there's no recommendation from this administration of a change in our nuclear posture.
So Congressman, first of all, thank you for the question. Second, I'll just say that under the current security environment, we -- so we see no need to change our nuclear force posture. But the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that we're going to continually review the security environment and make changes if required.
And so I don't want the concept that we're not changing right now to indicate that we aren't looking towards the future and constantly reevaluating and seeing what might not be done.
Do you have an answer also?
Yes, I would just concur with what Dr. Plumb has just articulated.
[Inaudible]
DONALD NORCROSS:
Thank you, Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here today. From the opening comments, both the chair and the ranking member along with many of the statements by our witnesses, we continue to talk about the challenges of the workforce, the craft worker in particular, and what we have heard is there are issues, delays narrowing of the projects when projects are going to be started because the workforce and the statement of risk of our industrial base, our workforce, our cyber.
But what I'm not hearing is, we know it's a problem. I'm not hearing any specifics on how we are addressing this. For the chairman to bring out why can't we pay them more is a rather simple question, but it goes right to the heart of it. What are we doing knowing that these projects are going to continue through the course of the next decade?
How are we addressing other than saying it's a problem? And let's go right down the line, would you please address what specifically are we doing to make sure we have the workforce, we can take care of the hardware, we can make sure that all the items that We need will be on the table, but if nobody is there to install it, that has the expertise, help me understand this.
Yeah, let me kick off. Representative, you've done a very nice job of articulating the challenge that's facing this country across the board where we no longer have a robust manufacturing workforce and it's something that our country needs to be recreating. Specifically at the Department of Defense, we are investing in the current workforce as well as developing under the Defense Production Act, a number of programs and projects that are designed to develop the workforce that we will need over the next 10 to 15 years.
Hold on just for one moment, so we get a better understand. We have the manufacturing and then we have the construction, two completely different worlds. But when you talk about Defense Act, it was recently put on for hypersonics, what programs do we have that that has been applied to and what does that do to increase?
So under the Industrial Base Analysis program, we have monies that are used in order to build programs, to train welders, to train mechanics, to train construction workers, everything that we are going to need across the nuclear modernization program, whether it be on the East Coast, in terms of our submarine force, working closely with the Navy with regards to that, as well as some of the other areas.
I'll leave it to Administrator Hruby to speak specifically to the NNSA complex. It's something that the department is investing in over the long term, recognizing that we will continue to these modernization programs over the next 10 to 15 years, and it is an area of focus for both Secretary Austin as well as our deputy Secretary in terms of having both the commercial and the organic workforce that we need.
Thank you, Administrator.
Yeah, thanks for this question. It's a -- it's a very important question and I appreciate your interest in it. The -- I want to start by saying we've taken a lot of actions in our science and technology workforce. We -- in FY '22, we instituted and distributed a mid-year pay increase to stop attrition, which was the highest we'd seen in the history of the complex.
We leaned into flexible benefits and pay adjustments for '23 as well and we're seeing our attrition come back to closer to normal rates. And we all have to continue to watch that because without that workforce there is nothing to construct or -- right. So we're looking at that. We've taken lots of action.
Now we've also started apprenticeship -- apprenticeship programs for our craft workers. We're working with the communities near the -- near the -- in the areas near our plants. But we haven't -- I mean, I'll say we need to be broader about pay increases. I mean, we -- we do try to be good stewards of taxpayers dollars, so we have to make sure that's going to work before we just willy nilly do it. But we will look at everything.
This is an issue we recognize as an issue. We thought we would recover, but we have a shortage of workers and honestly the productivity of workers is not where it has been historically, where it's in a new space that we're tracking as closely as possible, and we appreciate your support and interest, and we're -- we're equally interested.
Chairman, again thank you for bringing this up and as I leave, I'm going over to Education Labor to have the hearing on unleashing our hiring, which will be rather short, but -- I see a connection there -- could be. I yield back.
Very good. Representative Bacon.
DON BACON:
Thank you, Chairman. Thank you everybody for being here today. I appreciate your leadership and your dedication to our country. One of the main of two objectives I have in the armed services this Congress is to ensure that we can have a 100 percent reliable nuclear command and control survivability. We used -- I think we used to have it, but I'm not so sure we have it today.
You know we had a 24 seven airborne I command control operations for three decades ended in 1990, and after the communist government fell in Moscow, after the Berlin Wall fell, we rightfully thought, hey, the world is a safer place. We stopped those 24 seven airborne operations with a general on board to take control if need be. Then in 1998, we deactivated the EC-135 that had the looking glass mission.
We transitioned it to the E6s and the Navy, but today there's not enough E6 aircraft to fly extended 24 seven airborne operations. We used to have three, five minute warning time when it comes to ICBMs perhaps less with subs if they were closer to our coast. But today, with hypersonic weapons with nuclear weapons on them, we're talking 15 minutes or less.
If certain flight profiles are used, maybe no warning if space weapons are used, no warning. I think we are back to the future, and I think we need to seriously consider, do we need to go back to 24 seven command and control airborne or ground away from off away from the Pentagon and away from the White House.
So that we could have 100 percent assurance that we can respond to a first strike. And it's not really about us having that assurance, it's about the Russians and Chinese having that assurance we have deterrence. So my question is really to Mr. Rosenblum and a General Bussiere, if we funded a big enough fleet for 24 seven operations with a new platform, Would that not improve our command and control survivability?
And should that not be a requirement coming from DOD?
Thank you. Let me make a few remarks and then turn to General Bussiere. As Dr. Plumb, my colleague articulated this was something that was looked at in terms of NC3 as part of the Nuclear Posture Review and the decision was taken that there was not a need to make a change to the -- the posture nor to the alert status.
That said, we are very actively engaged in an upgrade and a modernization on the NC3 systems that we have and STRATCOM, which is the enterprise owner as you're well aware, of that is working very actively with both the Air Force and the Navy on that modernization upgrade?
If I may interject, I'll turn to the General. I used to be the general on board of the Looking Glass mission. I'm not convinced we can respond within 15 minute warning time and that scares me. I think that's unacceptable in my view and I'm going to do everything we can to get this fixed. John Bussiere. Thank you.
Congressman thank you for the question. The only thing I'll add to what Honorable Rosenblum said was I know General Cotton and STRATCOM are evaluating all the different facets of command and control. As you know, there are different avenues by which we can perform that mission. One of them is in the air domain.
And as you know, probably better than most that that mission was aggregated into the E6B years ago. If the decision is made to field another capability in the aerial layer, the only analysis will have to do in addition to just the command and control procedures, is the analysis on the increased manpower required and the training to be able to do that mission.
I think this is something Congress would fund to ensure that we get this 100 percent assurance. And I do hear a lot about a study and we're looking at it. I don't -- I think time is of the essence. We have Russia invading Ukraine, moving nuclear weapons into Russia. They've already shown the propensity that they will attack if they think they can get away with it, Right.
Makes might or -- might makes right in their -- in their mind. And so I -- I think we need to communicate to them that there is no way that they can catch us off guard and I think it's imperative for the safety of our country. One last question for you General if I may. The Navy is transitioning the E6 -- E6 for its tactical mission to the 130s. What does that portend for the looking Glass mission?
Or maybe I should ask the admiral, I don't know what whoever's best on this one?
Congress again, as the Navy transitions to their new platform for the Tacoma mission, the Looking Glass mission will be performed based on what General Cotton decides is the best platform for that. That may or may not be in the area later.
Okay , just let you know, we'll be pushing this. I think time is of the essence. We can't have years of discussions and analysis and treading water. I think we got to push forward. Thank you. I yield back.
Thank you, representative. Thank you for articulating that important issue, and for your information and for everyone on the subcommittee, we are going to have a briefing on NC3 to bring us up to speed hopefully on April 19th at 4 pm -- Great. Thank you. -- Thank you. Representative Carbajal.
SALUD CARBAJAL:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Hruby, in September of 2022, the GAO, assessed the NNSA's nuclear weapons, cybersecurity practices and found quote, the NSA and its contractors have not fully implemented six foundational cybersecurity risk practices. Based on the findings, the GAO recommended nine actions that the NNSA could implement to protect cybersecurity threats.
In November 2022, the NNSA agreed with each of the nine recommendations. Can you provide a status on the implementation of these recommendations and how the FY '24 budget addresses these shortfalls? The thought of our nuclear weapon systems being vulnerable to a cyber threat is pretty terrifying.
Yeah, thanks for that question. The -- what you'll see in the FY '24 budget for our IT and cyber infrastructure programs is a 30 percent increase over the 2023 enacted, I may have said, 2324 budget. In addition, there's a almost 40 percent increase in a program we call Nuclear Enterprise Assurance, which is the cyber associated -- the cyber and other sabotage associated with the weapons program.
So we've increased both of those programs substantially in FY '24. This is a -- this is a threat that we take very seriously, how we deal with cyber in the enterprise, our IT systems, and frankly it was ignored. I also just want to say with respect to that GAO report, it did mention a number of good things that NNSA has done and progress, but we -- we like, like you said, we agree with all the recommendations and we're working hard on it. Thanks.
It sounds like it was a bandwidth issue because you don't have enough resources.
Yeah, and we appreciate the -- actually the government has authorized pay increase for people in these fields in the cyber fields, which will help us attract and retain federal employees and the cyber area which we really need to do.
Thank you. General Bussiere and Admiral Wolfe, what are you doing to ensure your programs are protected from a cyber threat?
So from an Air Force perspective, Congressman, 16th Air Force kind of runs our cybersecurity really as a supportive component to both STRATCOM and obviously as the Air Force Global Strike Commands the air component to STRATCOM. So we have a dedicated number of Air Force that does that for us as well as individual airmen that maintain our networks.
Admiral Wolfe.
Yes, sir. So -- so for our program, everything that we do, cyber is an integral part of the design development. It's an integral part of how we -- how we test things. We also do other types of testing And I'll just leave it at that. As a matter of fact, we just took Secretary Rosenblum over the past year.
She actually went and looked at our program and how we do a lot of the cyber security aspects of what we do in Trident. So it's not just what we do internal, but it's what the department does as well to oversee to make sure that we're doing all of the right things, not just now, but as we look into the future.
Thank you, General Bussiere, I received notification recently that the Air Force canceled the Sentinel Reentry Vehicle facility that was intended to be built at Vandenberg Space Force Base, which is in my district due to requirement uncertainty. We were told the cancellation and delay won't impact the first test flight of -- flight test for the Sentinel program.
What can you tell me, will it have an impact on the overall readiness of the Sentinel program? If so, what are you doing to minimize the impact of this delayed construction?
Congressman, I have to take that one for the record. My understanding we just slipped it didn't cancel it because of the need date, but I will -- I will take that for the record and get back to you.
I understand it was canceled, so then I was going to ask you what can we do with $48 million at Vandenberg Space Force Base to prepare for the construction of this facility, but I'll let you answer that later. Ms. Hruby, it is my understanding that the NNSA's has great success with the minority serving institution partnership program.
Can you please give us more information on this effort, how successful it's been to recruit, hire and retain a talented workforce? How is this program executing compared to other initiatives across the agency?
Yeah, we're very excited about the Minority Serving Institution Partnerships program. It has two elements to it, it has grants to minority, minority serving institutions. And we're working -- we have a lot of programs across the full spectrum of the kind of workforce we need through that program, and we also have a -- howsuccessful is it -- it -- well we've hired a lot of those people, so I consider that one marker of success.
I've met a lot of these -- the students working in this program and they're amazing. So we -- we've expanded that program year over year. We have an intention to expand it again and it's -- it's getting us a workforce of the future.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Representative Houlahan.
CHRISSY HOULAHAN:
Salud, you took one of my questions and then you're leaving. No fair. It's really nice to be here with you guys. I want to talk a little bit about what a lot of other folks have also brought up, which is workforce issues. I know that we focused a little bit on welders and other sort of manufacturing and craft jobs.
I want to talk more though about things like cyber or engineering or any of those other kinds of billets that may or may not be filled. Now, I would like to start with you Ms. Hruby, Administrator Hruby, to talk about what kind of these 90 FTEs that are in your fiscal year 2024 budget. What kind of people are they -- equivalents are they?
I think you're referring to the federal workforce? Okay, thanks -- thanks and we -- I really appreciate the question because we haven't had a chance to talk about the federal workforce yet. And in NNSA, we have experienced the and greater than average attrition quite a lot actually in the 0 to 5 year experience range.
So we're trying to explore ways to address that student loans,
But are they people with four year degrees? Like what kind of requirements are they?
Well, they're at least four year degrees. Yeah, This is a professional workforce, this workforce that we're talking about. And our workforce has -- our federal workforce has expanded far less than the our programs.
And when we're talking about the people with professional experience or four year workforce or 0 to 5 years and then you also listed at the beginning of your testimony, the places where you're looking for them to work, could you list them again? Geographic places.
Oh, the geographic places, yeah. Well, we have labs in New Mexico and California and we have production plants in Kansas City, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. And we have the -- the nuclear test site in Nevada.
So, I guess what I'm trying to understand is we're in an environment now post-COVID where a lot of people with these kinds of skills and backgrounds are given opportunities for much, much more flexible working capabilities than what you're describing is. We're also talking about people who are increasingly with spouses or partners who also have careers of their own who want to make sure that they can find places to -- to land and to work.
Is there a world where we can be not just paying more potentially, but also more flexible in what it is that we're allowing people to do and where we're allowing it -- to where we are allowing them to do it physically from?
Yeah, thanks for this question. I love this question. We do have a large remote workforce now and we're trying to do that at all levels, managers to make it easier, also for staff to see how it's done. I would say this has -- this has greatly may -- is greatly helped us, but we do have a lot of jobs that are classified and we do have a lot of jobs that are production that you have to be, you know, in the right facility on the floor.
But we are leaning in as hard as we can to the flexibility and the workforce for the parts of the workforce that we can do that.
Are there any authorizations or authorities or anything else that you all collectively need from us to be able to allow for a more flexible working environment? When you're talking about classified environments as an example, is there a way for people to -- I know when I go home to my community, I can access a Skiff in my community if I need to, is there a way to be more adaptive -- adaptive in that area that we can be helpful with?
That's a great question. I will look at that. I used Skiffs all over the world and certainly all over the United States and so do many others in our workforce. But I would like to get back with you as to whether or not there's anything else we can do there. I appreciate the question.
Anybody else with my remaining 40 seconds that has anything that I -- that our collective body can be doing to be helpful in stimulating the working workforce.
I'd just like to chime in and I think many of the members have said it today. I think it's getting today's workforce to understand how critical it is, what these missions that we're doing right here are for our national defense and for the protection of allies and partners. This is hard work and it takes a lot of dedicated folks to do that.
It's not always glamorous, but it does underpin everything that this nation and our allies count on, So helping us get that word out.
I 100 percent agree. The reason why I am asking this question, indulge me for a couple of seconds is I served in there early -- the late 80s and early 90s. I was in the Hanscom Air Force Base Boston area. I was married to a gentleman and still am who couldn't necessarily find a job in the middle of somewhere else.
And so I want to make sure that we're being thoughtful. I'm a patriot. I'm sure many people are patriots as well who want to work on these really important programs. We just have to find them where they are and they're not always in the places we're looking. Thank you. I yield back.
All right, thank you. We will now go into an immediate recess and reconvene in 2337 upstairs in five minutes.
Johnny R. Wolfe
28 March 2023
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